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Introduction 
From Machinic to Technics (and back again) 
_________________________ 
 
 
 
1. The Instance of Emergence 
 
This book deals with technics. By the term technics I want to express a pre-
cise, albeit somewhat abstract idea that will bear on how one thinks about 
technology, technique, and machines. The concept of technics not only has 
implications for how one conceptualizes technology. It opens the possibility 
of positioning elements of technology within politics and literature. Tech-
nics can be seen as the outcome of a renegotiation of ontological differ-
ence: it is an attempt at tracing back technological elements to their multi-
ple, differential ontological core. First of all, in order to understand the con-
cept of technics it must be distinguished from technology. As a concept 
bearing on politics, literature, and ontology (including metaphysics), tech-
nics does not simply refer to a technology or to a technological artifact. 
Unlike an artifact, technics is not and can never become a thing. A thing in-
dicates a material unity which, while not necessarily an object that is con-
ceptually present,1 is embedded within a repetitive pattern of everyday use. 
                                                 
1 For a philosophical investigation of the thing (in its relation to nature 
and technics, and in distinction to ‘objects’), see Martin Heidegger, Poetry, 
Language, Thought (Harper & Row: New York 1971), 166-167: ‘The jug is 
a thing. What is the jug? We say: a vessel, something of the kind that 
holds something else within it. […] As a vessel the jug is something self-
sustained, something that stands on its own. This standing on its own 
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In contrast, technics is a relational concept that cannot be pinpointed as an 
object, thing, or artifact. Instead of indicating a unity, technics is a veritable 
‘in-between,’ it is at work in between things, constituting interrelations be-
tween things, or artifacts. However, insofar as technics is what establishes 
interrelations between things, it is also, in the same move and at various 
moments in their construction, the emergence of an unquenchable multi-
plication and dispersal in which no-thing can hold together. In this sense, 
technics becomes multiplicity itself. It is for these reasons that technics can-
not be conceptualized by focusing on technical things or artifacts.  
In his introduction to a seminar on Heraclitus, which he taught with 
Martin Heidegger, Eugene Fink gives the following circumscription of a 
thing in its relation to technics (Technik): 
  
On the one hand we take the concept of thing in a wider 
sense, and then we mean all that is. On the other hand, 
we also use it in a narrower sense. If we mean things in 
the narrower sense, then we can distinguish between 
such things as are from nature […] and such that are 
products of human technics […].2 
 
Fink does not just distinguish between two different kinds of things here. 
Instead, he makes a distinction between technically created things and 
natural things. In the first chapter of this study, I will attempt to bypass the 
difference between technics and nature by deconstructing the concept of 
thing. To this end, I introduce a novel concept of technics that cannot be 
enclosed within the existing conceptual categories of object or artifact, 
                                                                                                              
characterizes the jug as something that is self-supporting, or independ-
ent. As the self-supporting independence of something independent, the 
jug differs from an object. An independent, self-supporting thing may 
become an object if we place it before us, whether in immediate percep-
tion or by bringing it to mind in a collective re-presentation. However, the 
thingly character of the thing does not consist in being a represented ob-
ject, nor can it be defined in any way in terms of the objectness, the over-
againstness, of the object.’ 
2 Eugene Fink and Martin Heidegger, Heraclitus  Seminar (Northwestern 
University Press: Evanston 1993), 4. 
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technology or technique. This involves theorizing technics not so much as 
an object (or as a quality belonging to an object), but rather as interrela-
tions between a myriad of heterogeneous elements, as a multiplicity of in-
terweaving forces that slowly consolidate into more structural – or, as will 
become clear below, machinic - functions. Above all, I am deploying this 
idea of technics as a means to counter the assumption that technics can be 
reduced to the way it can be readily discerned in literature, politics, or in sys-
tems of writing and representative (political) institutions in general.3 Al-
though technics forms part of a system of writing, and takes part in political 
institutionalization, what I hope to explain in this study is that in order to 
effectively account for the ‘techno-logics’ at work in a system of writing, or 
in a mode of institutional-political representation, it must be encapsulated 
in a broader framework – that is, in a theory of technics. In order to open up 
its potential, technics must be conceived as emerging in multiplicity and as 
always relational. 
The emergence of technics should not be seen as the beginning of 
something, as the beginning of things, issues, or constellations (political, 
literary, metaphysical or otherwise). Technics decomposes the idea of a sin-
gle origin by already starting out from a multiplicity: its beginning already 
lies beyond any form of origin or originality. It has always already begun. 
Whilst technics figures as the instance of emergence, in the sense that it 
allows technologies and techniques to emerge and consolidate, it is not a 
beginning as such. In this introduction, I will explain how technics functions 
as an instance of emergence by studying the concept of an ‘economy of 
forces,’ which figures prominently in the works of Jacques Derrida and Gilles 
Deleuze (among others) and takes on a central role in this book. The con-
cept of an economy of forces will explain the transition from technics to 
machine (and back again) that I see at work in literature, politics, and meta-
physics. I will explain what I understand by ‘machine’ with reference to the 
concept of ‘abstract machine,’ developed Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. 
In the last section of this introduction, I explain how the machine is related 
to language and literature.  
 
 
                                                 
3 See Friedrich Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800 / 1900 (Stanford Univer-
sity Press: Stanford 1991). 
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2. From Economy to Machine 
 
The term economy is often used rather vaguely in the humanities. It is used 
in a loose fashion to designate a more or less rigid structure or order.4 In this 
book, I will rely on a specific use of the word economy, but I will nonethe-
less endeavor to give it a more precise meaning. At various moments 
throughout this book I refer to a play of singularities that is essential to 
technics. Such a play of singularities or forces is shot through with just as 
many irregularities as regularities. The structures through which these sin-
gular forces are played out against each other are still radically open and 
underdetermined. It is impossible to speak of distinctions or oppositions at 
this point, with regard to the play of forces that is instigated by technics. 
Oppositional schemas already belong to the machine, to the function of a 
metaphysical machine.5 For this reason, it makes more sense to speak of 
singularities within an economy of forces: such singularities cannot be re-
cuperated within an oppositional structural schema, which divides them 
into categories of original or unoriginal, natural or technical, etcetera. Thus, 
the singular play of forces interwoven in technics displays a difference that 
is not oppositional, but rather, following Deleuze, a difference of intensity. 
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze writes: ‘Everything which happens and 
everything which appears is correlated with orders of differences of levels, 
temperature, pressure, tension, potential, differences of intensity.’6 The or-
ders of differences avoid becoming oppositional differences. At the level of 
intensities, the forces that interweave in technics construct multiple interre-
lations that have not yet become oppositional. Yet the moment inevitably 
comes when these forces start to form more consolidated interrelations, 
and it is at this point that they can go on to form oppositional schemas. As I 
already suggested briefly at the beginning of this introduction, the moment 
in which these forces start to correlate on a structural level is the instance of 
emergence, the moment when the free play of forces begins to take on a 
more or less regulated structure. It is at this point that the conceptual use of 
                                                 
4 See Nicole Bracker and Stefan Herbrechter (eds.), Metaphors of Economy 
(Rodopi: Amsterdam / New York 2005). 
5 On metaphysical machines, see Chapter 1. 
6 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (Continuum: London / New 
York 2004) 280. 
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the word economy within the humanities becomes relevant for my project 
on technics. Steven Connor describes the way that the concept of ‘econ-
omy’ is use in the humanities: 
 
an economy is a dynamic structure, which allows and 
obliges the critic not only to order and distribute the ele-
ments of his field of study in inert relationships of 
equivalences and distinctions, but also to show the proc-
esses of exchange, circulation and interested negotiation 
which bring these relationships dynamically into being. 
The metaphor of economy may allow one, therefore, to 
escape some of the closure or seductiveness of the meta-
phor of structure.7  
 
The use of ‘economy,’ as Connor indicates, enables one to sketch a dynamic 
process. It becomes possible to see how the process of circulation can be 
grounded without conceiving of the relationship of exchange itself as static 
or inert. In this sense, the concept of economy allows me to create a middle 
passage between the absolutely chaotic, or unordered, on the one hand, 
and an absolutely rigid, mechanized structure, on the other. It can desig-
nate precisely the moment of passage from technics – as an absolutely free 
interplay of singular forces that escape any oppositional categorization – to 
a machinic function that operates with oppositional schemas. At the same 
time, it can account for transitions in which machines are broken down 
again and opened up by technics. In order to conceptualize these transi-
tions, it is necessary to analyze the relation between the free play of forces 
and the forceful ordering of these forces in a structural intertwinement. The 
concept of economy can be used to capture the singular moment of transi-
tion from technics to machine. The sense of an economy that traces these 
emerging differences, which are not yet oppositional, lies in between ‘an 
energetics of pure shapeless force’8 and a completely rigid machinic regula-
                                                 
7 Steven Connor, Theory and Cultural Value (Blackwell Publishers: Oxford 
1992), 57-8. 
8 Jacques Derrida, “Force and Signification,” in Writing and Difference 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul: London / New York 1978), 19. For a solid 
account of the relation between form, force, and economy in the work of 
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tion of force and difference. Instead, such an economy mediates and organ-
izes in between and in relation to force and form.  
 The economy of forces by which a machine operates already indi-
cates a difference between technics and the machine. Whereas technics is 
the free play of forces, the machine begins to emerge as soon as these 
forces become consolidated in oppositional schemas. From this point of 
view, it is unclear what precisely the difference is between a consolidated 
economy of forces and the machine itself. I will therefore try to give a more 
concrete outline of the machine. Without running ahead of issues that will 
be addressed and explained in the course of this study, a few remarks on 
how the machine operates will help to introduce the argument to be devel-
oped in the following chapters. Rather than attempting to provide an ex-
haustive definition of the machine, I will first give a general outline. Then, I 
will discuss a few related ideas about the ’abstract machine’ in the work of 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. The concept of the ‘abstract machine’ 
plays an important yet often implicit role in this study, so I will take the op-
portunity here to sketch the differences and alliances between Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept and my own. 
The concept of the machine that I develop in this book is to a large 
extent based on a study and critique of Derrida’s work on metaphysics, and 
in particular, his thinking of différance. However, to work on the concept of 
the machine in the context of Poststructuralist philosophy means to pass 
through the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. In A Thousand Pla-
teaus, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, and elsewhere, they have developed 
their concept of ‘machinic assemblage’ and ‘abstract machine.’9 My own 
                                                                                                              
Derrida, see the first two chapters of Christopher Johnson, System and 
Writing in the Philosophy of Jacques Derrida. (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge 1993). See also Joost de Bloois, L’économie générale: Derrida 
sur les traces de Bataille (Doctoral dissertation at the University of Utrecht, 
The Netherlands, 2003).  
9 For a systematic account of the concept of machine in the work of Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, see Alistair Welchman, “Machinic Thinking,” in 
Garry Genesko (ed.), Deleuze and Guattari. Critical Assessments of 
Leading Philosophers (Routledge: London / New York 2001), 1233-50; 
see also Marcel Swiboda, “Engineering Ethical Connections: (Re-
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concept of machine is indebted to theirs, but also digresses from it regard-
ing several issues. Before speaking of the machinic assemblage Deleuze and 
Guattari first draw an important distinction between the assemblage and 
abstract machine. In order to grasp what Deleuze and Guattari mean by the 
abstract machine, then, it needs to be distinguished from an assemblage. In 
Deleuze and the Political, Paul Patton explains in what ways these two differ 
by drawing on the Deleuze’s distinction between the virtual and the actual. 
This indicates that the difference between abstract machine and assem-
blage is not merely formal, in the sense that it is not a difference between 
two different forms of machine or construction. In so far as it is a difference 
between the virtual and the actual it is a difference between two different 
kinds of realities. The position of the abstract machine is virtual whereas the 
position of the assemblage is actual. This gives the abstract machine a deci-
sive position in relation to the assemblage. Patton explains this as follows: 
 
While assemblages are more or less concrete arrange-
ments of things, their mode of functioning cannot be un-
derstood independently of the virtual or abstract machine 
which they embody.10  
 
The assemblage is understood as an embodiment, or an actualization of the 
virtual abstract machine. Whereas an assemblage is an actualized, formed 
constellation which structures everything that takes place in it, an abstract 
machine is indeterminate in the sense that it does not have any concrete, 
consolidated, actual existence. An abstract machine delineates ‘functions’ 
that will afterwards be actualized by the assemblage. Form and content 
come into existence together with the assemblage. Deleuze and Guattari 
argue that the abstract machine has no form or content (as these appear 
only with the assemblage), only function. In A User’s Guide to Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, Brian Massumi explains that Deleuze and Guattari under-
stand a function as something that is undetermined:  
 
                                                                                                              
)Conceptualizing The Machines of Deleuze and Guattari,” Parallax, volume 
10 / n° 3, 2004, 113-19.   
10 Paul Patton, Deleuze and the Political (Routledge: London / New York 
2000), 44. 
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Function with no form or substance to confine it would be 
a continually changing, turbulent pool of matter-energy. 
The abstract machine in its virtuality would be indetermi-
nate in position and velocity, outside a space of relatively 
stable matter and quantifiable energy.11 
 
In this study, both ‘function’ and ‘machine’ will be understood differently 
from Deleuze and Guattari’s abstract machine. By ‘function’ – or rather, ma-
chinic function – I understand a consolidated connection that assures de-
termination and teleology within a given constellation of interlaced ele-
ments. Its determination is not dependent upon a relatively stable space. 
Instead, the machinic, as I understand it, assures the stabilization of space.  
The first and second chapters of this book argue that a metaphysi-
cal machine organizes space and time, turning them into a relatively stable 
ground. This organization is performed by machinic functions that, in turn, 
originate in the economy of forces set up by technics. In the first chapter, 
my argument is developed in discussion with Derrida’s différance. As Der-
rida pointed out on the occasion of Deleuze’s death, there was between 
Deleuze and himself  
 
a nearly total affinity concerning the “theses,” if we can 
use this word, across very obvious distances, in what I 
would call – lacking any better term – the “gesture,” the 
”strategy,” the ”manner” of writing, of speaking, of read-
ing perhaps.12 
 
The affinity between Derrida and Deleuze has to do with their mutual 
commitment to work out a notion of différance as a play of forces. For both 
Deleuze and Derrida, such a play of forces must be thought as non-
oppositional. Hence, Deleuze speaks of difference in intensity rather than 
difference in quality.13 However, the difference between them is not only 
                                                 
11 Brian Massumi, A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia (M..I.T. 
Press: Cambridge Ma 1992), 170. 
12 Jacques Derrida, “I’m Going to Have to Wander All Alone,” in The Work 
of Mourning (Chicago University Press: Chicago 2001), 192. 
13 See Deleuze, Bergsonism (Zone Books: New York 2001), 20-21. 
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located in the gesture or strategy that Derrida mentions. The distance be-
tween Deleuze and Derrida is spelled out in their respective articulations of 
ontological problems: for Derrida, différance is neither virtual nor actual; 
whilst for Deleuze, the virtual is not governed by différance.  
This distance brings me to a concept of the machine that, whilst in-
spired by Deleuze and Guattari, differs from their concept of the machine to 
a considerable degree. In my work the machine is understood as that which 
brings order within an otherwise chaotic free play of forces. The machine, 
then, is what follows from an economy of forces. A machine starts to take 
form at the moment these forces begin to function in a more or less calcu-
lable economy. A machinic function is what orders the economy of forces, 
thus turning it into a machine. It is a consolidated interlacement of ele-
ments, made up by machinic functions. The possibility of forming a ma-
chine derives from technics, since technics defines the possibility for forces 
to interlace, to consolidate, and to become machinic. At any moment, 
therefore, technics can interrupt the machine. This possibility for interrup-
tion is examined in the first chapter; and the tendency of the machine to 
close off possibilities for interruption is examined in the second chapter. 
In this study, I argue that the machine ultimately relies on technics. 
Technics is thus, in a sense, more fundamental than the machine. Deleuze 
and Guattari, on the contrary, bring their abstract machine into relation 
with assemblages. In their account, it is the abstract machine that is more 
profound than the assemblage. According to Deleuze and Guattari, there is 
something ‘more profound’ within the assemblage.14 This is the abstract 
machine, ‘which constitutes and conjugates all of the assemblage’s cutting 
edge of deterritorialization.’15 The abstract machine is responsible for draw-
ing up the plane of consistency upon which all assemblages will be based.16 
The assemblages territorialize and stratify. The abstract machine, however, 
                                                 
14 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (Continuum: 
London 2003), 155. 
15 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 155. 
16 My use of certain of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts, such as ‘plane of 
consistency,’ or ‘(de)territorialization,’ which have no immediate relevance 
to the stakes of this introduction, remain necessarily cursory. For a 
profound investigation into the meaning and use of these concepts, see 
Brian Massumi, A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
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articulates the virtual plane that will allow for stratifications. ‘The abstract 
machine in itself is destratified, deterritorialized.’17 This would not be possi-
ble if the abstract machine were not virtual. That it is virtual does not mean 
that the abstract machine is not real, only that it ‘constructs a real that is yet 
to come, a new type of reality.’18 So whilst the virtual is real, its reality is one 
that is constantly to come, rather than one that is simply given. In his earlier 
work, Difference and Repetition, Deleuze explains the relation between the 
virtual and the real more fully:  
 
We opposed the virtual and the real: although it could not 
have been more precise before now, this terminology 
must be corrected. The virtual is opposed not to the real 
but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is 
virtual. […] Indeed, the virtual must be defined as strictly 
a part of the real object – as though the object had one 
part of itself in the virtual into which it plunged as though 
into an objective dimension. […] The reality of the virtual 
is structure.19  
 
The abstract machine does not determine reality, which will only be properly 
embodied in assemblages, but it does make it possible by giving it struc-
ture. In this sense it constructs reality by opening it up to actualization. 
However, working from within the assemblages and strata that are built on 
the plane of consistency the abstract machine also unhinges these assem-
blages, ‘constantly setting things loose.’20 An abstract machine defines the 
functions that an assemblage can fill in with form and content. For Deleuze 
and Guattari, a machine and the functions it installs are therefore strictly 
virtual or abstract, whilst the assemblage operates at the level of the actual. 
This distinction between the actuality of the assemblage and the virtuality 
of the abstract machine indicates the difference between the abstract ma-
chine and my own understanding of machinic functioning. A machinic 
functioning operate neither at the level of the virtual, nor at the level of the 
                                                 
17 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 156. 
18 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 157. 
19 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 260.  
20 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 159. 
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actual. Instead, it makes the transition from a free play of forces to a stable 
economy, thus securing the transitory passage from technics to machine.  
Drawing on an analogy drawn by Paul Patton in his lucid explana-
tion of the virtuality of an abstract machine, I now want to examine the rela-
tion between machinic function and a more concrete conception of ma-
chines such as automobiles or computers. Patton explains that 
 
abstract machines are virtual machines in the same sense 
as the software program which turns a given assemblage 
of computer hardware into a certain kind of technical ma-
chine (a calculating machine, a drawing machine, etc.).21  
 
In this analogy, the software program takes on the role of the abstract ma-
chine, and the concrete, technical machine - or the hardware of a computer 
- is on the side of the assemblage. Just as the assemblage is determined by 
the virtual order of the abstract machine, so the software program deter-
mines the technical machine by turning it into a calculating machine or a 
drawing machine. This implies that the virtual abstract machine draws con-
nections from one assemblage to another in much the same way as a word-
processing software program transforms the hardware of a computer into a 
visual typing machine. However, there is a hitch when it comes to conceiv-
ing of hardware as the actual that is firmly opposed to the software, or the 
virtual. The argument can be made that hardware determines software just 
as much as software determines hardware. Whilst Patton’s analogy holds, 
his definition of a technical machine as the outcome of software is incom-
plete. Patton’s definition omits something that complicates the analogy 
considerably: although software can effectively turn a computer into a 
typewriter or a calculating machine, a computer still depends on a hardware 
driver that allows for software programs to run their codes. The point is that 
hardware itself is more open and more general than actual software, since it 
is the latter that gives the computer its destination as a word processor, or 
as a visual workstation on which one can edit photos. In that sense software 
still depends on hardware, however much it may have superseded it in 
terms of complexity. As Friedrich Kittler points out, even if today a com-
                                                 
21 Patton, Deleuze and the Political, 44-5. 
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puter’s operating program is reduced (or alleviated) to the status of a soft-
ware program, the fact remains that   
 
no underlying microprocessor system could ever start 
without the rather incredible autobooting faculty of some 
elementary functions that, for safety's sake, are burned 
into silicon and thus form part of the hardware.22  
 
A computer is a layering of software codes over software codes, but starts 
off from the Basic Input Output System (BIOS), which is hardware driven. 
The history of the computer is, admittedly, the history of the obfuscation of 
hardware by the increasing complexity of software design. Consequently, 
computer design has undergone an ‘implosion of hardware by the explo-
sion of software,’ by which ‘eventual differences between hardware imple-
mentations do not count anymore.’23 The software of Deleuze’s virtual ma-
chine lays out the structures of the reality that subsequently becomes pos-
sible. But if we take the computer analogy seriously, then this reality is not 
independent from a hardware that is already in place. Patton’s analogical 
argument claims that whilst the virtual abstract machine is itself indetermi-
nate, unable to mould into any grid, it constructs a grid that it ultimately 
escapes from. But it is questionable whether such an escape could be suc-
cessful, since in most actual machines it is extremely difficult to trace the 
distinction between the actual and the virtual. For precisely this reason, the 
analogy between the virtual and software is useful but limited. 
My own concept of the machine is an attempt to avoid such analo-
gies. Here, the machine is understood in relation to a consolidation in the 
economy of forces that defines technics. In that sense, it is probably closer 
to Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘assemblage’ than to the ‘abstract machine.’ How-
ever, the machine and its functions are not determined by technics. Whilst 
the machine begins from technics, the organization that it introduces into 
the free play of forces does not stand in relation to technics as the actual 
stands to the virtual, or hardware to software. The machine brings in an or-
der and organization that are present neither in technics nor in the play of 
                                                 
22 Friedrich Kittler, Literature / Media / Information Systems. (G+B Arts 
International: Amsterdam 1997), 150. 
23 Kittler, Literature / Media / Information Systems, 148.  
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forces that precedes it. This organization is only achieved through the con-
solidation of an economy, as shown at the beginning of this section.  
 
 
3. The Language Machine 
 
In his work on the modes of existence of technical objects, Gilbert Simon-
don is cautious not to think of machines as completely rigid structures. An 
operational machine needs to incorporate a certain degree of indetermi-
nacy in its functions in order to operate successfully. The degree of inde-
terminacy can differ, but in general a balance needs to be established be-
tween rigidity and indeterminacy. Simondon describes this process as fol-
lows: 
 
True perfection of the machine, such that we can say that 
it raises the degree of technicity, does not correspond to 
an increase in automatism. On the contrary, it corre-
sponds to the fact that the functioning of a machine con-
tains a certain amount of indeterminacy. It is this margin, 
far more than an increase in automatism, that enables the 
machine to be susceptible to the information that a tech-
nical whole [ensemble technique] can accomplish. 24   
 
Simondon distinguishes between the degree of technicity that belongs to 
the machine and to automatism. The machine is not the complete automa-
tion of its functions. Quite the contrary, too much automation will stop the 
machine from being able to function properly. A higher degree of technicity 
is achieved by endowing the machine with a certain degree of indetermi-
nacy.  
Literature works as a machine. However, unlike a political machine 
or a metaphysical machine, literature acts as a machine of dispersion, since 
it is a machine aimed at extending the margins of indeterminacy beyond 
their limits. It does this not only in relation to language, but also in its con-
nections with metaphysics and politics. The first and fourth chapters of this 
                                                 
24 Gilbert Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objets techniques (Aubier: 
Paris 1958), 11.  
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book stage readings of literature in relation to the metaphysical and politi-
cal machine: in the first chapter, Zwerm. Een geschiedenis van de wereld 
[Swarm. A History of the World] by Belgian writer Peter Verhelst; and in the 
fourth chapter, La disparition de la langue française [The Disappearance of the 
French Language] by French-Algerian writer Assia Djebar. Both novels allow 
for a reflection on language and the ways in which language interrelates 
with politics, or with what I will call the political machine. The first chapter 
reflects on how literary language disrupts the political machine (at least 
from within the literary), while the fourth chapter shows how literature can 
trace the (at times devastating) effects of the political machine. It is clear, 
then, that language and literature have a central role in this book; although 
in each case this role is played out in relation to technics and the machine. 
My central thesis is that literature operates as a machine that connects to 
other machines, such as metaphysical machines or political machines. 
In conceptualizing the machine, Derrida declares that ‘when I think 
of machine I am thinking just as much of machines of signs as of machines 
of movement and displacement.’25 Pondering on the complications of the 
alleged intimacy of Nietzsche and Heidegger’s philosophical work to certain 
tenets of Nazism, he suggests that the works of these philosophers may 
well have been driven by an utterance-producing machine. If language is 
guided by such an utterance-producing machine, it gives form and destiny 
to often conflicting philosophical statements that, at times, bring both Hei-
degger and Nietzsche into the vicinity of certain facets of Nazism, while at 
the same time making them into the most vigilant critics of this regime in 
general. Derrida’s formulation of an utterance-producing machine provides 
a starting point for a reflection on language that will help to clarify how lan-
guage relates to technics and to the machine:  
  
Must there not be some powerful utterance-producing 
machine that programs the movements of the two oppos-
ing forces at once, and which couples, conjugates, or 
marries them in a given set, as life (does) death? (Here, all 
the difficulty comes down to the determination of such a 
set, which can be neither simply linguistic, nor simply 
                                                 
25 Jacques Derrida, Sur Parole. Instantanés philosophiques (Éditions de 
l’aube: Paris 1999), 46. 
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historico-political, economic, ideological, psycho-
phantasmic, and so on. That is, no regional agency or tri-
bunal has the power to arrest or set the limits on the set, 
not even that court of “last resort” belonging to philoso-
phy or theory, which remain subsets of this set).26  
 
The question posed by Derrida concerns the production of utterances. The 
possibility of such a production hypothesizes that an utterance is a compo-
sition of heterogeneous elements. Connecting these elements constitutes 
an utterance. However, the assemblage of elements of which the utterance 
is the result draws upon an element that is already an intrinsically complex 
structure. This element, which is never ‘one’ but which is in itself already a 
complex entity, Derrida designates by the name of grammē. In its most 
general meaning, grammē is ‘an element without simplicity.’27 This element, 
which is never simple and which ‘one must forbid oneself to define within 
the system of oppositions of metaphysics,’28 serves as the basic figure from 
which a language machine will emerge.29 
At its origin, grammē is a multiplicity. Its multiplicity precedes the 
oppositional conceptual constructs that are formed in metaphysics, or in a 
metaphysical machine. Because of its central role in language grammē also 
serves as the first preliminary figuration of a literary machine. As such, it 
                                                 
26 Derrida, The Ear of the Other. Otobiography, Transference, Translation 
(Schocken Books: New York 1985), 29. My italics. 
27 Derrida, Of Grammatology (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore 
1976), 9. 
28 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 9 
29 ‘Figure’ is used here in a provisional way, in place of less cautious 
terms such as ‘building block’ or ‘form’, which would be in outright 
contradiction to the circumscription of technics in this introduction. 
However, in using the word figure I am not unaware of, or inattentive to, 
the philosophical usages of figure and/or figuration in Jean-François 
Lyotard, Discourse, figure (Klinsieck: Paris 1971); Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari, What is Philosophy? (Verso: London / New York 1994); and Rosi 
Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in 
Contemporary Feminist Theory (Columbia University Press: New York 
1994).      
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introduces an irreducible multiplicity and technicality in language from the 
very beginning, before structures of meaning, designation, or conceptual 
opposition are in place. To say that grammē serves as a figure from which 
the machine emerges does not mean that it is a unity or a single form or 
shape; it is not a series or composition of points that in themselves are dis-
crete units, and it does not provide the first unitary form or point of a ma-
chine as such. What must be rejected, Derrida writes, is ‘not the grammē as 
such, but grammè as a series of points, as a composition of parts each of 
which would be an arrested limit.’30 A language machine starting out from 
grammē is thus never simple: its machinic function consolidates from an 
earlier multiplicity that it cannot control completely. As Simondon argues, 
any operational machine must be able to take indeterminacy into consid-
eration in order to be functional: ‘A machine that consists of a certain regu-
lation is in fact a machine that contains a certain margin of indeterminacy in 
its functioning.’31 In the case of an utterance-producing machine these in-
determinacies operate within the machine from the beginning through the 
complex element of grammē. This complexity can only be accounted for in 
language as incalculable, as an originary element girdling language with a 
complexity that precedes the calculable. Deleuze describes such a multiplic-
ity as resulting from a difference that is in itself an ‘internal multiplicity of 
succession, of fusion, and of organization, of heterogeneity, […] it is a vir-
tual and continuous difference that cannot be reduced to numbers.’32 In the 
chapters that follow, I argue that the potential for such complex elements 
to reemerge on the surface of a fully developed language machine gains a 
central role in literature. They reveal the multiplicity upon which any ma-
chinic function is based by exceeding the limits of signification.  
 
The poetic or the ecstatic is that in every discourse which 
can open itself up to the absolute loss of its sense, […] of 
non-meaning, of un-knowledge or of play, to the swoon 
from which it is reawakened by the throw of a dice.33  
                                                 
30 Jacques Derrida, “Ousia and grammē,” in Margins of Philosophy (The 
University of Chicago Press: Chicago), 59. 
31 Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objets techniques, 139-40. 
32 Deleuze, Bergsonism, 38. 
33 Derrida, Writing and Difference, 261. 
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Such a spilling over of signification, as an adjournment of sense, not only 
opens onto the senseless but also reopens the multiplicity from which the 
machine first emerged. In the same movement, it would compel one 
  
to give up a concept of language regulated by deep se-
mantic anchoring points that would authorize, for exam-
ple, questions of the type: what is the guiding sense or 
etymon of the gift on the basis of which all semantic di-
versities, all idioms, and all usages are diffracted?34 
 
Posing that kind of question presupposes that language goes back to one 
original arch-word that would unify all utterances. This would lead to the 
construction of a machine that regulates the signifying effect of language 
down to the tiniest detail. Instead, grammē allows for no semantic anchor-
ing point because it is not of the order of signification. 
The production of an utterance structures heterogeneous, complex 
elements with the help of a machine, a ‘powerful utterance-producing ma-
chine’. Bringing together these complex elements implies ordering them: 
they need to become machinic functions that are part of a machine – in this 
particular case, a language machine. Insofar as the ordering of complex 
elements into operable functions is internal to language itself, it reaches 
into the multiplicity of grammē that serves as the first dispersive figure for 
meaningful utterances. Language fans out and gathers itself together from 
grammē - that is, from the complex element that, irreducible to language 
itself, opens up the possibility of language. Grammē precedes and exceeds 
the signification that is at work in language. At the same time, by preceding 
it, it defies its origin. Grammē does not defy the origin directly, but, thanks 
to its elementary complexity, crosses out and effaces the origin by multiply-
ing it from the beginning. What does elementary complexity mean in the 
case of grammē? It is this question that paves the way for grammē and 
technics, since it is in its elementary complicity and its subsequent defying 
of the origin that grammē overlaps with technics. In fact, grammē becomes 
technics, and its figure coincides with the operation of technics. As a play of 
                                                 
34 Jacques Derrida, Given Time 1. Counterfeit Money (The University of 
Chicago Press: Chicago 1992), 48. 
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forces, technics defies the origin because of its complexity and multiplicity. 
The way in which this multiplicity is constructed is as an elementary com-
plexity. Elementary complexity here means interrelation; it means a play that 
is taking place, an engagement of heterogeneous elements with each 
other. This engagement or interrelation of heterogeneities is precisely the 
first element, though it always remains a complex and interrelating ele-
ment. This is grammē: a mode of interrelating that precedes things; and 
which is called technics throughout this book. At the moment of technics 
there is as yet no counting of interrelations, there is no ‘two or double ori-
gin’ versus a ‘single origin,’ since the only origin marked by grammē is that 
of the emergence of interrelations that are not one (they are inter-) and that 
are not unitary (they are relations and therefore only exist in relation to one 
another). It is this mode of interrelation, which cannot be counted as one or 
as two, that I call technics. 
The utterance-producing machine programs a set of words in 
which two opposing forces are intertwined. The difficulty is to determine 
the nature of this set, since it often consists of mutually exclusive concep-
tual oppositions. Each of these conceptual oppositions is assembled in an 
utterance-producing machine that is itself riddled by ‘quasi-concepts that 
are so many aporetic places or dislocations.’35 Quasi-concepts precede con-
ceptual oppositions, and forcefully pair them into one aporetic machine. 
One such quasi-concept is grammē, another is différance. The possibility of 
quasi-concepts, I argue, stems from technics as the possibility of incalcula-
ble, multiple interrelations of forces from which, eventually, concepts might 
emerge. Preceding the domain of the conceptual as such, quasi-concepts 
constitute the economy that marks the transition from technics to machine. 
They are ‘quasi’ because they come about in relations that in themselves 
already include a multiplicity that is not reducible to the concept; they are 
characterized by an interplay of forces that will intertwine conceptual op-
positions posterior to it.  
An important objection can be raised at this point: namely, that 
quasi-concepts are, in fact, sham-concepts. This objection needs to be ad-
dressed in order to understand in what way technics as interrelation devel-
ops a different attitude toward the concept. It was Gottlob Frege, widely 
regarded as the founder of analytical philosophy, who rejected the idea of 
                                                 
35 Derrida, Aporias. (Stanford University Press: Stanford 1993), 15.  
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quasi-concepts on a logical basis. Not insignificantly for my argument, 
Frege based his argument on the relation between ‘concept’ and ‘relation’: 
 
We get the same case for a relation as for a concept: logic 
can recognize a relation only if it is determinate, as re-
gards any one object and any other object, whether or not 
the one stands to the other in that relation. Here too we 
have a tertium non datur, the case of its being undecided 
is ruled out. If there were a relation for which this re-
quirement were not fulfilled, then the concepts that we 
can derive from it by partly filling it up […] likewise would 
not have completely sharp boundaries, and would thus, 
strictly speaking, not be concepts at all, but inadmissible 
sham-concepts.36 
 
Frege’s objection against quasi- or sham-concepts implies that there can be 
no ‘set’ of words resulting from the relational activities of such quasi-
concepts that make up the language machine, or utterance-producing ma-
chine. According to Frege, a relation must go from one object to another, or 
from one concept to another; and a concept must refer to an object and to 
a certain property of this object (to which this object has a relation, or not). 
In Frege’s philosophy, the idea of a ‘concept’ and of a ‘relation’ presupposes 
the (logical) possibility of reference and predication. The concept is thus a 
function defined by referentiality. From this presupposition flows analytical 
philosophy’s emphasis on discussing, complicating, and explaining such 
apparently simple phrases as ‘the cat is on the mat.’ However, to commence 
from such a statement one already presupposes that what is at stake in lan-
guage is reference and referentiality, and what is at stake in thinking (and in 
the concept) is intentionality.37 Precisely this idea of the concept is under-
mined by a deconstruction of the language machine by quasi-concepts. The 
possibility of reference in the concept and in language - and thus the possi-
                                                 
36 Gottlob Frege, The Frege Reader (Blackwell Publishers: Oxford 1997), 
264. 
37 For a systematic account of the relation between analytical philsophy 
and deconstruction, see Samuel C. Wheeler III, Deconstruction as Analytic 
Philosophy (Stanford University Press: Stanford 2000).   
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bility of designating a certain set of objects or words - is what must be ex-
plained. This is where the quasi-concept comes in as an irreducibly ‘com-
plex element’ that forms the first figure of a language machine and/or a 
metaphysical machine. The consolidated concept is thereby in itself already 
riddled by multiplicity, held together by a stabilized play of forces that 
originates in the ‘an-original’ (because multiple) interrelation of quasi-
concepts set up by technics.  
A concept, as Deleuze and Guattari note, ‘is defined by the insepa-
rability of a finite number of heterogeneous components traversed by a 
point of absolute survey at infinite speed.’38 Where do these heterogeneous 
components come from? How is their coming together as intertwined 
components possible? And how does the concept consolidate itself in rela-
tion to its heterogeneous elements and in relation to other concepts? If the 
concept is in a certain sense related to a creative conjuring with language, 
to ’almost crazy etymological exercises,’39 then what has been said about 
the language machine will hold for the concept as well: commencing from 
the multiplicity of grammē and différance, quasi-concepts structure the 
economy of forces that make possible a consolidated machine in which 
concepts can emerge. Such a machine also gives destiny to utterances and 
conceptual oppositions. In quasi-concepts a teleology begins to emerge, a 
destiny that reaches its highest intensity in metaphysics. Derrida describes 
conceptual oppositions as governed by ‘antagonistic forces,’ arguing that  
 
neither of the two antagonistic forces can break with this 
powerful machine: it is their destination; they draw their 
points of origin and their resources from it; in it, they ex-
                                                 
38 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 21. Paul Patton 
provides an instructive comparison between Derrida and Deleuze’s idea of 
the concept in his article, “Concept and Politics in Derrida and Deleuze,” 
Critical Horizons, 2003, vol. 4 / n° 2, 157-175. For a comparisson 
between Deleuze, Derrida and Frege on the quasi-concept, see Paul 
Patton, Deleuze and the Political, 15ff. For an account on the relation 
between Gilles Deleuze and analytical philosophy, see Manuel DeLanda, 
Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (Continuum: London / New York 
2002). 
39 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 8. 
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change utterances that are allowed to pass through the 
machine and into each other, carried along by family re-
semblances, however incompatible they may sometimes 
appear. Obviously, this “machine” is no longer a machine 
in the classical philosophical sense, because there is “life” 
in it, or “life” takes part in it and because it plays with the 
opposition life/death. Nor would it be correct to say that 
this “program” is a program in the teleological or mecha-
nistic sense of the term. 40 
 
At this point, having begun with the assemblage of an utterance-producing 
machine, there now is a machine in which life partakes, a machine that jug-
gles with the very distinction between life and death. At this point, it should 
be kept in mind that the distinction between life and death is presented as 
a conceptual opposition that is constructed in the language machine on a 
metaphysical level. The political machine tries to take these oppositions one 
step further, in order to establish political control along the lines of these 
distinctions. Conceptual oppositions thus start to work as ordering-words: 
they order the multiplicity of technics into categories of possibilities that 
can be controlled, regulated, and calculated. Such is the effect of machinic 
functions. Deleuze and Guattari made the common French word for slogan 
(mot d’ordre) into a concept that captures the way that the utterance-
producing machine links up with the political machine. They spoke of order-
words that regulate what is possible and what is impossible within language 
and also within society: 
 
We call order-words, not a particular category of explicit 
statements (for example, in the imperative), but the rela-
tion of every word or every statement to implicit presup-
positions, in other words, to speech acts that are, and can 
only be, accomplished in the statement. Order-words do 
not concern commands only, but every act that is linked 
to statements by a “social obligation.”41  
 
                                                 
40 Derrida, The Ear of the Other, 29. 
41 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 87. 
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The order-word is itself ‘a language function’ that, although not an explicit 
statement, regulates the way language takes on signification.42 Such lan-
guage functions, I would argue, can come about and consolidate only 
within an utterance-producing machine, as described above. Throughout 
this book it will become clear that the utterance-producing machine time 
and again intertwines with the metaphysical and the political machine. 
They overlap and arise from one another. 
 The metaphysical machine, in my analysis, plays a crucial role in 
bringing together language and politics. In the first chapter, I analyze the 
conceptual structure of the metaphysical machine in its relation to technics. 
Here I address the question of the transition from technics to the machine. 
Metaphysics plays a crucial role in this transition, at least on a conceptual 
level. In this chapter, metaphysics is shown to be a machinic way of distin-
guishing and opposing concepts. Such conceptual oppositions do not yet 
exist in technics. The ability to draw conceptual oppositions is consolidated 
by the political machine, which tries to bring these oppositions into real life 
by drawing up borders and ordering patterns of behavior. The literary ma-
chine, on the other hand, intensifies and subverts these conceptual opposi-
tions, only to disperse them. The central role of the literary machine, I argue, 
is that it acts as a machine of dispersion. It unhinges meaning from the ma-
teriality of language, a project impossible by any other means. A recent 
novel that shows this process of dispersion at work across political, literary, 
and metaphysical levels is Peter Verhelst’s Zwerm. The first chapter will ana-
lyze and interpret the myriad of events that take place in that novel. 
 The second chapter explores the idea of a metaphysical machine. 
At this point in the argument the concept of the modern machine is intro-
duced. What characterizes the modern machine, both in its metaphysical 
and its political tendency, is the desire for closure – that is, the desire to 
close off the realm over which the machine exerts its power. In order to un-
derstand this striving for closure, this chapter undertakes a theoretical in-
vestigation of a difference between Derrida and Heidegger’s conceptions of 
the history of metaphysics. Whereas Heidegger argues in favor of the ‘end’ 
of metaphysics, Derrida introduces the idea of the ‘closure’ of metaphysics. 
To posit the end of metaphysics allows one to step outside the history of 
metaphysics, thereby also essentially escaping the metaphysical machine. 
                                                 
42 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 85. 
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Derrida’s concept of closure emphasizes the impossibility of simply marking 
an end to the machine. Instead, the concept of ‘closure’ marks the tendency 
of metaphysics to absorb everything within its realm. Through this discus-
sion between Heidegger and Derrida, I will argue that the machine, both on 
a political and a metaphysical level, is marked by the interplay of closure 
and ending. The machine strives both for an absolute end that would super-
sede its own functioning and for a closure that would grant a total imma-
nence to the machine. By exploring this double tendency, I show that what 
underlies it is a problem of time and acceleration, which in the last instance 
turns out to be the problem of technics. 
The third chapter traces the conceptual development of the ‘mod-
ern political machine.’ At first glance, the modern political machine is char-
acterized by two operations: first, it creates a state through a process of ter-
ritorialization;43 and second, it sets up a discourse of legitimacy to justify the 
social stratifications and sovereignty of the modern state. My argument is 
that to understand the modern political machine a third, underlying ele-
ment needs to be discerned: the modern political machine shows a turn 
toward executive functioning – that is, executive functions such as the mili-
tary, the police, and bureaucracy become increasingly important. This turn 
towards executive functioning makes the modern political machine into a 
machine. The two events of the modern political machine – construction of 
the state and a discourse on legitimacy – are both the result of this third, 
underlying event of a turn toward executive functioning, or the becoming-
machine of the political. Political modernity equals the becoming-machine 
of the political. In the first case, territorialization is what enabled the con-
struction of the state; yet such territorialization became possible by the cen-
tralization of the armed forces (the construction of an army by the state). 
The state is the result of a centralization of the armed forces, understood as 
an executive functioning of the state. In the second case, the discourse on 
legitimacy (of the state, of sovereignty, of the monopoly of violence by the 
state) is a distinctively modern discourse: the word legitimacy only gained 
currency in political philosophy during the sixteenth century, when the ab-
solutist state had already been consolidated. Nevertheless, the problem of 
                                                 
43 Territorialization is understood here as a geographical re-organization 
of the land that falls under the control of a state. It does not refer to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the term in A Thousand Plateaus (2003). 
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legitimacy is a central problem of the relation between the state, machinic 
functioning, and philosophical thought: it shows how the state machine 
retroactively engenders a state thinking. State thinking is a form of thinking 
that obfuscates the executive functioning of the modern political machine – 
that is to say, it obliterates the machinic within the modern political. In-
stead, it constructs a theory on the origin of law. This origin of the law justi-
fies the construction of the modern state and serves to demonstrate that 
the legal framework of the modern state is justified.  
The fourth chapter returns to literature and joins together my in-
sights about language and the modern political machine. In Assia Djebar’s 
La disparition de la langue française [The Disappearance of the French Lan-
guage].44 the main protagonist, Berkane, returns to his native country of 
Algeria after several years in France. Meanwhile, Berkane maintains a diary 
in which he relates his feelings with regard to Algeria, France, and toward 
the languages that he speaks. The diary brings us back to Berkane’s youth, 
during which he participated in the Algerian war of independence. As the 
story unfolds the young Berkane is arrested and imprisoned by French 
troops after participating in an insurrection against the French occupation 
of Algeria. The interrogation and torture of the young Berkane form the 
starting point of a reflection on the relation between language and the ex-
ertion of physical violence. In this chapter, I argue that the machine of the 
state is constructed by interlacing the technics of language with physical 
elements, such as the use of violence. Indeed, language and the exertion of 
physical violence continuously bleed into each other, which in fact consti-
tutes the very possibility of language as a social instrument for belonging. 
To explore this idea further I draw on Derrida’s concept of exappropriation. 
Exappropriation expresses the double move of a subject being both appro-
priated and expropriated, its ‘self’ being both given and removed from it. 
For Derrida, this double move is the result of language. Berkane’s experi-
ence of exappropriation, I will argue, is the result of an interweaving of lan-
guage with the techniques of torture. 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Assia Djebar, La disparition de la langue française (Paris: Albin Michel 
2003). 
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Chapter One  
Machines / Dispersion / Technics 
_________________________ 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: Machines of Dispersion 
 
At the swarming, rhythmically pulsating machinic heart of Peter Verhelst’s 
novel Zwerm. Een geschiedenis van de wereld [Swarm. A History of the World]45 
something like a virus is at work; not only in the fictive world by which 
Verhelst emulates an outside world, “the nonverbal ‘outside’ to which 
language refers,”46 but also in language itself. Within this language the 
external ‘thing’ to which language usually refers is internalized and 
migrates throughout the story to designate a myriad of different objects 
and events, time and again indicated in italics as a “thing” [ding]. These 
things are not actual objects, but rather they are swarming coagulations 
that temporarily exist and then explode again to dissolve into “a glittering 
cloud composed of millions and millions of little splinters [een glinsterende 
wolk, samengesteld uit miljoenen en miljoenen scherfjes].”47 Likewise on a 
narrative level the novel is a shattering whirlwind of short, descriptive 
fragments that depict a decentered world suffering from terrorist and viral 
                                                 
45 Peter Verhelst, Zwerm. Een geschiedenis van de Wereld (Prometheus: 
Amsterdam 2005). All translations from the Dutch are mine. 
46 Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading. Figural Language in Rousseau, 
Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (Yale University Press: New Haven / London), 
3. 
47 Verhelst, Zwerm, -1. 
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attacks; the hide-outs and refuges of a mutant fighting machine called 
Angel, who relives his past as a soldier in battlefields that recall the Vietnam 
War; young Abel’s quest to find out what happened to his girlfriend Pearl, 
abducted after a piano recital, with the occasional help of Angel; a phone 
call repeated nightly telling Angel to “start at the beginning”48 and leading 
him to a house in which he finds a dead man clasping a phone between his 
jaw and his shoulder; Abel meeting with an older gentlemen called H, who 
holds Pearl captive in a room with nothing but a piano and whose 
connections reach as far as Israel; a DJ called Rimbaud messing around with 
soundscapes in his hi-tech apartment; an Israeli scientist called Baruch 
Goldstein49 and his research project that aims to create an artificial black 
hole; and a certain mister V50 who spends years in isolated imprisonment for 
making public state secrets. In short, the narrative swarms. It takes us all 
over the place. Yet whilst the narrative literally is all over the place, 
spreading like a swarm without a center, at the same time a number of 
narrative elements set up a teleological, even eschatological drive that is 
equally important to the novel. The page numbers in the book, for example, 
                                                 
48 The first actual phone call takes place on page 542, but the narrative 
about Angel – recognizable by its different typography – starts with the 
sentence: “If I try to reconstruct everything it started with the night I 
received a phone call that probably wasn’t meant for me. [Als ik alles 
probeer te reconstrueren, is het begonnen met de nacht waarin ik een 
telefoonoproep kreeg die vermoedelijk niet voor mij was bedoeld…].” 
Verhelst, Zwerm, 662. 
49 Not coincidentally the Israeli scientist has the same name as that of the 
jewish doctor responsible for the Cave of the Patriarchs massacre in 
Hebron, February 25, 1994. For a sociological analysis of the massacre in 
the wider frame of political conflict in Israel, see Yehouda Shenhav and 
Nadav Gabay, “Managing Political Conflict: The Sociology of State 
Commissions of Inquiry in Israel”, Israel Studies, 2001, Volume 6, number 
1, 126-156. 
50 This character is clearly inspired on Mordechai Vanunu, the Israeli 
nuclear technician who revealed details about Israel’s nuclear weapons 
program to the British Press in 1986. Vanunu, who had fled Israel, was 
abducted in Rome by an Israelian secret agent and sentenced to 18 years 
in prison, 11 of which were spent in solitary confinement. 
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count backwards from 666 to -5; in the exact center of the novel 15 black 
pages proclaim the constitution of a new empire called virutopia and a new, 
mutant man called Homo Invictus Viralis (abbreviated, H.I.V.);51 and all the 
while the characters that appear in the novel are feverishly running away 
from something, or frantically searching for something until they, too, get 
sucked up in a black hole imploding on page 0 with someone screaming 
“oh my god!!”52 The overall effect is that everything in the novel seems to 
happen “in imminence and in urgency.”53 It also means that the novel acts as 
a machine of dispersion. 
 Like any dispersion, a machinic dispersion is a way of diffusing and 
spreading, of scattering around elements and forces that were previously 
tied into each other. Yet instead of building up a machinic function with all 
its semi-centralized automatic capacities, Peter Verhelst’s Zwerm disperses 
the functioning of the machine. The machinic functions of different things 
are spreading out like a swarm rather than operating in an ever more 
intertwined, structural way. The swarm that is created in the novel is 
machinic, but it is a machine that builds up loose ends; a machine that cuts 
loose the end of every narrative, every machinic function that the narrative 
might try to build up. In Zwerm, there is a machinic dispersion at work 
which makes that things [dingen] explode into a swarm of singularities that 
can no longer be recuperated in a larger, functional constellation. These 
swarming singularities trace the operation of différance, as Jacques Derrida 
defines it in Specters of Marx for example: 
 
Differance, if it remains irreducible, irreducibly required 
by the spacing of any promise and by the future-to-come 
that comes to open it, does not mean only (…) deferral, 
lateness, delay, postponement. In the incoercible 
differance the here-now unfurls. Without lateness, 
without delay, but without presence, it is the precipitation 
of an absolute singularity, singular because differing, 
precisely [justement], and always other, binding itself 
                                                 
51 Verhelst, Zwerm, 333-317. 
52 Verhelst, Zwerm, 0. 
53 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx (Routledge: New York / London, 
1994), 31.  
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necessarily to the form of the instant, in imminence and 
urgency (…). 
 No differance without alterity, no alterity without 
singularity, no singularity without here-and-now [ici-
maintenant].54   
 
The singularity-driven differance both disperses and gathers the here-and-
now. It places and displaces, allays and relays the here-and-now, that is to 
say, according to Derrida, the ontological presence that metaphysics 
desires. Preceding metaphysics and even extending “beyond the thought 
of Being”55, differance makes the metaphysical machine possible while 
escaping it. “Without the possibility of differance, the desire for presence as 
such would not find its breathing-space.”56 Such a space for breathing is 
found in the interrelation of forces that is enacted by differance, where the 
rhythmically breathing desire for presence tries to take over and forces 
these forces to become present, functional and calculable. Such a coercive 
force that tries to order the free floating forces of differance can be wielded 
by metaphysics, building up a metaphysical machine; it can be operated in 
politics, establishing a political machine; and it can be the topos of literature, 
creating a literary machine of dispersion. At the same time, differance 
menaces these machines: it jeopardizes metaphysics’ “self-presence in the 
breath”57; it opens the political machine to invest it with “the singularity of 
each as a fundamental organizing principle” and with “a process of self-
transformation, hybridization, and miscegenation”58; and the literary 
machine itself is the continuous possibility of dispersal that thus makes way 
for differance and its multiplicity. Differance is incoercible and irreducible. It 
will thus unsettle the machinic again. Detaching and breaking open the 
consolidated functions of the machinic, differance rains down upon us 
                                                 
54 Derrida, Specters of Marx, 31; Spectres de Marx (Galilée: Paris 1993), 
60. 
55 Derrida, Of Grammatology (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore 
1976), 143.  
56 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 143. 
57 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 26. 
58 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude. War and Democracy in the 
Age of Empire (The Penguin Press: New York 2004), 356. 
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absolute singularities, engendering “the reprise of singularities by one 
another, the condensation of singularities one into another.”59 This 
operation of differance - the way that its interrelation of forces evolves in a 
machinic function that it also breaks down again - will be the thematic focus 
of this chapter. Its outcome will be a concept of technics derived from 
differance but trespassing on some of differance’s ontological reservations 
and reconsiderations.  
For Derrida, differance opens up the possibility of the machine and 
of metaphysics. It therefore necessarily “precedes metaphysics”60 and all its 
machinations. In the idea of democracy-to-come, differance lays down the 
sojourning groundwork for any democratic political project, which is 
therefore always already in deconstruction.61 Likewise, the precedence of 
differance for any kind of machinic function is not of the order of a historical 
temporality – which, like time in general, already “belongs to metaphysical 
conceptuality”62 - but rather constitutes the very possibility of temporality. 
In contrast, what technics allows us to conceptualize is an operation close to 
difference, but one that starts after and from within the machinic 
(metaphysical, political, or literary) rather than remaining strictly exterior to 
it. Before I get to this contrast, let us take a breath, a metaphysical breath, 
the “liberty of a breath that nothing breaks into pieces”63 and like Angel in 
Zwerm, attempt to start at the beginning. “A voice says: ‘start at the 
beginning.’ A voice answers: ‘this is the beginning’.”64 
 
                                                 
59 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (Continuum: London / New 
York 2004), 251. 
60 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 143. My italics. 
61 See Derrida, Rogues. Two Essays on Reason (Stanford University Press: 
Stanford 2005). 
62 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy (The University of Chicago Press: 
Chicago ), 65. The next chapter makes a detailed analysis of time as 
inherently metaphysical. For a thorough, booklength analysis of this 
subject, see David Wood, The Deconstruction of Time (Northwestern 
University Press: Evanston 1989), and John Protevi, Time and Exteriority. 
Aristotle, Heidegger, Derrida (Bucknell University Press: Cranburry 1994). 
63 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 308. 
64 Verhelst, Zwerm, -5. 
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2. Phonocentric Metaphysics 
 
It is no coincidence that the beginning for which Angel searches is 
announced over the telephone, a technological synecdoche for the 
contamination of voice and machine; or, as Avital Ronell put it, “the locus 
par excellence where voice, language and instrumentality share a common 
residence.”65 It leads to the love of the spoken word, but it also leads to 
instrumentality, or as I will call it, the machinic. All this starts with a 
phonocentrism which, for Derrida, captivates metaphysics early on in its 
machinic formation. Let’s start there. 
With the rhythmic breathing of metaphysics’ desire for presence 
comes its love for the spoken word. The spoken word - breath and the 
convoluted vocal cords by which it is articulated - is the closest possible 
connection between sense and presence. The spoken word attracts 
metaphysics because of a deeper seated “determination of being as 
presence.”66 It is because of this relation to presence that speech is favored 
over writing in metaphysics. From the determination of being as presence 
logocentrism and phonocentrism emerge; metaphysics’ “adventure merges 
with that of logocentrism.”67 Derrida’s detailed circumscription of 
phonocentrism at the heart of the history of metaphysics gives him ample 
opportunity to explain how desire for presence permeates metaphysical 
thought and language. Through meticulous analyses of classic texts from 
the history of metaphysics – Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and 
others – Derrida demonstrates that the preference for the spoken word, 
present in all these metaphysical works, is invested by a desire for an 
immediate presence of thought. Only when thought is present can it truly 
be. Insofar as Being is understood as presence, the thought of Being – the 
philosophical discourse of ontology – must be present as well if it is to 
adequately understand Being. Ideally, it should not be mediated by 
                                                 
65 Avital Ronell, Finitude’s Score. Essays for the End of the Millennium 
(University of Nebraska Press: Lincoln 1994), 26. See also Avital Ronell, 
The Telephone Book: Technology / Schizophrenia / Electric Speech 
(University of Nebraska Press: Lincoln 1989). 
66 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 97. 
67 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 97. 
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anything. It should be immediate, constituting a here-and-now (Derrida’s 
ici-maintenant) of absolute presence. The spoken word is what comes 
closest to rendering thought immediate. Thus the spoken word is closest to 
Being understood as presence. If mediation is unavoidable, then the 
mediating technologies (words, writing, gestures, or technical media) must 
be constrained to stay as close as possible to what really counts: Being 
understood as presence. Technologies are thus understood as derivative 
techniques, as media devised to re-present the presence of Being.  
Phonocentrism delineates an operation for getting as close as 
possible to Being as presence. This operation acts against supplementarity 
and against mediation. Technologies are necessarily mediating 
technologies that function within a stratagem for attaining presence. They 
are instrumental; oriented toward controlling the intervals of desire and 
presence regulated by differance.68 The drive of metaphysical 
phonocentrism, then, is a desire for presence stimulated by differance, 
which can also be understood politically: presence is power. Political power 
is the capacity to decide over presence and absence, life and death.69 For 
this reason politics is conceptually concerned with tracking the movements 
of differance: “Death is the movement of differance to the extent that that 
movement is necessarily finite.”70 Differance precedes the distinction 
between absence and presence, but also engenders it. This is why 
metaphysics emerges in the breathing-space of differance, in the interval 
between absence and presence. But to master the differantial economy of 
absence and presence would be to master an absolute political power over 
life and death. The modern political machine consists in various attempts at 
                                                 
68 See Bernard Stiegler, “Derrida and Technology: Fidelity at the Limit of 
Deconstruction” in Tom Cohen, Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical 
Reader (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2001), 252. 
69 See Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended.” Lectures at the 
Collège de France 1975-1976 (Picador: New York 2003), Giorgio 
Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford University 
Press: Stanford 1997), and Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics”, Public 
Culture, volume 15, n° 1, 2003, 11-40.  
70 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 143. 
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mastering and redistributing this economy.71 The machinic is the structural 
emanation of these attempts. It is via the machinic that political modernity 
is marked by “a generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the 
material destruction of human bodies and populations.”72 Controlling the 
temporal and spatial intervals of absence and presence a generalized 
instrumentalization of human bodies becomes possible on a political 
level.73 Politics as the instrumentalization of human existence follows in the 
wake a becoming-machinic that defines the modern political. It is enacted at 
the end of the fourteenth century through a territorialization by which the 
control of space becomes one of the main objectives of modern politics.74 It 
is made possible through the development of strong military apparatus and 
a police force, and by the excessive import of the executive functions of the 
state machine in general. “Humanitarian intervention” and “rescue 
operations” would be impossible without the preceding becoming-
machinic of politics and the completion of its executive functions to master 
the differantial economy of absence and presence – and thus to decide over 
life and death.75 In Zwerm several such rescue operations (or just one, 
                                                 
71 Derrida uses the term “modern political machine” in Of Grammatology, 
138. My understanding of the modern political machine issues from 
Derrida’s, but it will also significantly differ from (and take issue with) it. 
72 Mbembe, “Necropolitics”, 14. 
73 Derrida writes: “Spacing insinuates into presence an interval.” Derrida, 
Of Grammatology, 203.  
74 The third chapter of this present work deals extensively with the 
becoming-machinic of politics at the beginning of modernity. 
75 Adi Ophir has argued that “the emergence, development and 
institutionalization of a dispositive articulating rescuing technologies 
meant to respond to large-scale catastrophies, is one of the distinctive 
traits of modernity [L’émergence, le développement et 
l’institutionnalisation d’un dispositif articulant des technologies de 
secours et d’assistance, destiné à répondre aux catastrophes de grande 
envergure, constituent un des traits distinctifs de la modernité].” Adi 
Ophir, “Le souverain, l’humanitaire, et le terroriste: conjurer, produire, 
prendre en charge les catastrophes”, Vacarme, n° 34, 2006, online: 
http://www.vacarme.eu.org/article488.html. 
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perhaps, represented and reconfigured several times throughout the novel) 
take place, which neatly blend in with police pursuits and civil arrests.  
In Zwerm, then, a number of narrative events are grouped around 
the implosion of a building known as the Silver-Colored Building Block [het 
Zilverkleurige Complex]. Or rather, the narrative events swarm out from the 
attack on the Silver-Colored Building Block. Within minutes of the attack, an 
extensive rescue operation is set up around the building block. At the 
beginning of the novel the events are described as follows: 
 
Presently a vibration travels through the Silver-Colored 
Complex, followed by a howling that rises from the very 
foundations, but for now a helicopter searches the 
buildings for elements with body heat and focuses of 
heating. There are surveillance screens, faces upon which 
no panic is yet written, rather gradations of surprise. On 
one of the screens a body floats over dozens of hands. In 
the heads of the security experts the blueprint of the 
Silver-Colored Complex  unfolds itself.  They know that 
fire, for now still a sneaking poison, develops a capricious 
logic. Little flames shoot into cracks and hollow spaces to 
hiss to those who come closer at unexpected places. 
Imperturbably they eat their way through the fuse. 
 
Fire brigade ladders slide out, little mosquito legs that try 
to get hold of the outer walls. 
 
Weldra trekt een rilling door het Zilverkleurig Complex, 
gevolgd door gebrul dat uit de fundamenten zelf opstijgt, 
maar voorlopig zoekt een helikopter de gebouwen af op 
lichaamswarme elementen en broeihaarden. Er zijn 
bewakingsschermen, gezichten waarop nog geen paniek 
te lezen staat, eerder gradaties van verwondering. Op een 
van de schermen drijft een lichaam over tientallen 
handen. In het hoofd van de veiligheidsdeskundigen 
ontvouwt zich het grondplan van het Zilverkleurig 
Complex. Ze weten dat vuur, voorlopig nog een sluipend 
gif, een grillige logica ontwikkelt. Vlammetjes schieten in 
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spleten en holle ruimten om op onvoorziene plekken te 
sissen naar wie dichterbij komt. Onverstoorbaar vreten ze 
zich een weg door de lont. 
 
Brandweerladders schuiven uit, muggenpootjes die vat 
proberen te krijgen op de buitenmuren.76 
 
From the very start there is emergency, calculation and intervention. From 
the beginning there is an attempt to take control of the differantial 
economy of presence and absence. Zwerm revolves around the 
impossibility to delimit the events that are about to take place. Within 
moments the building will collapse, the helicopter hovering over the 
building will digress from its calculated trajectory and fly out over the city, a 
car will crash, the reader overhearing a hobo’s frantic apocalyptic rambling, 
a young man will be arrested and led to a prison for interrogation, a 
carjacking will take place, a street fight among hobos will be followed by 
yet another violent police intervention. The scene depicts the moment 
before the Silvery-Colored Building Block collapses. A helicopter is circling 
around the building, monitoring it. Equipped with advanced technologies, 
it is scanning for body heat. On the ground, security experts are calculating 
possibilities for intervention by visualizing the floor plan of the building and 
estimating the time before collapse. They will give the signal for the fire 
brigade to enter. As this is done different spatial zones must be delineated: 
zones in which an intervention takes place; zones to which the victims are 
brought; and zones through which passers-by must be diverted from the 
spectacle taking place before their eyes. Moments after the event, the 
mayor of the city arrives in a limousine, smiles and assures everyone that 
“nothing’s happening. Really there isn’t. You have to believe me.”77 As 
events unroll it becomes clear that section F of the Silvery-Colored Building 
Block is of specific interest to the police. Holding a photo of Angel in their 
hands, police troops storm in to search for what remains of Angel, a mutant 
man and subject to all kinds of state experiments. By that time, Angel is 
racing out of town in a stolen Ford Mustang. “Two agents unwind red- and 
                                                 
76 Verhelst, Zwerm, 664. 
77 Verhelst, Zwerm, 663. 
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white-colored ribbons and divide the place in restricted areas, entries and 
exits, zones that are to be photographed meticulously.”78  
The narrative events that occur in rapid succession at the 
beginning of the novel emulate the executive apparatus of police troops 
and military functionaries, which incorporates modern technologies to 
chart, calculate, and ultimately contain the events that are taking place. The 
mayor assures us that nothing is happening while two police officers mark 
off restricted areas: this nicely captures Jacques Rancière’s definition of the 
police. In his “Ten Theses on Politics”, Rancière defines police as “a reminder 
of the obviousness of what there is, or rather, of what there isn't: ‘Move 
along! There is nothing to see here!’ The police says that there is nothing to 
see on a road, that there is nothing to do but move along.”79 Rancière’s 
concern is to distinguish this policing activity, with its own economy of 
restricted spaces and no-go-zones, from politics. Instead of closing off 
spaces, instead of placing restrictions politics ought to be “transforming this 
space of ‘moving-along’ into the space for the appearance of a subject: i.e. 
the people, the workers, the citizens.”80 The trouble, to my mind, is that the 
modern political is indistinguishable from its policing apparatus and from 
its executive apparatus in general. To separate the policing activity from the 
political reconfiguration of space is not possible. The constitution of the 
political takes place with the demarcation of space by what Rancière calls 
police, the executive function of the state. Derrida calls it ontopology: the 
political attempt to master the territory by controlling space and time, 
absence and presence.81 Technologies facilitate the control of space and 
time at a political level. They are intimately interwoven with the functioning 
of the political machine, in which they receive their properly technical 
destination, as a means for registration for example: 
 
In the hall of section F of the Silver-Colored Building Blick 
the evacuated men and women are chased through a line 
of detectives. Data flicker on laptops. Bags slide past X-
                                                 
78 Verhelst, Zwerm, 641. 
79 Jacques Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” Theory & Event, Vol. 5, No. 
3, 2001 (online). 
80 Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics.” 
81 See Specters of Marx, 82. 
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ray cameras. Everyone is scanned, searched, filmed and 
afterwards branded with a stamp that is invisible to the 
naked eye which will light up for weeks to come under 
the ultraviolet light. 
 
In de hal van sectie F van het Zilverkleurige Complex 
worden de geëvacueerde mannen en vrouwen door een rij 
rechercheurs heen gejaagd. Data flikkeren op laptops. 
Tassen schuiven langs röntgencamera’s. Iedereen wordt 
gescand, afgetast, gefilmd en daarna gemerkt met een 
voor het blote oog onzichtbare stempel dat weken later 
nog zal oplichten onder het ultraviolet licht.82  
 
An interlacing constellation of scanners, laptops, films tapes, and seals is 
used to check whoever has been in restricted F Section of the Silvery-
Colored Building. This is done in order to get a grip on the here-and-now, in 
order to control the events that have just taken place in the building. But 
the fragmentary narrative that spreads out in the course of the novel makes 
clear that these events cannot be pinned down. Instead, by swarming out, 
the narrative also opens up the political machinery that attempts to isolate 
the event. It is the political machine - that is, the indistinguishable 
interlacement of the political and the technological - that assures us that 
“nothing’s going on,” “there’s nothing to see.” To be able to say this, the 
political machine needs to control absence and presence, life and death. To 
do so it uses modern technologies.  
 But as it is for metaphysics attempt to attain presence, so it is for 
politics attempt to control the rhythm of absence and presence. Ultimately 
something will escape it.  
 
 
3. The Supplementary Technique and the Machine  
 
On the level of metaphysics phonocentrism rapidly becomes the foremost 
manifestation of a desire for presence. This is why, in Derrida’s work on 
metaphysics, the differantial unfurling of the here-and-now is circumscribed 
                                                 
82 Verhelst, Zwerm, 641-640. 
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by what happens to a failed attempt of phonocentrism. In Of 
Grammatology, Derrida lines up a set of philosophical and metaphysical 
concepts to show how they all originate from a desire for presence that is 
most adequately captured in terms of phonocentrism. Phonocentrism not 
only “merges with the historical determination of the meaning of being in 
general as presence,” it also merges with “all the subdeterminations which 
depend on this general form.”83 The subdeterminations that Derrida 
subordinates to the overdetermination of “Being as presence” are the basic 
concepts of western philosophy in a nutshell: the “self-presence of the 
cogito”84 as a form of hearing oneself speak; the presence of the logos as 
breath of the spirit;85 the “presence of the thing to the sight as eidos”; and 
“temporal presence as point [stigmè] of the now or of the moment [nun]”.86 
Phonocentrism determines the self as present and determines the other as 
co-present,87 defining the cogito as a form of “grasping of self as grasping of 
                                                 
83 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 12. 
84 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 12. 
85 Apart from the passages on “breath” in Of Grammatology to which I 
have already alluded, see also Derrida’s reading of Martin Heidegger’s 
hesitation to sever the connection between “breath” and “spirit” in Of 
Spirit. Derrida argues that Heidegger still partly upholds the connection, 
albeit in a derivative form: “Heidegger does not simply reject the 
determination of spirit as spiritus as pneuma (…). Rather, he derives it, he 
affirms the dependence of breath, wind, respiration, inspiration, 
expiration, and sighing in regard to flame.” Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit. 
Heidegger and the Question (University of Chicago Press: Chicago 1989), 
97. See also David Farell Krell, “Spiriting Heidegger” in David Wood (ed.), 
Of Derrida, Heidegger, and Spirit (Northwestern University Press: Evanston 
1993), 11-40. 
86 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 12. 
87 In Speech and Phenomena, Derrida delineates how phonocentrism 
invests thought with an auto-affectivity that comes with “hearing oneself 
speak”: “To speak to someone is doubtless to hear oneself speak, to be 
heard by oneself; but, at the same time, if one is heard by another, to 
speak is to make him repeat immediately in himself the hearing-oneself-
speak in the very form in which I effectuated it. This immediate repetition 
is a reproduction of pure auto-affection without the help of anything 
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non-self.”88 The moment that these concepts are lined up, showing their 
affinity with phonocentrism, it begins to transpire why they are always on 
the rebound. 
Due to the importance it places on the spoken word, 
phonocentrism is menaced by writing (écriture). If Being is pure presence, 
then “voicing” the logos of this Being implies distancing one step away from 
pure presence. And given that the spoken word is one step away from 
Being, the written word is two steps away from Being as presence. From a 
phonocentric viewpoint, then, writing is a supplement in the second 
degree. This gives writing a deeply problematic status: while Being is pure 
presence, writing is a re-presentation of presence in the second degree. The 
adequacy of the representation that writing gives must therefore be 
checked and double-checked. Writing itself must be kept in check. This 
means making sure that writing fulfils the function that it was designated 
from the perspective of metaphysics: writing must be a faithful 
representation subjugated by the spoken word that is closer to Being. It is 
from within this metaphysical constellation of concepts, all of which are 
over-determined by Being understood as presence, that writing is 
understood as “always technical [technique] and representative.”89 It is 
important to realize that this understanding of writing only arises from 
within the desire for presence that is proper to metaphysics. What we have 
here is not an axiomatic definition of writing as such, but the subjugation of 
writing within the machine of metaphysics. I want to concentrate on how 
this subjugation is implemented so that writing becomes a technique, a 
technical phenomenon. The work of subjugation done here by 
metaphysics, it will turn out, is not restricted to the realm of metaphysics. It 
can be found in literature and it structures the political. The work of 
subjugation is done by the machine. The machinic is what assembles 
distinct elements to organize them in an operative interlacement. “That 
which makes a machine, to be precise, are connections, all the connections 
                                                                                                              
external.” Derrida, Speech and Phenomena (Northwestern University Press: 
Evanston 1973), 80.  
88 Derrida, Of Spirit, 26. 
89 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 11. 
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that operate the disassembly.”90 The metaphysical machine organizes a 
conceptual interlacement in which writing becomes technical. Technicity, 
technicality and techniques originate inside the machine. Within the 
subjugation effectuated by the machinic, free-floating forces are 
“straightened out” to become functions that have a technical or ancillary 
function within the larger functional machine. The metaphysical machine 
has a specific significance here because, with its technical conception of 
writing¸ it gives a blueprint of how technicality is formed. The operation 
that makes something into a technical artifact and into a representative 
supplement is a result of “the metaphysical enslavement to technicity.”91 In 
metaphysics, enslavement and subjugation take place on a conceptual level. 
The representative and technical function designated to writing is 
exemplary for how technological artifacts are treated in a metaphysical 
machine. From the very first moment technologies (like writing, for example) 
are reduced to the status of techniques. A technique is understood as an 
auxillary function. It is a means toward an end without it determining or 
having a grip over the end it serves. This comprehension of technique or 
technicality could also be termed techno-logical, in the sense that 
something is transformed into a derivative technique that is governed by a 
logic that does not, as such, belong to it. In his work on technology and 
philosophy, Bernard Stiegler has argued that technology, understood as a 
logic of the technical, is at once at the origin of philosophy and yet has been 
forgotten by it. 
 
From its beginning, philosophy has provided evidence for 
such a techno-logical condition, but in its foreclosure and 
denegation; and it is the entire difficulty of my project to 
show that philosophy begins with the foreclosure of its 
proper question.92  
 
                                                 
90 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka. Toward a Minor Literature 
(University of Minnesota Press: Mineapolis / London 1986), 82. 
91 Martin Heidegger, Mindfulness (Continuüm: London / New York 2006), 
152. 
92 Bernard Stiegler, Philosopher par accident. Entretiens avec Élie During 
(Galilée: Paris 2004), 15. 
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The technological condition of philosophy consists in the fact that 
knowledge needs to be exteriorized in order to be transmitted in space and 
in time. It is this exteriorization that requires technics from the start: from 
the very first moment there is a prosthesis that is essential to knowledge. 
This prosthesis is not exterior to knowledge, as metaphysics might contend. 
The proper task of philosophy, according to Stiegler, is to reflect upon this 
techno-logical condition. However, from very early in its development, 
philosophy becomes metaphysical through a denegation of technics. This 
was done by appropriating technics into the structural conceptual 
oppositions of a metaphysical machine. Metaphysics, Stiegler argues, 
revolves around a 
 
dogmatism based on a play of simple oppositions that 
reduce the elementary complexity for which the element 
is not just the simple, precisely because it is already 
‘supplementary’, that is to say technical [technique], or 
‘prosthetic’.93 
  
The reduction of complexity is in fact the reduction of technics. Such a 
reduction is achieved by subjugating technics to become instrumental 
techniques within a connective set of concepts. Such a connective set of 
concepts constitutes a metaphysical machine because within it an 
operative order is created. Metaphysical concepts are arranged in 
oppositions, such as the opposition between nature and culture, original 
and unoriginal, presence and absence: 
 
It is precisely these concepts that permitted the exclusion 
of writing: image or representation, sensible and 
intelligible, nature and culture, nature and technique 
[technique], etc. They are solidary with all metaphysical 
conceptuality and particularly with a naturalist, 
objectivist, and derivative determination of the difference 
between outside and inside.94 
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The “metaphysical conceptuality” that Derrida mentions in the quote 
performs an action - namely, the action of “excluding” writing. In the same 
movement it subjugates writing by turning it into an instrumental function. 
The exclusion and instrumental subjugation that the metaphysical machine 
undertakes are not restricted to writing; they are indices for a more general 
action that is undertaken by the metaphysical machine. This is the action of 
instrumentalization in which technique comes about. It is precisely this 
action that makes metaphysics machinic. The machinic is what takes place 
in between concepts, what arranges these concepts; the machinic is what 
happens in the connectivity of these concepts, what arranges the free 
floating forces of technics into an operative, instrumental function that I call 
technique. 
By arranging the concepts in complex constellations of oppositions 
a teleology emerges. It is a teleology that tries to attain pure presence and 
uncontested origin. In it everything is subjugated and instrumentalized to 
become a representation of the origin and of the pure presence of Being. 
While “any attempt to return toward the untouched, proper intimacy of 
some presence or some self-presence is played out in illusion,”95 the illusion 
itself is highly efficacious. 96 A proper beginning or pure presence will never 
be found, but in the mean time the metaphysical machine does not stop 
trying to attain it, arranging technics in ever more functional intrumental 
relations. It is via a constellation of concepts, then, that technics can be reduced 
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to techniques – techniques of writings, techniques of storing information, 
techniques of representation, techniques of mediation, techniques of 
acculturation, etcetera. By reducing technics to technique, technics is 
inscribed as a function in a machine. It becomes a machinic function. Such a 
machinic function can arise in the context of the teleology that a machine 
establishes. It is therefore a techno-teleology, or rather a teleo-techno-logic 
that does not belong to technics as such but only arises within a machine. 
It will have become clear by now that my concept of the machine 
does not coincide with a regular understanding of a machine. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines a machine as “a structure regarded as functioning 
as an independent body,” and alternatively as “a material structure 
designed for a specific purpose, and related matters.” In itself, this definition 
of a machine is similar to what I am calling a metaphysical machine, a 
political machine, or a literary machine. But such metaphysical, political, or 
literary machines are not what we think of when we say “machine”. They are 
not steam engines, cars, typewriters, or anything of that sort. At best, and 
depending upon the machinic constellation they are in, these objects 
(steam engines, cars, typewriters) can be called techniques. That is to say, 
they are already instrumentalized – there is no getting around the 
instrumentalization that the metaphysical machine enacts. The 
instrumentalization itself has been performed by the machine, which brings 
these objects in a larger teleo-techno-logical constellation in which they 
become functional. In my argument, a machine is therefore nothing like a 
motor in need of fuel, and neither is it the complex mechanism that is 
dependent on more simple or general human techniques. The concept of 
the machine is used to explain how, from a play of forces that is neither 
instrumental nor pre-technical, a structural interlacement of these forces 
comes about. 
Jacques Ellul sketches a relation between technique and machine 
that is almost the exact opposite of mine. In Ellul’s work, the machine is 
unadapted to human society, while it is technique that makes it suitable for 
societal application. The suggestion is that the machine is profoundly 
inhuman whereas technique is still in touch with humanity: 
 
Let the machine have its head, and it topples everything 
that cannot support its enormous weight. Thus everything 
had to be reconsidered in terms of the machine. And that 
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is precisely the role technique plays. In all fields it made 
an inventory of what it could use, of everything that could 
be brought into line with the machine. The machine could 
not integrate itself into nineteenth-century society; 
technique integrated it. (…) Technique had enough of the 
mechanical in its nature to enable it to cope with the 
machine, but it surpasses and transcends the machine 
because it remains in close touch with the human order.97    
 
It is clear from Ellul’s account that he understands the machine in its narrow 
sense, as the highly mechanized artifacts that were invented during the 
industrial revolution and which have led to a radical transformation of 
society on a technical, economic and political level. This revolution and the 
mechanical changes it brought about are important, though it is not the 
object of my inquiry. Ellul’s philosophy endeavors to “contextualize 
machines”98 by tapping into a wider comprehension of technique as any 
kind of human “method of operation.”99 In that sense technique is in close 
contact with the “human order” because it is what defines humans, whereas 
a machine is understood by Ellul as indifferent to human order. Technique 
can then function as the intermediary between human nature and the 
machine. By integrating the machine into human society, technique also 
estranges man from himself. Eventually, in the nineteenth century, this 
brings about what Ellul calls the “technical phenomenon”, which occurs 
when human “consciousness and judgement” become involved with 
technique to reflect upon human techniques with the aim of optimizing 
and perfecting them. “The technical phenomenon is the main 
preoccupation of our time; in every field men seek to find the most efficient 
method.”100 The technical phenomenon has led to the machine and will 
lead us beyond it, Ellul argues. However, in doing so there remains no 
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possibility for reflection upon, nor critical distance from, technique or 
machine:  
 
From that moment onwards, when technical operations 
[opérations techniques] travel at the speed of a 
nanosecond, when the most consummate engines 
become obsolete within a few years, distance, reflection, 
and critique are no longer possible.101 
 
For Ellul this risk has always been imminent in technique. This leads him to 
take a skeptical position toward technique and the machine. Ultimately, 
there is no level of technique, technical knowledge or advancement that 
can help overcome the deadlock of technological society. On the contrary, 
Gilbert Hottois argues that, for Ellul, “technoscience can only lead to a total 
closure and the failure of every utopia.”102 Ellul is unable to conceive of 
technics without immediately conceptualizing it as a subservient, 
instrumentalized relation that has gone out of hand. For Ellul, the only way 
out of instrumentalization is to deny technique altogether. Below I will 
propose a concept of technics that tries to overcome, or at least bypass the 
dilemma that Ellul, along with many other philosophers of technology, 
faces. In this present study, technics is conceived of as “an-originary 
technicity” without it being instrumental. Technics is an-originary in the 
sense that it defies all origin. At the same time, nothing is more original 
than technics: time and again, it is the play of forces in technics that allows 
machinic functions to come about. Instrumentalization emerges with the 
machine taking the heterogeneous forces of technics to constitute 
operative interlacements. The literary, the metaphysical, and the political 
are constituted from within these operative interlacements of the machinic. 
At the same time, the play of forces in technics can return to break open 
these interlacements.  
A deconstruction of the machine starts off by analyzing the 
discursive constellation of concepts that forms a machine. A machine is a 
structural formation of concepts that are underpinned but also disturbed by 
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forces.103 Deconstruction is an attempt to trace the emergence of such a 
constellation of concepts, and to uncover the “rules of formation” by which 
the conceptual constellation of metaphysics operates.104 At the same time, 
it tries to uncover how these rules of formation and their conceptual 
constellations break down. Disturbed and displaced by the very forces that 
underlie it, the conceptual constellations of the metaphysical machine are 
opened up by technics. The tracing of such displacements and disturbances 
is achieved by tracking the movements of the forces at play, by looking for 
the moments at which difference and multiplicity are engendered in a play 
of forces that cannot be contained by the machinic. These forces both 
motivate and displace the machinic formation of any constellation of 
concepts, including that of metaphysics and its conception of technique. 
Deconstruction thus resides in a subtle “displacement of meaning from the 
point of view of the system of forces that gave rise to it, that motivate it and 
work through it.”105 Such a displacement of meaning goes further than 
meaning itself; it arises from the play of forces that underlies meaning and 
gives it form. From thence these displacements proceed to fracture the 
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machinic formations of metaphysics or politics. Deconstructive 
displacements aim to break open the consolidated functions in which the 
machinic takes form.  
Opening up machinic functions to engender multiplicity and 
difference is central to Zwerm both on a thematic and on a narrative level. 
On a thematic level, there is the zigzagging story of Angel, who, at the start 
of the novel, is fleeing the police. In a separate narrative, distinguishable by 
its different font type, Angel recounts his life in an attempt to find out how 
he ended up as the creature we encounter at the beginning of the novel. At 
times, Angel’s narrative parallels the main narrative of the novel, but 
whereas Angel functions as a character-bound narrator, this parallel main 
narrative is told by an external narrator. Oftentimes the thematic contents 
of these two narratives start to enmesh. In this way the history of Angel’s life 
takes form, but not in chronological order. The novel zigzags through 
Angel’s life, telling of his life as a clubbing teenager; his recruitment with 
the army; his training for war; his experiences in war; his escape from the 
army; his life as pariah. Central to all these fragmentary cuts and takes from 
Angel’s life is his awareness of having seen “things” and of having seen 
these things splintering into a myriad of little, ungraspable objects. In a 
certain sense, Angel’s story begins at the moment he realizes that he is 
seeing “things” and sees them fall apart to become a multiplicity of 
ungraspable little splinters. This is neither an aesthetic affair nor a 
subjective one. Instead, I would suggest that at this point the novel engages 
with the ontological, criticizing the conceptual constellations that make up 
a metaphysical machine. The dispersal of “things” that Angel witnesses is 
contrasted with the tendency to divide everything into clearly assignable 
conceptual categories. In the case of the implosion of the Silvery-Colored 
Building Block the dispersal of “things” counters the political attempt at 
control. This machinic dispersal is the thematic and textual wager of Zwerm. 
For this reason Zwerm operates as a machine of dispersion. Like 
metaphysics or politics, literature can be seen as a machine that organizes 
and structures the play of forces to constitute a narrative. In the case of 
Zwerm this narrative is itself an organized form of dispersion, gesturing 
toward the multiplicity that I call technics.    
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4. Angel’s Multiplicity 
 
Angel’s heightened awareness of the multiplicity of things begins as a child. 
As he sees his dog coming out of the water he comments: “When he shakes 
himself dry I see thousands, millions of things. As if I’m seeing the entire 
world reflected in those splashing drops.”106 As a grown-up Angel first tries 
to subdue this multiplicity, convinced that it is all in his mind. Gradually this 
multiplicity of shattering splinters becomes central to the novel itself, at 
which point it is clear that it is not merely happening in Angel’s head. 
Instead, his heightened awareness of these “things” is what distinguishes 
him from the other characters, along with the fact that he is infected by a 
virus developed by the military. As these two facts seem to be central to the 
novel, Angel can be read as an allegorical character substituting for the 
novel itself. In the following passage, Angel evokes “things” in recounting 
his earliest experience of seeing them shatter. The inevitable shattering of 
the things seems to be related to his initial desire to divide everything into 
strict oppositional categories (absence/presence, safety/danger). In this 
passage we witness the transition from a subjective feeling of multiplicity to 
a more objective feeling grounded in “things” themselves: 
 
Impossible to sleep, and if you succeed in it, you wake up 
in a pool of sweat. In fact you have not even slept, you 
have brought yourself into a state of a simultaneously 
reduced and intensified form of consciousness: a reptile 
rhythm is imposed on the body while it continues to 
receive and code every sound, however small, to classify 
them in two categories: danger / no danger. The latter 
category becomes more and more rare after a while. In 
the corners of your eyes you continously see things, but it 
is the very light that breaks apart into mobile little parts, 
as though your retina is affected. 
 
Onmogelijk om te slapen, en als je daar toch in slaagt, 
word je wakker in een zweetplas. In feite heb je niet eens 
geslapen, je hebt jezelf tegelijk in een verlaagde en een 
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verhevigde vorm van bewustzijn gebracht: het lichaam 
wordt een reptielenritme opgelegd terwijl het elk geluid, 
hoe miniem ook, blijft opvangen en coderen, 
rangschikken in twee categorieën: gevaar / geen gevaar. 
De laatste categorie wordt na verloop van tijd steeds 
zeldzamer. In je ooghoeken zie je onophoudelijk dingen, 
maar het is het licht zelf dat in beweeglijke deeltjes 
uiteenbreekt, alsof je netvlies is aangetast.107  
   
Angel is just beginning his story. He still tends to subjectize the experience 
of multiplicity he is having. Here it is the light that breaks open into flexible 
particles. As the story unfolds Angel will come to experience the shattering 
of things more and more as an objective, ontological phenomenon. When, 
at the end of the novel, the implosion of the building is described as the 
swarming out of a “millions of birds, millions of wide open beaks,”108 Angel’s 
story has come to an end. The shattering myriads that disperse the “things” 
Angel sees guide every description he gives of his experiences as a soldier, 
hobo, and terrorist. At the end of the novel multiplicity has shifted from 
Angel’s descriptions to the overall narrative of the novel itself. The dispersal 
of “things” that is staged in the novel arises from within these things 
themselves. 
A deconstructive literature is not just about text or concept. The 
multiplicity and difference engendered in Zwerm are not contained by the 
merely textual. To the contrary, it engages with a political machine and a 
metaphysical machine. These machines will be at the center of inquiry in 
subsequent chapters of the present work. At this point, it will already be 
clear that a literary machine such as Zwerm has a potential for 
deconstructing these machines. This potential for deconstructing the 
machinic arises from the same forces that give rise to these machinic 
functions: the same forces that structure the rules of formation for a 
metaphysical or political machine can de-structure it. Such a de-structuring 
or displacement results from a play of forces that is proper to technics. 
Concepts of technology and technique are the result of the structural 
formations of these forces – forces forced into a form – and as such they 
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assist in keeping the machinic on track. Technics, on the other hand, is the 
totality of these forces and regulates the play of these forces. For this reason 
technics is the precondition for the machinic, whereas the machinic is the 
arranging and reordering of the free play of forces to consolidate them in 
operative interlacements. As the interplay of heterogeneous forces technics 
is neither form nor content. Preceding that distinction, it allows for this 
distinction to be made. The machinic does not hesitate to make these 
distinctions and to interlace different formations that technics can then 
displace once again. By focusing on technics, by scrutinizing its 
implications, potentials and limits, a reconceptualization of metaphysics 
and politics starts to take shape. This is possible precisely because in 
Derrida’s work technics and politics lie in one and the same trope, as Paul 
Bowman explains: 
 
For Derrida, in one trope, the political moment or event 
arises when ‘telecommunication’ or regular relations and 
distributions and communications are derailed, jammed, 
and warped. This is basically (…) why deconstruction 
places such great emphasis on ‘merely’ reading – on 
working interminably and vigilantly at reading (…). 
Reading is never ‘mere’, if it is reading: it is the freeing 
from sedimented practices, presumptions, structures, 
institutions and establishments.109    
 
By carefully analyzing the concepts and tropes by which a metaphysical or 
political machine is formed, deconstruction attempts to “untangle the 
hidden forces of attraction linking a present word with an absent word in 
the text.”110 These forces do not simply structure the formation of a machinic 
function; rather, by making possible the form of the machine, they also give 
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it its drive. The teleological movement that gives direction to the 
metaphysical constellation of oppositional concepts originates here. At the 
same time, a machinic function will not be able to contain the forces from 
which it is constituted. While forming a machine, giving it its drive, these 
forces also overflow the machine, distorting its machinic functions and 
opening up the teleological overdetermination that comes with a machinic 
interlacement. The teleology in which technology is conceptualized as 
supplementary aid or technique ultimately relies on the forces that drive 
and set to work a text in the same way as they drive and set to work 
metaphysics or politics.111 In this context, Heidegger has spoken of “the 
onto-theological nature of metaphysics”112, recuperated by Derrida as the 
“onto-theological schemas or the philosophy of technique as such.”113 
Expanding on Derrida’s statements concerning eschatology and teleology, I 
would argue that while there is a “teleo-eschatological”114 
overdetermination at the heart of every metaphysical function, technics “in 
the last analysis refuses to be governed by a teleo-eschatological 
horizon.”115 I call metaphysics the attempt at forming these forces and to 
force them into a closed and fully operative system. 
Since this metaphysical attempt at formatting emerges from the 
play of forces of technics, it will never attain presence and it will never be 
able to abolish technics in favor of an absolute and unmediated presence. 
The desire for presence is generated within the metaphysical machine. My 
use of Derrida’s reading of metaphysics, though not separated from the 
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metaphysical machine, is aimed at clarifying the machinic and the way it 
tries to reduce the multiplicity of technics to machinic functions. 
Technology and technique are two exemplary machinic functions, since 
they are formed in the machine. Technics, on the other hand, is clearly 
distinguished from technique or technology in that technics is not 
instrumental. Technics does not adapt to the logic of the technical that I 
explained above, and which is crucial to machinic functioning. Instead, 
technics is presupposed as what will allow this logic to take form. It follows, 
then, that technics does not coincide with metaphysics or its machinic 
functions. Metaphysics is machinic because it takes the forces at play in 
technics and tries to enact a “neutralization (…) by the form.”116 The 
machinic functioning of metaphysics takes effect in this neutralization, in 
this formation. Technics is not an attempt at neutralizing or arresting 
heterogeneous forces. Instead it sets up an economy of forces that gives 
those forces free play. When these forces are formed into a machinic 
function technics re-establishes its economy of force by breaking up the 
machinic function. An analysis of technics will have to trace this double 
move in which forces are first allowed to be incorporated in a machine and 
then, when the machine is operational, break up the machine again. 
The relation between technics and metaphysics is the relation 
between two different ways of dealing with the free play of heterogeneous 
forces that determine ontology. Metaphysics is an attempt to neutralize 
through the form, while technics is what gives space to the forces 
themselves. At certain points, the disruptive capacity of force in relation to 
form becomes manifest at the level of language. For language to be 
operational, for the signifying capacity of language to be assured, each 
signifier has to be neatly switched into a larger circuit of signifiers. The 
signifier is the instrumentalized ordering of language, where the 
instrumentalization is achieved by placing the signifier in a chain of 
signifiers.117 According to Friedrich Kittler, contemporary literary criticism 
will have a bright future if it can succeed in analyzing the machinic, military-
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strategic construction of language. This would mean taking issue from 
information sciences and discourse analysis:    
 
At least for the literary critic, it appears that [the] 
military-strategic field of information science has a big 
future before it. Specifically, it could proceed on a strictly 
technical plane according to methods similar to those 
with Foucault’s discourse analysis proposed for 
utterances and texts. Rather than investigating the 
meaning of a sign-chain as interpretation or investigating 
the rules of a sign-chain as grammar, discourse analysis 
is quite simply concerned with sign-chains in as far as 
they exist and do not, on the contrary, not exist.118 
 
Connecting the fate of literary criticism to information sciences Kittler 
proposes to focus on the “strictly technical” side of meaning and language. 
The technical conditions for meaning are laid down in the formation of a 
chain of signifiers. However, the fact that this is a technical condition 
already points to the fact that an instrumentalization of language is taking 
place. Kittler makes a valuable point in arguing that this technical side of 
language is more important than meaning, but he leaves unexplained how 
language lets itself be instrumentalized, or how it becomes technical.  
What remains to be asked, therefore, is how a chain of signifiers, or 
a machinic ordering of language, or an instrumental account of language 
are possible as such. Meaning and the instrumental are on the same side 
here: meaning is created by technically ordering language into a chain of 
signifiers. Technics and the forces that underlie the formation of chains of 
signifiers are on the other side. Together these two explain the possibility of 
language to become what it usually is, that is to say meaningful and 
technical. The instrumentalizing process that constructs chains of signifiers 
to evoke meaning starts out from a play of forces. At the same time these 
forces displace signification and upset meaning. Language shows its true 
face at the moment signification is disrupted and the chain of signifiers 
becomes defunct. At that very moment “we have entered another regime, 
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other zones infinitely muter and more imperceptible (…) over-spilling the 
limits of the signifying system.”119 Within the metaphysical machine, 
signification is the only thing that matters about language. What I would 
like to bring to attention are those singular moments in which language is 
torn away from its signification so that the forces underlying it can be seen 
at work.120 Force is “the other of language without which language would 
not be what it is.”121 The importance of technics, as the other of language, 
for literature becomes clear in the following remark by Derrida in “Force 
and Signification”: 
 
It is when that which is written is deceased [défunt] as a 
sign-signal that it is born as language; for then it says 
what is, thereby referring only to itself, a sign without 
signification, a game or pure functioning, since it ceased 
to be utilized as natural, biological, or technical 
information, or as the transition from one existent to 
another, from a signifier to a signified. And, 
paradoxically, inscription alone – although it is far from 
always doing so – has the power of poetry, in other words 
has the power to arouse speech from its slumber as 
sign.122    
 
The task of tracking down the forces of technics that allow a metaphysical, 
political, or literary machine to take form might begin by looking for the 
moment of inscription in all of these machines. Neither material nor 
immaterial, neither present nor absent, the inscription Derrida is talking 
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about cannot be recuperated by a machinic function that operates with a 
rigorous distinction between presence/absence, material/immaterial, 
etcetera. The inscription itself is the ground that opens up the possibility to 
differentiate between material and immaterial, present and absent. Because 
it precedes these distinctions in a certain sense it also jeopardizes them. 
Henceforth, it becomes possible to disturb and displace machinic functions. 
Literature is a play with language that is not restricted to the technical 
capacity for the production of meaning. On the contrary, literature like 
Zwerm is apt at exploring “the other of language,” that which gives 
language its capacity to create chains of signifiers but also disrupts these 
chains. In literature the play of forces of technics is brought to the fore in a 
unique way. Krzysztof Ziarek has argued along similar lines that art has the 
capacity to show how technics is operative in everyday life: 
 
It is art that may allow us to see technicity for what it is: 
not simply the omnipresence of technological products or 
the growing impact of technologies on all aspects of 
modern being, down to the elemental level of genetic 
information, but the specific valency of relating, the 
power vector, so to speak, of relations, which become 
increasingly constitutive for how contemporary reality 
unfolds.123   
 
Ziarek distinguishes between technicity and technological products. The 
force of art is that it shows how technicity is at work in everyday life, 
including, but not limited to, technological artifacts. I prefer to hold onto 
technics as a term so that a distinction can be made between technique or 
technicity as an instrumental effect of machinic function, and the free play 
of forces that technics sets to work. However, I concur with Ziarek’s 
description of technics as essentially relational, as always interrelating 
heterogeneous forces. The force of a novel like Zwerm is that it tracks down 
those interrelations and shows how they generate a multiplicity that cannot 
be accounted for by technology or technique alone. Zwerm itself generates 
this multiplicity on a narrative level by acting as a machine of dispersion. 
                                                 
123 Krzysztof Ziarek, “Is All Technological? Global Power and Aesthetic 
Forces”, CR: The New Centennial Review, volume 2, n° 3, 2002, 143.  
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5. A Double Move in Technics 
 
Instead of analyzing specific technological products such as, for example, 
the microscope, the radio, or the computer, this study aims to develop a 
logic of the technical. This requires that we follow the becoming-machinic 
of the forces of technics to see how instrumental relations emerge. These 
are instrumental interlacements of forces from which a logic of the 
technical arises. In so far as this logic is machinic, it also constitutes a 
metaphysical machine. By arranging and interlacing the forces of technics 
in a structural way it introduces technique. This reduction is a first move that 
can be seen at work in the metaphysical. The second move, while operating 
from within the metaphysical machine, is a reemergence of technics that 
annuls the first move by a teleological overdetermination that characterizes 
the logic of technique. It reveals that the conceptual constellations of the 
metaphysical machine were always already dependent on the multiple 
force that they tried to subdue. This dependency can only be truly revealed 
by first allowing technologies to turn into techniques. Ultimately, the 
second move is based upon something that precedes the metaphysical 
machine - technics. It demonstrates how a certain economy of technics is 
presupposed in the oppositional and conceptual constellations of the 
metaphysical machine. This will show how technics is at the heart of 
metaphysics, both giving it shape and displacing it in one and the same 
movement. Technics is the inside and the outside of the metaphysical 
machine. In a way, the machine tries to push the forces of technics outside 
of its formal construction; it tries to neutralize these forces through the 
form. The form delineates an inside within which the machinic can have its 
way, while technics is neutralized. 
An inside is demarcated and maintained by opposing it to an 
outside. For that reason the outside is always in an essential relation to the 
inside, since it is only in this relation that such a distinction is possible. In a 
sense, then, the inside is affected by the outside. It therefore loses its 
absoluteness: inside and outside begin to interlace. The paradoxical move 
in which the inside can only be maintained by contrasting it with an outside 
demonstrates how the inside presupposes the outside. For the inside to lay 
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claim to pure interiority it must rely upon an outside.124 A relation of 
identity is always established with reference to the non-identical - never to 
the identical itself. While the relation of the identical to itself may be real, it 
will never be able to confirm its own identity. At best it will confirm a 
relation of identification, but it will not be able to establish identity tout 
court. To confirm identity an engagement with the non-identical is needed. 
The conceptual oppositions between inside and outside, identity and its 
other are therefore always interlacing. In the Science of Logic Hegel 
describes this interlacement by means of the internal limit that defines the 
relation between the identical and the non-identical, the self and the other:  
 
Something, as an immediate determinate being, is (…) the 
limit relatively to another something, but the limit is 
present in the something itself, which is a something 
through the mediation of the limit which is just as much 
the non-being of the something. Limit is the mediation 
through which something and other each as well is, as is 
not.125 
 
As a limit marking the outside of something, the non-identical other takes 
on a constitutive role in the creation of the identity of the inside. The inside 
presupposes the outside within its own identity as inside. What takes place 
here is a mutual interlacement of inside and outside, theorized by Hegel as 
a limit that is both internal and external to something. Such a limit marks off 
the individuality of something by relating its inside to an outside from 
which it differs. At this point the interlacement of outside and inside could 
be recuperated to account for individuation. It would even be possible to 
construct a machinic individuation from the operative interlacement of 
outside and inside that Hegel expresses with the concept of the limit. In 
                                                 
124 In his essay “Plato’s Pharmacy” Derrida writes: “The purity of the inside 
can (…) only be restored if the charges are brought home again against 
exteriority as a supplement, inessential yet harmful to the essence, a 
surplus that ought never to have come to be added to the untouched 
plentitude of the inside.” Derrida, Dissemination, 131. 
125 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science of Logic (Humanities Press: 
1976), 127. 
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Gesture and Speech André Leroi-Gourhan already conceived how such a 
machinic account of individuation would proceed. It would have to shape 
itself first of all as “a real biology of technique [technique].”126 Such a bio-
technical account of individuation, Leroi-Gourhan argues, would consider  
 
the social body as (…) an organism [un être] independent 
of the zoological one – an organism animated by humans 
but so full of unforeseeable effects that its intimate 
structure is completely beyond the means of inquiry 
applied to individuals.127 
 
Individuation of the social body would be as much a matter of technique as 
a matter of biology; or rather, social individuation would be technically 
producible. In this technical model of individuation the distinction between 
inside and outside, between self and other, and between identity and 
difference are constructively set to work within a machine. Not only are 
beings individuated within this machine, but so, too, are techniques – one 
might also say: not only are techniques individuated, but so , too, are 
beings. I explained above how a becoming-machinic gives rise to a teleo-
techno-logic in which technique emerges. In this logic of technics, 
technique attains a concrete function. The emergence of technique is 
described by Stiegler as “giving concrete form to a technical object [la 
concretisation de l’objet technique]”, that is to say “its becoming-individual, 
(…) its organization as becoming-indivisible.” 128 In machinic individuation 
the limit would connect one technique with the other, thus at the same 
time adapting them to each other to create a machinic function.  
                                                 
126 André Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech (M.I.T. Press: Cambridge Ma 
1993), 146. (Translation modified.) See also Gilbert Simondon, L’individu 
et sa genèse physico-biologique (Presses Universitaires de France: Paris 
1964). 
127 Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech, 146. 
128 Bernard Stiegler, “Temps et individuation technique, psychique, et 
collective dans l’oeuvre de Simondon”, Futur Antérieur, 5-6, January 1994, 
online retrievable at Multitudes http://multitudes.samizdat.net/Temps-
et-individuation-technique.html. See also Stiegler, Passer à l’acte (Galilée: 
Paris 2003). 
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A question of a totally different matter is whether the machine that 
consolidates this mode of individuation effectively deals with the 
distinction between inside and outside as the distinction between the 
machinic and its other that gives rise to it. By reshaping the distinction 
between outside and inside within itself as a means of technical 
individuation, the machine performs a doubling of this distinction. By thus 
doubling the distinction between inside and outside it is possible to 
confirm the identity of the inside by relating it to an outside still inside the 
machine. In that case “the division between exterior and interior passes 
through the interior of the interior or the exterior of the exterior.”129 There is 
a universal tendency toward immanence in the machine, a desire to shape 
and determine everything from within the limits of the machinic.130 This can 
only succeed to the point where machinic immanence is “essentially 
exposed to the intervention of forces that are apparently alien to its 
system.”131 These forces are what allow distinctions between inside and 
outside to be made. In relation to the machine, technics is “an outside more 
distant than every external world because it is an inside deeper than any 
internal world.”132 Technics is what makes it possible for differentiation to 
emerge, prior to any conceptual opposition. This brings us to another level 
of individuation and differentiation. Here we have an individuation in which 
difference and multiplicity are maintained within the individuated object. 
This is because technics functions as “the prior medium in which 
differentiation in general is produced.”133 At the level of technics, “laws and 
universals are but the evolutionary results of the stabilizations of relations, 
and individuals the hardened – but nevertheless provisional – nodes of 
these relations.”134 While a machinic individuation will try to universalize 
these provisional nodes, technics will open them up again. This is possible 
because the play of forces in technics constitutes the possibility of 
                                                 
129 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 43. 
130 This tendency is addressed in more detail in the next chapter. 
131 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 43. 
132 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy? (Verso: London / 
New York 1994), 59. 
133 Derrida, Dissemination, 130. 
134 Alberto Toscano, Theatre of Production. Philosophy and Individuation 
between Kant and Deleuze (Palgrave Macmillan: London 2006), 128. 
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difference prior to any ontological decision, prior to any philosophical 
thinking, prior to any teleology, and prior to any possibility for 
universalization. In this sense it is close to the plane of immanence which 
Deleuze and Guattari argue is the unthought that underlies every 
philosophy:   
 
Perhaps this is the supreme act of philosophy: not so 
much to think the plane as to show that it is there, 
unthought in every plane, and to think it in this way as 
the outside and inside of thought, as the non-external 
outside and the non-internal inside – that which cannot 
be thought and yet must be thought, which was once, as 
Christ was incarnated once, in order to show, that one 
time, the possibility of the impossible.135      
 
Technics does not oppose the machinic. On the contrary, it allows for the 
machinic to emerge – whether political, metaphysical, or literary. At the 
same time it cannot be reduced to the machine. From time to time it opens 
up the ‘possibility of the impossible’. When that happens technics 
intertwines heterogeneous elements to set to work an auto-productivity 
irreducible to the machinic. 
While Peter Verhelst’s earlier work has been described as 
“extremely visual and almost objectlike”136, Zwerm is both a reflection and a 
dispersion of the object as thing. Not only does the novel deal with 
dispersion on a visual, aesthetic level – on megascreens and personal 
computers, which figure prominently in the story – it also grapples with the 
ontological implications of such a dispersion of things. More specifically, 
technics, as the other of language, is staged in Zwerm on a narrative and a 
                                                 
135 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy? (Verso: London / 
New York 1994), 59-60. 
136 Kurt van Bellegem, “Triple appropriation”, in Annette W. Balkema and 
Henk Slager (eds.), Concepts on the Move (Rodopi: Amsterdam / New York 
2001), 45. This shift in writing style has not gone unnoticed. Many critical 
reviews of Zwerm target the change in style of Verhelst’s prose. See, for 
example, Jeroen Theunissen, “Een stem zegt: ‘we hebben zin’. Over 
Zwerm van Peter Verhelst,” in Yang, volume 2, 2006.   
 64 
linguistic level as a virus that roams language itself. As Verhelst remarks in 
an interview with the Belgian daily De Standaard, “reading Zwerm is like 
seeing the virus at work, but for once with language as its object and not 
the human body.”137 On a conceptual level Zwerm is about how the thing 
itself is a metaphysical assemblage that is continuously placed and 
displaced by a swarmlike virus inside and outside language - technics. The 
characters that figure in the novel, like Angel, each try to deal with this 
phenomenon in their own way. 
Zwerm is a novel about how language as a signifying chain 
maintains a commitment to present objects in language as things with a 
unified, extra-linguistic existence. At the same time, Zwerm also testifies to a 
multiplicity of forces that would seem to be outside of language. Roving 
inside language these forces de-structure the image of the thing that 
language as a signifying chain gives us. But there is more. This multiplicity 
of forces operates like a virus. Zwerm shows how language has always 
already internalized this virus. The forces that structure language belong to 
a “pre-individual sphere within which is rooted the process of 
individuation.”138 In Peter Verhelst’s novel these forces act like a virus, 
contaminating the inside of language and all narrative events. As a result 
the novel itself acts as a swarm with narratives continually dispersing, 
spreading out without any apparent unity between the narrative fragments. 
Throughout the novel this swarmlike composition is connected to the 
machinic. The swarmlike structure takes place from the backdrop of a 
machine, but also defies this machine in a similar way to technics. The 
following passage describes a machinic yet swarming event that captures 
this relation between machine and technics: 
 
On a thousand screens in town similar images appear, 
snapshots that, when put together, might form a film. But 
nobody is capable of overviewing the whole. You do not 
recognize the images themselves, nor the technique that 
was used. You only see that something is situated in the 
                                                 
137 “We zijn besmet en we muteren: Peter Verhelst over Zwerm”, De 
Standaard, September 22 2005. 
138 Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude (Semiotext(e): New York  
2004), 77. 
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screen and that it seems to breathe. Only after looking on 
for a long time you become aware that you are a witness 
to something that has to be so intimate that you cannot 
possibly avert your head. As if you were looking at an 
exposed heart, as if you were located in an exposed heart 
that contracts faster and faster, a mechanism that feeds 
itself and that drives itself to impossible speeds. One day 
a moment has to come, you think, when it has wasted 
itself, maybe even that is its goal. But it does not happen, 
the images become sheer speed. So fast that, 
paradoxically enough, the thing remains immobile. 
The only way to get rid of it: pull the plug out of 
the socket. 
But even then it continues in your eye, at night, 
when your eyelids are closed, by day, when you look 
around yourself, you always see that vibrating thing. 
 
Op duizenden schermen in de stad verschijnen 
soortgelijke beelden, momentopnamen die, 
samengevoegd, misschien een film vormen. Maar 
niemand is in staat om het geheel te overzien. Je herkent 
niet de afbeelding zelf, noch de techniek die werd 
gebruikt. Je ziet alleen dat iets zich in het scherm bevindt 
en dat het lijkt te ademen. Pas na lang toekijken dringt 
het tot je door dat je getuige bent van iets wat zo intiem 
moet zijn dat je onmogelijk het hoofd kunt afwenden. 
Alsof je kijkt naar een blootgelegd hart, alsof je plaats 
neemt in een blootgelegd hart dat steeds sneller 
samentrekt, een mechanisme dat zichzelf voedt en 
zichzelf tot onmogelijke snelheden opjaagt. Ooit moet er 
een moment komen, denk je, waarop het zichzelf verspild 
heeft, misschien is dat zelfs het doel. Maar het gebeurt 
niet, het beeld wordt louter snelheid. Zo snel dat het ding 
paradoxaal genoeg onbeweeglijk blijft. 
 De enige manier om het weg te krijgen: trek de 
stekker uit het stopcontact. 
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 Maar zelfs dan blijft het nog in je oog doorgaan, 
’s nachts, als je de oogleden sluit, overdag, als je om je 
heen kijkt, altijd zie je dat trillende ding.139   
   
In this passage all the key elements that figure in a myriad of different 
constellations throughout the novel are present: on megascreens 
throughout the city, on a personal computer, even on the inside of the eye 
after the plug has been pulled, something indefinable is shown. It is not 
simply an image that is transmitted; something actually appears to be in the 
screen itself. What it is exactly cannot accurately be described or named. An 
essential trait of this thing [ding], as it is called in the novel, is its machinic 
action, its rhythmic pulse rising and falling, steadily accelerating to an 
infinite speed. Endlessly accelerating its rhythmic, machinic motion the 
machine-thing seems to be at a standstill. This is why it looks like a static, 
unchangeable thing, whereas in fact it is spreading and swarming all over 
the city (on megascreens), in households throughout the world (on 
personal computers), and in peoples minds. The rhythmic pulses of the 
thing are described as mechanical; on the other hand, it does not function 
like any ordinary machine since it continues to operate even when 
unplugged. More important, it is unlike any classical machine in that it 
spreads like a swarm. Like the novel itself, it is a machine of dispersion. 
Whether metaphysical, political, or literary, a machine is about 
calculation; it is about stabilizing the assemblages it creates by neutralizing 
and interlacing heterogeneous forces. As the machine arranges them into a 
teleo-techno-logical order they become operational. In this passage 
something is operational. But the operation does not go as planned. 
Something disturbs it from within. The image of a thing as a unified object 
present both to the mind and to the external world is a deep-seated 
metaphysical idea. Techno-teleo-logical assemblages such as  computers 
and large screens can help to secure this metaphysical idea. All this is 
present in Zwerm. But as the passage above shows, the unity of the thing, 
roaming inside the machine, is completely dispersed. Dispersion can take 
place from within the machine. I would suggest that here we have technics 
reemerging from within the machine. As a result it can create a retroactive 
loop. A retroactive loop occurs when technics destabilizes consolidated 
                                                 
139 Verhelst, Zwerm, 475. 
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machinic functions from within a (political, metaphysical, or literary) 
machine, giving rise to a free play of forces and opening up new possible 
techno-teleo-logical constellations. Technics here follows the logic of a 
double move, faithfully tracing machinic functions in a first move to 
disperse them in a second move. For this reason it is retroactive: technics 
emerges both before and after the machine. Bernard Stiegler describes how 
such a retroactive loop can occur from within a given technological 
constellation of machine, using the example of Western society during the 
industrial revolution: 
 
A human society is always based on a technical system 
(…). A society puts this technical system to work, but at 
some point it no longer provides the expected results – 
for example because it has enabled a social 
transformation in relation to which it “disadjusts” itself. 
This disadjustment then induces a dynamic exogenous to 
the system, one that may in turn come up against a 
dynamic endogenous to the system itself. For example, 
the steam engine enables the production of better steel 
which enables the production of more effective machines 
and this constitutes a positive retroactive loop, which 
progresses until the machine reaches an optimal 
performance and then declines. And in the end this 
changes the technical system. The result of this dynamics 
is a process of technical evolution that regularly leads to 
a transformation of the very laws of the system and so 
produces a boomerang effect, such that the system itself 
then impacts upon society as excess, disadjustment, 
inadequation, etc.140 
 
What Stiegler calls a system, I would prefer to call a machine. New 
technologies introduced into a machine are recuperated as part of a 
                                                 
140 Bernard Stiegler, “Technics of Decision: An Interview”, Angelaki, vol. 8 / 
n° 2, 2004, 163. I will discuss the concept of disadjustment at greater 
length in Chapter 3, specifically in relation to the consitution of the 
modern state machine.  
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machinic function. Thus they become techniques in a larger constellation. 
The steam engine revolutionized both economy and national politics.141 In 
much the same way contemporary political machine tele-technologies such 
as the telephone, radio, or television have opened new possibilities that 
may be appropriated for political purposes. The technological assemblage 
that is thereby created in a political machine thus defines the political. At 
times, however, by refusing to fit in the political machine, these 
technologies de-structure the political. At that point a retroactive loop is 
created. Such a retroactive loop is a creative moment par excellence. It is 
precisely for this reason that it is also a positive political moment, taking 
multiplicity into consideration and even generating it. Such a thought of 
multiplicity, situated on a political, technical, and ontological level, is what 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri call “multitude”: 
 
The multitude (…) is not unified but remains plural and 
multiple. (…) The multitude is composed of a set of 
singularities – and by singularity here we mean a social 
subject whose difference cannot be reduced to sameness, 
a difference that remains different.142 
 
Technics might be best described as generating a multiplicity that procures 
“a difference that remains different” without shunning the technological 
conditions that define the world. Those technological assemblages, which I 
call the machinic, are always already taking their course. They do not stop 
technics from generating multiplicity. On the contrary, they depend upon it. 
In the remaining part of this chapter I will look for the technical 
underpinnings of the possibility for difference. Drawing on Derrida’s 
thinking of différance and the pharmakon, I will ask how technics works as a 
medium in which difference as difference and multiplicity can first emerge.  
 
 
 
                                                 
141 Karl Marx has arguably provided the most famous analysis of the 
political economic effects of the steam engine, in Capital. Volume 1 
(Penguin: London 1990), 288ff. & 499ff. 
142 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude, 99. 
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6. Différance of Technics / Technics of Différance 
 
Technics is more than a supplement contaminating the spoken word. It is at 
once more original and less static. It is a movement of contrasting and 
contracting forces by which difference is produced. As such, it is not only 
more original than the spoken word and its contamination, it also shows 
that there is no single origin. Instead of one single origin there is an 
emergence of several forces.143 According to Derrida, “the pharmakon is the 
movement, the locus, and the play: (the production) of difference.” Because 
it is the site where difference is produced it is “the différance of 
difference.”144 At this point, however, the production of difference is a 
matter of contrasting forces. Even more, the contrasting that happens in 
this play of forces is still undetermined, it is not yet a matter of oppositions. 
It is only later that “the process of discrimination will come to carve out” 
from this indetermination “the opposites and the differends“ of conceptual 
difference.145 An economy of différance as an economy of forces is at play 
here. The locus or site where this economy of forces takes place is not one. It 
is doubled, tripled, disseminated. The multiplicity of forces revolves around 
this dissemination. The economy of forces creates a site, locus, plane, or 
milieu that is multiple. “It has neither beginning nor end, but always a 
middle (milieu) from which it grows and overspills.”146 From within this 
economy difference can emerge. This all happens in the blink of an eye, or 
even quicker. It happens at such speed that it is not even instantaneous. 
The instant as a temporal unit becomes possible from the backdrop of the 
plane or site created by the economy of forces. The locus of this economy is 
therefore not simply spatial, it affects time as well. As soon as it emerges 
temporality becomes possible, immediately – without any delay an infinite 
                                                 
143 See Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, in D.F. Bouchard, 
Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. Selected Essays and Interviews 
(Cornell University Press: Ithaca 1977), 149-150: “Emergence is always 
produced through a particular stage of forces. (…) Emergence is thus the 
entry of forces; it is their eruption, the leap from the wings to center 
stage, each in its youthful strength.”  
144 Derrida, Dissemination, 130. 
145 Derrida, Dissemination, 130. 
146 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 23. 
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delay reverberates. It is deferral in difference, in which time and temporality 
find their multiple origins. Because it is multiple, or rather because it creates 
multiplicity, this origin of time and temporality is not one. The emergence 
of a metaphysical machine is an attempt at arranging and ordering this 
multiplicity. It follows, then, that the machine takes its cue from technics, 
from the heterogeneous locus that technics creates. 
In much the same way as technics, pharmakon inhabits Socrates’ 
discourse and arguments from the beginning. It is not just (in) writing. Its 
effects and affectations are not simply “present” in the written word. In fact, 
remaining as close as possible to the written word could be a way to 
counter the dangerous pharmakon, Socrates suggests. It is “pharmakon 
against pharmakon,”147 a frenetically literal reading of the law versus the 
ambiguous forces that place and displace the written word. This is why 
Socrates pays such heed to the laws when he is condemned to death. Only 
by obeying the law in the strictest possible way, and by declining Crito’s 
generous proposal to help him escape from prison and set him up outside 
Athens, can Socrates hope to counter the dangerous pharmakon with the 
good pharmakon of the law and philosophy. But the price to be paid is life.  
The strategy of opposing pharmakon to pharmakon immediately 
ends in defeat. Both are “a force inscribed within the general alogical 
economy of the pharmakon.”148 So even Socrates’ rigorous adhering to the 
law is futile. Pharmakon, too, is part of an economy of forces that Derrida 
has called différance. The eidos, truth, law, and epistémé that, in Platonic 
philosophy, are fixed against the flux of becoming and excrescence of 
writing are also equally inscribed in the economy of différance. In the best of 
all possible scenarios they, like everything else, “refer back to a same that is 
not the identical, to the common element or medium of any possible 
dissociation.”149 This is precisely what Plato’s doctrine of ideas cannot 
tolerate: heterogeneity introduced in the idea itself. In its attempt to undo 
différance, to still its differential forces in the ideas, Platonism begins to 
disintegrate. 
Shimmering through in the pharmakon there is a différance that 
resides in the Platonic idea itself and divides the idea within itself. Différance 
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precedes the Platonic idea, as it precedes every idea. A letter in the word 
différence is displaced, erased and then replaced for another letter. An ‘e’ is 
replaced by an ‘a’, with no audible difference. Starting out from language 
and what it has to offer us, différance presents a “literal permutation” that 
signals an “inaudible displacement.”150 Exchanging an ‘e’ for an ‘a’ is so 
effective because it reveals, ironically enough, some sort of deficiency in 
phonetic writing. Already we can see a double move here similar to the one 
made by technics.  First it follows the given system – in this case phonetic 
writing – and only then starts to deconstruct it. This inaudible difference, 
precisely because it is inaudible, puts into question the difference between 
the sensible and the intelligible. Différance is thus an attempt to conceive of 
an order that exceeds these oppositions which rule Western philosophy: 
“The order which resists this opposition, and resists it because it transports 
it, is announced in a movement of différance (with an a) between two 
differences or two letters.”151 This opens the possibility for the “strange 
place” (espace étrange) in which différance is situated. This place is outside 
of Being and outside of not-Being. Différance is the medium in which this 
distinction between Being and not-Being can first be made at an ontological 
level. It therefore precedes ontology; it is anterior to Being and makes Being 
possible. This paradoxical (a)position of différance defines the place of 
technics, the place from whence an interlacement of different 
heterogeneous elements can start to take place.    
Insofar as it is the precondition for the distinction between Being 
and non-Being, différance is also what allows for things to be presented as 
things. Différance itself, however, can never be brought to presence and can 
never be formed into a thing. Derrida writes that “if différance is (and I also 
cross out the ‘is’) what makes possible the presentation of the being-
present, it is never presented as such. It is never offered to the present.”152 
Différance is that which allows for beings to be present, and even allows 
Being to become present, without itself falling under the yoke of Being. 
Without itself being present, and without being at all, differance is what 
forms things. But here we need to be careful when using the concept of 
form. The formations of Being and being-present that différance enacts are 
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themselves not formed by a form; they are not the result of simply molding 
into the grid of différance. The process of becoming present is a contingent 
activity enacted by a play of forces. Différance, then, is not a collection of 
transcendental a priories, nor a collection of categories in which being 
reveals itself (whether subjectively, according to Kant, or objectively, 
according to many philosophers before him). It is precisely not this well 
delineated grid of transcendental categories of which Being would be the 
highest and most general.153 One way of individuating something, as I have 
explained above, is by giving it a limit that marks off this thing from 
another. However, such a limit requires that things are already present; 
before they can be clearly delineated, something of a material thing must 
first have come about. By giving it a limit something is reinforced that was 
already taking place. The limit therefore creates a difference – like a 
difference between self and other, between one thing and another thing – 
but it is not différance or technics. It is not the multiplicity that underlies 
everything:  
 
There is a crucial experience of difference and a 
corresponding experiment: every time we find ourselves 
confronted or bound by a limitation or an opposition, we 
should ask what such a situation presupposes. It 
presupposes a swarm of differences, a pluralism of free, 
wild or untamed differences; a properly differential and 
original space and time; all of which persist alongside the 
simplifications of limitation and opposition. A more 
profound real element must be defined in order for 
oppositions of forces or limitations of force to be drawn, 
one which is determined as an abstract and potential 
multiplicity.154  
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What I am looking for in technics is a difference that is not yet oppositional, 
not yet limiting, but instead will be able to account for the ”swarm” and 
”pluralism” that Deleuze mentions. Crucial to this difference is that it 
underlies subsequent oppositional distinctions but is not a part of them. To 
differentiate this kind of difference – the difference of differance, Deleuze’s 
difference, or technics - from any system of oppositional categories, 
apriority conceptual schemata, or limits, the notions of force and play need 
to be taken into account. 
Technics is a play of forces that determines a difference that is not a 
matter of conceptual opposition or of a difference in objects. Instead, the 
difference of technics that is present in the play of forces is a multiplicity 
that, unlike the metaphysical machine, does not yet have any teleological 
determination. It is technical because it is not original, defies every so-called 
natural order, and gives rise to technocultural machines of all kinds. But 
because it is free of any teleological overdetermination technics has a 
potential of multiplicity more free than any freedom. Hence the free play of 
forces. For Derrida the play of differance signals that it is a “strategy 
ultimately without finality [stratégie finalement sans finalité].”155 This testifies 
to the contingency of what happens in différance. It might well not happen, 
but at the same time it cannot stop happening (for it cannot be captured in 
the realm of Being, nor can it disappear into the realm of non-Being). The 
notion of forces in play shows how technics engages with Being: preceding 
both Being and not-Being, it brings Being to presence without determining 
it or overpowering it. Forces are not a (dominating) power. This is why, for 
Derrida, différance “governs nothing [ne commande rien], reigns over 
nothing, and nowhere exercises any authority.”156  
I suggested earlier how forces drive and distort a metaphysical, 
political or literary machine without ever appearing as concepts within it. In 
the play of différance forces are never present, they escape any ontology of 
presence. But they push forth the problematic that underlies machinic 
functions. They drive a metaphysical machine and push it beyond its “break 
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boundary” without ever acting as a classical causal motor in a machine.157 A 
first and perhaps strongest impression of such a play of forces was given by 
Friedrich Nietzsche in his notebooks from summer 1885: 
 
This world: a monster of force, without beginning, 
without end, a fixed, iron quantity of force, which grows 
neither larger nor smaller, which doesn’t exhaust but only 
transforms itself, as a whole unchanging in size, an 
economy without expenditure and losses, but equally 
without increase, without income, (…) a determinate force 
set into a determinate space, and not into a space that is 
anywhere ‘empty’ but as force everywhere, as a play of 
forces and force-waves simultaneously one and ‘many’, 
accumulating here while diminishing there, an ocean of 
forces storming and flooding within themselves, eternally 
changing, eternally rushing back, with tremendous years 
of recurrence, with an ebb and flood of its forms, 
shooting out from the simplest into the most 
multifarious, from the stillest, coldest, most rigid into the 
most fiery, wild, self-contradictory, and then coming 
home from abundance to simplicity, from the play of 
contradictions back to the pleasure of harmony, (…).158 
 
Nietzsche describes the forces that make up the world as an economy. One 
could say this is a truly differential economy: an economy that creates a 
multiplicity of differences without expenditure or loss, as opposed to the 
difference of a limit that inevitably creates a loss (a loss of the other when 
demarcating the self, a loss of the non-object at the moment that an object 
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is demarcated). A distinction between self and other is not yet made within 
the multiplicity of difference/technics. For that reason Nietzsche defines the 
play of forces as simultaneously one and ‘many’. This is not a contrast or 
ordinary distinction, it is an indication of how the play of forces precedes 
oppositions. “Force says difference. To think force is to think it by way of 
difference.”159 The rivalry between forces is not about oppositions but 
about different scales of intensity.160 The same goes for the apparently “self-
contradictory” fashion of the play of forces. It is self-contradictory because it 
has no unity within itself; the forces of technics are differentiated within 
themselves, they are never one, always many.  
Drawing on Nietzsche, Derrida’s différance can be read as a “field of 
forces”, where it is precisely the “interweaving of the field [that] is named 
différance.”161 I want to hold on to this interweaving because it comes close 
to the heterogeneous interlacement set to work by technics. Technics 
cannot be entirely equated with Derridean différance, Deleuzian difference, 
or Nietzschean forces because of its technical underpinning. This technical 
underpinning suggests that technics is not just concerned with formulating 
the differential (pre)ontological basis for Being, but also with the possibility 
for a re-emerging multiplicity and difference inside an always already 
technical and machinic Being – whether it be metaphysical, political, or 
literary. All three thinkers share a similar endeavour to account for a 
multiple difference that cannot be reduced to determinate distinctions. 
John Protevi provides a productive interpretation of force when he argues 
that “it is always a marshalling of force against force, a differential shift of 
meaning by a shift of forces, the non-hylomorphic production of a forceful 
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body politic.”162 The fact that there is a body politic at play here also implies, 
I believe, that these forces are ordered and rearranged so that they can act 
as a political machine processing the body. To understand how such a thing 
is possible technicity must be placed at the heart of différance. Technics is 
the milieu from which both the free play of forces and the machinic body 
politic arises. 
Taking up Leonard Lawlor’s words technics could be described as 
“the place between form and formless as a chiasmic fold, the mi-lieu (the 
displaced field).”163 What would such a milieu, as a sort of middle ground 
between form and formless be? As indicated in the beginning of this 
section, the locus, site, plane, or place in question must first of all be 
thought of as plural or multiple. Lawlor’s chiasm implies an interlacement of 
heterogeneous elements. The form and the formless are plaited into each 
other because the distinction between them does not as yet exists in 
technics. Instead, there is a play of forces that is in itself multiple. The 
machine tries to neutralize this through the form. Technics exists as a milieu 
in the sense that it is not a beginning but a middle. It is a milieu in the sense 
that it does not only start before the machine, but starts in the machine as 
well.  
One last aspect that deserves attention is the way multiplicity of 
difference avoids causal overdetermination. Derrida is quick to point out 
that différance is not subject to causality. The classical conception of 
causality involves a first, crucial step toward teleology. Technics will allow 
such teleological overdetermination to take place through the machinic, 
but it is not teleological itself. It is able to avoid teleology because it escapes 
causality. Derrida points out how, in the French language, the shift from -
ence to -ance also displaces the opposition between active and passive in 
the words différence/différance. The ending -ance neutralizes the active 
connotation that is still present in the infinitive ending -ence.164 In other 
words, what we end up with is an activity that is neither active nor passive, 
but rather passes through the opposition between active and passive. Thus, 
the way in which différance enacts being is by crossing out the opposition 
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between active and passive. This is reinforced by the description of 
différance as a play of forces : the play and interweavement of forces stress 
the contingency of différance. They are not an original cause, they are an-
original. Différance therefore becomes “an operation that is not an 
operation.”165 In a similar way technics is a modus operandi that is neither 
direct cause nor direct event; it is not a beginning, but begins somewhere in the 
middle as it were, interlacing and de-interlacing machinic functions that were 
already there. Technics is “a taking place” of the entire process of 
intertwining heterogeneous elements. At the moment that it takes place it 
develops a retroactive auto-productivity that opens up new possibilities.   
 
 
7. The Turning of Technics / Heidegger’s Technè 
 
Technics pushes the classical conception of causality to breaking point. It 
thus opens up a rethinking of the debate on technological determinism.166 
On a conceptual level, technological determinism formulates a deadlock: it 
introduces an either/or relationship in which only one of the components 
can determine the other. The two components at stake in this discussion 
are, most commonly, human nature and artificial technology. Only one of 
these two can determine the other; or, in a more subtle version of this 
argument, one of the two will have greater impact on the other. 
Unsurprisingly, the argument regularly exhibits a certain disdain. On one 
side,  arguments against technological determinism are often disparaging 
towards technology, which is depicted as never being able to match the 
complexity of the human mind. At the same time, these arguments display 
a fear of technology as something that will overpower and rule human 
nature.167 On the other side, arguments for technology exhibit a disdain for 
human nature. In this argument technology determines human nature and 
culture.  
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Both sides of the argument are problematic because they share 
two common presuppositions that I believe to be untenable. A first 
presupposition for technological determinism is that ”human nature” or 
”human mind” exists in in an original state – that is to say, uncontaminated 
by technology. A second presupposition is that one entertains a notion of 
technology that is already on the level of the conceptual. I have argued that 
oppositional concepts only arise in a machine, whereas technics itself is a 
play of forces that is neither conceptual nor oppositional. As a concept, 
technology only exists within a machine. Likewise, the distinction between 
the human and the non-human technical artifact, or between nature and 
technique, can only be made from within a metaphysical machine that 
structures these oppositional concepts. Failing to realize this will inevitably 
lead to some kind of technological determinism. Read closely, even an 
eminent philosopher of technology like Lewis Mumford builds up a critique 
of the machine on the basis of this rudimentary – but ultimately untenable 
and unproductive – distinction between (human) nature and machine:  
 
All the arts and institutions of man derive their authority 
from the nature of human life as such. This applies as 
fully to technics as to painting. A particular economic or 
technical regime may deny this nature (…). At all events, 
the mere bulk of technology, its mere power and 
ubiquitousness, give no proof whatever of its relative 
human value or its place in the economy of an intelligent 
human society. The very fact that one encounters 
resistances, reversions, archaicisms at the moment of 
greatest technological achievement (…) makes one doubt 
both the effectiveness and the sufficiency of the whole 
scheme of life the machine has so far brought into 
existence.168     
 
For Mumford, technological possibilities and achievements arise from ”the 
nature of human life as such”. Although life can be brought into existence 
by the machine, a human resistance to these same machines gives evidence 
                                                 
168 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (Routledge and Kegan Paul: 
London 1934), 317. 
 79 
of the ultimate anteriority of the human over the machinic. For the same 
reason, Mumford makes a distinction between art and technology. Art, he 
argues, “springs spontaneously (…) from the desire for individuation and 
self-expression.”169 For Mumford, the distinction between art and technics 
lies precisely in this spontaneous human desire: modern machines stand 
opposed to human nature and the  desire for individual self-expression. 
 In certain respects, Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology 
comes closest to refiguring the relation between technology and causality. 
His distinction between poièsis and technè is closely related to his critique of 
the reduction of causal complexity at work in Western philosophy. 
Heidegger’s critique represents a powerful way of re-conceptualizing Being 
as an event that cannot be reduced to causality. As such, his work is an 
instructive attempt for freeing technics from its conceptual and causal 
strictures.  
In Being and Time Heidegger argues that “from time immemorial, 
philosophy has associated truth with Being.”170 It is because of this 
“association” that a philosophical investigation into the nature of truth 
becomes pertinent to Heidegger’s project of a fundamental ontology. While 
adhering to the principle that Being and truth somehow entertain a 
fundamental relation, Heidegger de-structures the metaphysical tenet that 
underlies this claim:  
 
If truth rightfully has a primordial connection with Being, 
the phenomenon of truth moves into the scope of the 
problematic of fundamental ontology. (…) Because Being 
actually ‘goes together’ with truth, the phenomenon of 
truth has already been one of the themes of our earlier 
analysis (…). Now we must explicitly delimit the 
phenomenon of truth giving precision to the problem of 
being and fixing the problems contained therein.171 
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I would like to take this quote as a starting point for unraveling Heidegger’s 
lifelong engagement with rethinking of truth as Being. His meditations of 
truth and Being will bring him to conceive of truth as disclosure 
(Entbergung). For Heidegger, disclosure indicates that truth is something 
that both reveals (or discloses) and veils (or closes). In other words, along 
with that which is being shown by truth, there is something that is not 
shown but remains hidden. Truth has now become something that takes 
place; it is an appropriation (Ereignet). These are the parameters that define 
Being for Heidegger. By facilitating appropriation (Ereignis), the activity of 
disclosing is both close to and far removed from the play of forces in 
technics. Heidegger will conceive of technè as a way of bringing Being to 
presence.  
 How does the disclosure of Being take place? What guarantees that 
Entbergung and Ereignis take place? This is, ultimately, a question of 
causality, or at least of a causality that cannot be called by this name. 
Heidegger situates the birth of technique in a shift in the concept of 
causality. At the same time it also becomes a shift in the way Being 
discloses. Walter Brogan summarises it well when he says that “Heidegger 
attributes the birth of technology to a reductive transformation of the 
Aristotelian sense of nature, causality, and motion.”172 To understand 
technique, Heidegger writes in his essay “The Question Concerning 
Technology,” we need to know what is the essence (Wesen) of technique.173 
If we focus merely on technical machinery, without taking into account its 
essence, we will not have begun to ask the question concerning 
technology. The essence of technique is not found in technical apparatuses 
or machines. Instead, this essence lies somehow “deeper”, intimately 
related to the way in which Being is disclosed. For Heidegger, moving 
toward the essence of technique implies understanding it as a particular 
way of disclosing Being. In its essence, then, technique is an activity, one 
that is closely connected to Being as truth (Entbergung). Furthermore, 
technique or technè will come to represent a transformation in the way that 
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Being is disclosed. Henceforth, technique will take on a critical role in the 
history of Being. 
It is with this transformation in mind that Heidegger analyzes the four 
relations of causality established in classical philosophy. These four causal 
relations are explained through the example of the difference elements 
required to craft a sacrificial implement. Heidegger writes: 
 
For centuries philsophy has taught that there are four 
causes: (1) the causa materialis, the material, the matter 
out of which, for example, a silver chalice is made; (2) the 
causa formalis, the form, the shape into which the 
material enters; (3) the causa finalis, the end, for 
example, the sacrificial rite in relation to which the 
required chalice is determined as to its form and matter; 
(4) the causa efficiens, which brings about the effect that 
is finished, actual chalice, in this instance, the silversmith. 
What technology is, when represented as a means, 
discloses itself when we trace instrumentality back to 
fourfould causality.174       
 
There is a material cause, a formal cause, a causal finality, and finally a causal 
efficiency. Heidegger’s claim is that, in more recent times, philosophy has 
tended to reduce these four causes to only one: that of the maker or the 
craftsman. As a result, it has become impossible for philosophy to 
understand Being as disclosure. After all, these four causes together bring 
something into presence. Consequently, they partake in the disclosure of 
Being. They even have an essential function in disclosing, since they make 
Being come to presence as a thing and as Being: they “let what is not yet 
present arive into presencing [ins Anwesen ankommen].”175 Heidegger calls 
the activity of bringing into presence Her-vor-bringen, bringing-forth. 
Bringing-forth guarantees that something that until this moment was not 
present, is now brought to presence. Heidegger’s endeavor to reflect on 
technique as something that is concerned with bringing-to-presence is 
certainly compelling, and he makes  two important contributions. First, he 
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thinks of technique as an activity and not as something static. Second, by 
intertwining the activity of technique (as bringing-to-presence) and the 
activity of Being, he takes into account the possibility that Being might be 
brought-to-presence by technique. In other words, Heidegger seems willing 
to consider the possibility that Being as disclosure might be dependent on 
technique’s bringing-to-presence. The question that must be asked, then, is: 
where does Heidegger locates the transformation in bringing-to-presence 
that accounts for the role of technique in the history of Being? 
The Greek word used from which Heidegger derives bringing-to-
presence is poièsis. Poièsis is a specific manner of bringing-to-presence that 
is particularly associated with craftsmanship. As Heidegger’s explanation on 
the four sources of causality makes clear however, a poetic bringing-into-
presence requires more than just the craftsman. The craftsman is only one 
causal element in a more complex process. Phusis (Greek for nature) is 
another way of bringing-to-presence. While phusis as a natural process does 
not need any help to bring-to-presence, poièsis is precisely that which 
brings those things to presence which cannot bring themselves to 
presence. This is where the artisan, or craftsman, comes on the scene. The 
craftsman is only one of the causalities, but it is the one that triggers the 
bringing-to-presence of the sacrificial implements. In essence, technique is 
almost exactly the same way of bringing-to-presence that which does not 
bring itself to presence: like poièsis and phusis, it is a mode of disclosing 
Being:  
 
Technique [Technik] is therefore no mere means. 
Technique is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, 
then another whole realm for the essence [Wesen] of 
technique will open itself up to us. It is the realm of 
revealing, i.e. of truth. Technè belongs to bringing-forth, 
to poièsis; it is something poetic.176 
 
The difference between bringing-to-presence as technè, or technique, and 
as poièsis lies in the fact that technè will quickly evolve into an extremely 
aggressive way of bringing-to-presence. Technè forms what Heidegger calls 
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the framework (Gestell) that forces everything into presence as much as 
possible. The name given by Heidegger to this way of bringing-to-presence 
is “challenging” (Herausforderen). The framework that brings-to-presence in 
such a violent way is no longer restricted to inanimate things that cannot 
bring themselves to presence. Because technique reigns in Being as the 
mode in which Being is disclosed, living things are equally ordered in the 
framework. Human beings are held in reserve and become part of the 
standing-reserve (Bestandstucke) that belong to the framework. It is from 
here that they can be disclosed, since Being discloses itself in technique. At 
the end of The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger argues that there 
are two possible ways to relate to technique. The first is to negate it and to 
act as if it did not exist, and posed no threat to the world. Those who argue 
that the value of technique lies in its utility take this position. The second is 
to turn oneself over to technique, hoping that a day will come when Being 
as phusis will once again pierce through the bringing-forth of technique: 
 
This other possibility: that the frenziedness of technique 
may entrench itself everywhere to such an extent that 
someday, throughout everything technical, the essence of 
technique may unfold essentially in the propriative event 
[Ereignis] of truth.177 
 
Until that time comes, Being will be technical.  
 In a similar way as technics Heidegger’s technè is driven by a desire 
to relate technological phenomena back to an activity that concerns Being 
itself. But Heidegger’s bringing-to-presence still has a teleological 
underpinning that technics seeks to avoid. Above all, Heidegger’s technè 
seems dependent upon a certain unity (of Being, of disclosure, and of truth) 
that would be diametrically opposed to the multiplicity technics is 
concerned with. Because it is so closely related to ontology, Heidegger’s 
philosophy of technology is engaged in theorizing a space for Being to 
disclose itself. Heidegger’s philosophy does not presuppose particular a 
priori coordinates of space and time. On the contrary, it is the appropriation 
of Being that gives place and time. The appropriation (Ereignis) of Being 
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gives space and time, while technè, phusis, and poièsis assure that the 
disclosure is possible. Appropriation as such is a contraction, a gathering of 
time and space which makes possible a birth ground (Heimat). In one of his 
last letters to Bernard Welte, Heidegger seems to doubt whether technè still 
allows for such contraction of time and space: “It requires contemplation to 
say whether and how there can still be a birth ground (Heimat) in an era of 
technicalized uniform world civilization.”178 Heidegger fears that modern 
disclosure by technè destroys appropriation. Being therefore withdraws 
itself. However, within the lines of his philosophical project, Heidegger 
remains true to the conviction that Being is a disclosure that contracts time 
and space. As a form of disclosure, technè cannot essentially disturb this 
process: it can only aid or provoke disclosure of Being. Heidegger’s technè 
thus remains tied to an ontology which it essentially cannot grasp. 
Throughout this chapter, I have tried to develop a different idea of technics, 
one that escapes an ontology that holds on to the unity of Being as a first 
premise.   
Derrida’s différance is an answer to some of Heidegger’s ontological 
presuppositions, such as the unity of Being. For Heidegger, Being requires a 
presence or presencing that is achieved through disclosure. Différence, on 
the other hand, is not present. It precedes presence, whereas presence only 
becomes possible through this play of forces. On a spatial and temporal 
level différance must be understood as an original displacement of space 
and time. This is implied in the word différance itself: it refers to differing, 
which means both stalling and displacing. Différance is an “interval that 
might be called spacing, the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time 
of space (temporization).”179 For Derrida, différance names the spatialization 
and temporalization that are required in order that Being can take place. As 
soon as différance has spatialized and temporalized Being, as a contraction 
of space and time, can eventuate. Derrida argues that différance is at the 
same time displacing and deferral. When différance spatializes it also 
immediately displaces the space it opens; when it temporalizes it also 
immediately differs time. As a result, full presence is impossible. From this 
perspective Heidegger’s postulate that Being is an event presencing itself as 
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a contraction of time and space becomes problematic. Derrida’s différance 
deconstructs Heidegger’s concept of Being for two reasons. First, it shows 
that Being is not the most originary event. The spatialization and 
temporalization that take place in différance are presupposed by any event. 
Différance itself is an activity that cannot be pinned down. It undermines 
the very idea of an origin and of Being as an originary grounding. Second, 
Heidegger’s claim that Being is a contraction of time and space is countered 
by the infinite deferral and displacement of différance. Being is displaced 
and differed; it does not take place as an event contracting time and place, 
but is always already disseminated and dispersed. 
Yet disseminated, scattering time and space before they are even 
“born”, différance remains untouchable. At no point in time or in space does 
différance give way to the technological constellations created in a 
metaphysical, political, or literary machine. Whereas différance touches, 
disturbs, and contaminates everything, taking things out of place and 
disjointing time, it is never touched or contaminated itself. In Specters of 
Marx, Derrida sets différance to work on a political level. He argues that 
politics desires to take control over a delineated territory because of a 
deeper-seated desire for presence. The attempt to control territory is a 
political reformulation of a metaphysical desire for ontological presence. 
Consequently political control over territory is called ontopology by Derrida: 
 
By ontopology we mean an axiomatics linking 
indissociably the ontological value of present-being [on] 
to its situation, to the stable and presentable 
determination of a locality, the topos of territory, native 
soil, city, body in general.180   
 
Political action here refers back to an ontological problematic, to a “process 
of differentiation [that] is no less arch-originary,”181 and hence it has no real 
independency. Within Derrida’s ontopological framework there is no 
political machine that is not already reliant upon the ontological 
deconstruction carried through by différance. It implies that political 
machines will try to build up, will try to use tele-technical instruments to 
                                                 
180 Derrida, Specters of Marx, 82. 
181 Derrida, Specters of Marx, 82. 
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fulfil their politico-ontological desire for presence. But they will never 
succeed in this aim. Consequently, there are no real metaphysical, political, 
or literary machines in Derrida’s differential philosophy. They are 
deconstructed before they have a chance to build up. I believe this is 
because Derrida developed différance in the context of a metaphysical and 
ontological discussion (with Heidegger and Nietzsche among others) and 
only later considered the political and technological stakes. Technics, on the 
other hand, is an attempt to situate the technological and political possibilities 
in the heart of differential multiplicity. In that way machines are constructed 
from multiplicity, and multiplicity can reemerge from within these 
machines. Technics is truly a milieu, a middle ground that does not 
determine politics or literature from a quasi-ontological level, but is capable 
of opening up political or literary machines from within – from the middle.          
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
In his book on technesis, Mark Hansen has criticized the relation between 
différance and technology in Derrida’s work for a tendency to reduce all 
technologies to techniques. A good example of such a reduction is the way 
that Derrida deals with cybernetics and its concept of program.182 Hansen 
argues: 
 
Derrida seizes on the notion of the cybernetic program 
precisely because it allows him to restrict technology to 
[a] doubly derivative status and consequently to support 
the totalizing grasp of his ontology of différance. For 
Derrida, in the context of the history of the trace, 
technology functions as a mere machine – ‘a technics in 
the service of language’ – while différance is the genetic 
or quasi-vitalist principle that animates the technical 
machine.183       
 
                                                 
182 See Derrida, Of Grammatology, 84. 
183 Mark B. Hansen, Embodying Technesis. Technology beyond Writing 
(The University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 2000), 85.   
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Hansen reproaches poststructuralist theory, and Derrida in particular, for 
restricting technology to textual conventions. He argues that Derrida has 
succeeded in conceptualizing technology according to the model of 
textuality, but has not succeeded in conceptualizing technology in terms of 
its own qualities. As a result, poststructuralist philosophy in general has 
unwittingly tried to transpose the uniqueness of technology onto the 
generic model of a theoretical discourse based on textuality. It is this desire 
to discursivize technology and to push “concrete technologies in the 
service of a generative, deconstructive textual model” that Hansen calls 
technesis.184 At the heart of technesis lies a deep-rooted resistance to 
technology and an unwillingness actually to embody technology. 
 Hansen makes a valuable point in warning against a confusion of 
text with technology. I agree with Hansen when he charges différance for 
operating as a quasi-vitalist principle that animates the machine. However, 
as I have argued above, differential philosophies like Derrida’s are not 
primarily about textuality. Instead, they are concerned with a play of forces 
that both places and displaces the text and its linguistic conventions. What 
both Derrida and Deleuze attempt to think in the multiplicity of differences 
is the moment when the signifying chain is broken. It is at such moments 
that the play of forces remerges from within a textual, semiotic framework. I 
have tried to emphasize this aspect of différance - and  de-emphasize others 
– by focussing on the concept of technics.  
Technologies are not mere machines. Yet, as I have argued, 
technologies do not exist outside them. This claim draws upon a broad 
conception of machine, one that cannot be reduced to mechanical artifacts. 
On the most basic level, then, a machine is the idea that “technologies” and 
“techniques” always imply a schema of means and ends. In other words, 
technologies do not exist out in the open, outside of any functional 
framework. On the contrary, they are the result of a functionality that is 
forced upon them by a machine. In this respect, they are distinct from 
technics, which does not have any functionality or determinations but 
instead represents a genuinely creative multiplicity of possibilities. A 
machine starts out from this multiplicity. It reduces multiplicity and tries to 
interlace the heterogeneous elements into a functional constellation, or a 
                                                 
184 Hansen, Embodying Technesis, 86. 
 88 
machinic function. A metaphysical machine does so by arranging 
conceptual oppositions. A literary machine undertakes a similar action, but 
in a very special way. Peter Verhelst’s Zwerm can be read as an attempt to 
disperse the machinic functioning of metaphysics. But this dispersion is not 
an attempt to escape the machinic as such. Instead, the novel itself 
becomes a machine. Except that this time, what we have is a machine of 
dispersion. 
Insofar as it functions as a machine of dispersion, creating a swarm 
of narrative fragments, the novel is different from other machines, such as a 
metaphysical machine. A metaphysical machine does not open up 
interrelations, nor does it establish correlative possibilities for creation 
between heterogeneous elements according to the structure of a swarm; 
instead, it orders and mechanizes these heterogeneous forces in a 
structural and functional way. I analyzed the build-up of such a 
metaphysical machine. At the same time, I analyzed Peter Verhelst’s novel 
Zwerm, contrasting it to different ways of machinic functioning: one tries to 
order heterogeneous forces into a subdued pattern of order and functional 
presence; the other tries to disrupt such ordered, machinic functions by 
acting as a destructive machine of dispersion that untangles the machinic 
functions of a metaphysical or political machine. Zwerm tracks down such 
machines as they operate in language, then goes on to show that 
something different is at work in language, including within the linguistic 
conceptualization of a metaphysical machine and within political machines. 
This something, this indefinable thing, always already shattering, spreads 
like a virus.  
Most attempts to “start up the process of disabling the 
metaphysical machine”185 remain attached to this machine. It might seem 
almost impossible, at times, to escape the metaphysical or political 
machine. The notion of technics demonstrates that there are forces from 
which metaphysics derives its machinic functioning, and which reappear 
within the metaphysical machine to disturb it and open it up all over again 
– even to counter it. Technics breaks open with an incredible, 
nondestructive, creative counterforce. 
 
                                                 
185 Avital Ronell, The Test Drive (University of Illinois Press: Urbana 2005), 
211. 
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Chapter Two 
Machinic Functions:  
Deconstruction and/of the Metaphysical Ma-
chine 
_________________________ 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There is a real risk that, starting out from Derrida’s work on metaphysics, the 
metaphysical machine will be understood as a metaphysical text. At times 
Derrida’s work hazardously reduces the machine to text.186 At different 
moments in his argument he refers to the metaphysical machine as the 
metaphysical text as if those words and their subsequent clusters of mean-
ing could be used interchangeably. In the light of Derrida’s intensive cri-
tique of semiotics and his attempt to establish a grammatology that over-
comes the classical concept of text in order to open it up to the grammē 
and trace, this lapse is comprehensible. Nevertheless, it remains problem-
atic for a conceptualization of technics and the machine. This ambiguity has 
led Mark B. Hansen to reproach Derrida for reducing the machine to text 
                                                 
186 This is also the theme of a fascinating study on deconstruction by 
François Laruelle, Machines textuelles: Déconstruction et libido d’écriture 
(Seuil: Paris 1976). Laruelle’s interpretation of Derrida’s ‘metaphysical 
text’ brings him to understand the text as a machine of reproduction. 
What becomes increasingly clear toward the end of his study is that 
Laruelle not only understands the text as a reproductive machine, he also 
understands machines from the vantage point of the text.  
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and thus understanding everything to function as a text, technology in-
cluded: 
  
Derrida is compelled to localize the operation of technol-
ogy exclusively within the domain of the text. Technology 
is thus restricted to the “machine”, to the “programmatic”, 
and, ultimately, the “grammatical” aspect of thinking (the 
mechanisms of language).187  
 
Hansen mistakenly believes that the text is what defines and determines 
the potential of Derrida’s work for developing a concept of technics. In the 
previous chapter, I argued that a more viable point of departure that opens 
up wider possibilities is différance. The interweaving of forces that is done 
by différance cannot be captured by any sort of immanent textualism. In-
stead, the interweaving play of forces constructs multiple poles of attrac-
tion to which the text itself is bound.188 Derrida’s work is not in line with a 
textualism understood as the ‘mechanics of language’ that determines 
technics.189  
While an urgent task is to develop a concept of technics starting 
out from différance as I have done in the previous chapter, technics also 
needs to be distinguished from the machine. Although the two concepts 
rely upon each other and operate by grafting themselves onto each other, 
they are not the same. In Derrida’s work the machine is most often used in 
relation to metaphysics. It does not designate something that Derrida 
deems positive.190 Quite the contrary, it is the machine that Derrida wants 
                                                 
187 Mark B. Hansen, Embodying Technesis: Technology Beyond Writing, 
129. 
188 This is why Derrida can refute both attempts at literal, strictly textual 
readings and readings that try to abstract the meaning of a word from its 
form. See Derrida, Dissemination, 112. 
189 Another difficulty in Hansen’s critique is that it does not clearly 
distinguish between technology, the machine, and the program. Derrida 
himself, however, does make a distinction between these concepts.  
190 Sometimes Derrida also speaks of machines when referring to tele-
technologies. This is perhaps another signal that the concept of the 
machine, albeit important, remains underdeveloped in Derrida’s work.  
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to deconstruct – the metaphysical machine. This chapter deploys an analy-
sis that rigorously scrutinizes Derrida’s reading of metaphysics with refer-
ence to the machine. This enables me to uncover what could be called the 
machinic functioning of metaphysics. The properties of this machinic func-
tioning can be derived from Derrida’s analysis of metaphysics. In particular, 
Derrida’s reading of metaphysics as the construction of a teleo-
eschatological history, and his distinction between the end of metaphysics 
and the closure of metaphysics, play an important role in this chapter. By 
abstracting these issues from their strictly metaphysical context, I show that 
they can serve as a starting point for conceptualizing the machine. At that 
moment it also becomes possible to digress from Derrida’s analysis in order 
to investigate the concept of the machine as a conceptualization of the po-
litical.  
At various moments this chapter zooms in on a discussion between 
Derrida and Heidegger while developing a thinking of the machine in the 
interstices of every paragraph and every turn of the tongue. I only deal with 
elements of this longstanding discussion; they are brought in as far as they 
are relevant for a conceptualization of the machine. But the elements that I 
select are presented in full to give a clear view of the matter at stake before 
derailing it. This is a painstaking activity that takes time, but that is neces-
sary to explore the full potential of the deconstruction of metaphysics for 
conceptualizing the machine. In the first section, I explore how and how far 
the analysis of metaphysics has implication for Derrida’s formulation of a 
deconstructive practice. Metaphysics captures thought in a closure from 
which it cannot free itself. At the same time, it strives toward its own end. 
This argument only becomes comprehensible when it is clear that meta-
physics has a hold on our notions of time, history, and epoch. These meta-
physical concepts, which hold us in their closure, are appropriated in a de-
constructive reading (in a first move) only to subvert them later on again (in 
a second move). Tracing the moves that are made in a deconstructive read-
ing of the ‘tradition,’ ‘history,’ or ‘epoch’ of metaphysics puts us right at the 
heart of the discussion on time that unfolds in Derrida’s essay, “Ousia et 
grammē.” At this point in the chapter, I look into the problem of time, not 
only as a metaphysical and a machinic problem, but also as a problem for 
deconstruction itself. Différance is what makes time possible, I argue, but it 
is the machine that actualizes time. So time only comes into existence at the 
moment that the machine is grafted onto différance. The concluding argu-
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mentative step in this chapter contends that the grafting of the machine 
onto différance introduces time at the heart of the political functions of the 
machine. This brings into focus the implications of the teleo-eschatology 
that can be detected in the machine. It also refers back to the ontopological 
functioning and disrupting of the political by différance and technics that 
was analyzed in the first chapter. In returning to the problem of time (as a 
metaphysical one), I return to the metaphysical concepts of history and ep-
och with which I begin the argument, and so consequently the beginning 
returns in the end. 
 
 
2. The Metaphysical Machine, Reading History 
 
Derrida’s reading of metaphysics – or, as I prefer to call it, the metaphysical 
machine - unfolds itself as a reading of a specific history. In so far as this his-
tory is presented as an organic unity, with the ‘conceptual crisis of lan-
guage’ as its guiding thread, Derrida’s project does indeed seem to hinge 
on the classical ways of writing history as a unity. This has vast implications 
for Derrida’s reading of metaphysics: it would signal that Derrida himself 
remains captured in metaphysics in that he adopts the metaphysical pre-
supposition that history can be read as a unity with a guiding principle. 
Studying metaphysics and the concepts employed therein, Derrida is 
caught up in the use of metaphysical concepts such as ‘history,’ ‘unity,’ ‘ep-
och,’ ‘presence.’ The fact that he adopts these terms in a first move does not 
mean that he remains caught up in metaphysics. His use of these concepts 
is strategic: he adopts them in a first move only to overturn their use and 
meaning in a second move. The same double move that I traced in the first 
chapter with regard to the concepts of technique, technology, and technics 
is at work in Derrida’s reading of metaphysics as a history. It is the way in 
which Derrida uses these terms that allows him to (de)construct the meta-
physical era and reveal its crucial traits. 
In many respects Derrida’s analysis of the metaphysical machine is 
preoccupied with history, with situating deconstruction in (metaphysical) 
history. In the preface to Of Grammatology, Derrida underlines his ambition 
to create a theoretical matrix that should subsequently provide some marks 
and points of contact for further historical inquiry into the history of writing 
as the history of metaphysics. Derrida’s reading of the history of metaphys-
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ics cannot be accounted for by any of the existing classical modes of read-
ing. In order to bring out the essential traits of the history of metaphysics it 
is necessary to transgress the boundaries and restrictions laid out by these 
classical modes of reading and writing history. For this reason, Derrida 
claims that it was absolutely necessary that his reading  
 
should free itself, at least in its axis, from classical cate-
gories of history – not only from the categories of the 
history of ideas and the history of literature but also, and 
perhaps above all, from the categories of the history of 
philosophy.191  
 
Immediately following this, Derrida argues that in writing the history of 
metaphysics he also had to respect the norms that are inherent to that tra-
dition and which cannot simply be undone. The concept of the axis plays a 
critical role in explaining this paradox. Whilst Derrida claims that in its axis 
his reading of metaphysics has to move away from the classical concepts of 
writing history, it is now suggested that around this axis his reading needs 
to conform to some of the most impeding concepts and rules of metaphys-
ics. Around this axis he has to ‘respect them [i.e., the classical categories of 
writing history].’192 Derrida consciously moves back and forth between a 
new approach to writing history, on the one hand, and a classical approach 
to writing history, on the other. The question is how these two approaches 
are related. They are intricately interwoven, and whilst the new approach to 
writing history defines the axis of Derrida’s reading, the classical approach 
lies around this axis. In other words: the new approach should form the ma-
trix even if the classical form is still present.  
This rather abstract issue becomes clearer by looking at some con-
cepts that function as prerequisites to Derrida’s writing of the history of 
metaphysics, concepts such as ‘history,’ ‘epoch,’ or ‘era.’ All these concepts 
are impregnated by metaphysics. This implies that even the idea of writing 
a history of metaphysics will remain captured within metaphysics. The 
metaphysical machine overdetermines the relation to the past in such a 
way that a unifying grid can be laid over it so as to conjure up a ‘history.’ 
                                                 
191 Derrida, Of Grammatology, lxxxiv. 
192 Derrida, Of Grammatology, lxxxxix. 
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This unifying grid is not at a stand-still, like a snapshot; it has its own teleol-
ogy embedded in it. Therefore, in order to write a history of metaphysics, 
Derrida already needs to revert to a metaphysical concept, i.e., ‘history’. A 
similar problem poses itself with concepts such as epoch, age or era. Der-
rida’s project in Of Grammatology is itself overdetermined by the meta-
physical machine by the concepts it uses and displaces. 
The solution Derrida provides once again highlights the double 
move that was introduced and analyzed in the first chapter. By reading 
metaphysics as a history two performative modes are installed in Derrida’s 
reading that together add up to the double move of deconstruction. First, 
in reading and writing the history of metaphysics this reading and writing in 
turn start to belong to metaphysics. There is no way one can write a history 
of metaphysics without being part of it precisely because one is writing it as 
a history. Second, by writing the history of metaphysics from within (the 
margins) of metaphysics Derrida is actively displacing the metaphysical ma-
chine, using it against itself even as he himself remains caught inside it. Ac-
cording to Derrida, it is necessary to use these metaphysical terms as struc-
tural figures and as historical totalities: 
  
Although the word “age” or ”epoch” can be given more 
than these determinations, I should mention that I have 
concerned myself with a structural figure as much as a 
historical totality. I have attempted to relate these two 
seemingly necessary approaches […].193  
 
Derrida uses a concept such as ‘history’ or ‘epoch’ in a figurative sense to 
discover a structure. He uses the concept of ‘history’ or ‘epoch’ to reveal the 
axiology of metaphysics as it has appeared in the tradition of Western phi-
losophy. Taken as a figure, a concept such as ‘history’ enables Derrida to 
trace certain structural connections between metaphysical concepts. By 
thus tracing the connections from one concept to another a first idea of the 
metaphysical machine becomes apparent. The machine is what allows for 
these concepts to be connected, what sets these concepts to work and 
what gives them their teleology. This machine, as I argue throughout the 
chapter, is first and foremost characterized by its functioning. The machinic 
                                                 
193 Derrida, Of Grammatology, lxxxix. 
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functioning drives the teleology that lies behind it. Derrida characterizes 
metaphysics as teleo-eschatological while at the same time stressing there 
is no concept that is metaphysical by itself. The teleology of metaphysics 
must therefore come from something other than these concepts. I propose 
that it is inaugurated through the machinic functioning of metaphysics. 
Moreover, machinic functioning is just as much at work in politics as it is in 
metaphysics. In fact, what Derrida reads as a history of metaphysics lets it-
self be read just as easily as a cryptic history of modernity’s conceptualiza-
tion of the political. This conceptualization is carried out through the ma-
chine and within the machine. 
Using such concepts as ‘history’ and ‘epoch’ Derrida is aware of 
their metaphysical effect. These effects are the result of the machinic func-
tioning that links them. Using them implies succumbing to the functions of 
the metaphysical machine. For example, the concept of history is also char-
acterized as a historical totality, and this is also the (metaphysical) definition 
of the concept ‘epoch.’ The lever of Derrida’s deconstruction will be to dis-
place the relations between these concepts so that the machine that links 
them will fall apart. If such a deconstruction is successful, then the meta-
physical machine in its totality would be nothing but ‘an erratic graft, par-
ody perhaps’; and thus ‘it is not a totality [after all] […], perhaps in certain of 
its most slippery movements,’ it only deceives us in appearing like a total-
ity.194 
Although Derrida aims for a deconstruction of the metaphysical 
machine, he also realizes that he cannot simply do away with metaphysics 
and everything it implies. At the philosophical level, from which Derrida is 
very much still speaking in Of Grammatology, the history of metaphysics is 
all there is. It provides the concepts and it provides the linkages between 
those concepts. Inventing new concepts without first deconstructing the 
older metaphysical ones would cause the old concepts to become caught 
up in the metaphysical machine again. In Derrida’s work, the political effi-
cacy of philosophy often depends on the successful deconstruction of con-
cepts that political discourses depend upon. In Rogues, for example, Derrida 
deconstructs the concept of sovereignty in relation to the machine. Only 
when these concepts are deconstructed is a possibility for new concepts 
                                                 
194 Jacques Derrida. Épérons. Les styles de Nietzsche (Flammarion: Paris 
1978), 115 (my translation). 
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opened. The relation of Derrida’s political deconstruction to his deconstruc-
tion of the metaphysical machine will be investigated in more detail below. 
However, for Derrida, to deconstruct metaphysics means to do so from 
within its closure; if possible, by bordering on the outside as much as on the 
inside of metaphysics. The relation between inside and outside, and more 
generally speaking, of the hierarchies that are operational in the metaphysi-
cal machine, might however be effectively disturbed by deconstruction. In 
his political work Derrida has often made the case that politics too falls prey 
to the same desires as metaphysics. The argument Derrida offers concern-
ing ontopology in Specters of Marx is motivated by his conviction that poli-
tics tries to establish an ontological presence, a present ground or territory 
that would be controlled by politics. The question remains whether Derrida 
is not just transposing the features of the metaphysical machine onto poli-
tics. This would not be wrong in itself; in fact, it may prove to be one of Der-
rida’s more fascinating and creative political figure of thought. I suggest 
however that we take the concept of the machine with us in this transposi-
tion. 
 
 
3. Destruction / Deconstruction, Wither the Metaphysical Machine (1) 
  
In Of Grammatology deconstruction is played out as first and foremost a 
deconstruction of the history of metaphysics. Derrida’s attention to con-
cepts such as history or epoch already gave ample evidence of this. It might 
appear, then, as if Derrida uncritically inherits a task that Heidegger sets 
himself at the beginning of Being and Time: to destruct the metaphysical 
tradition by a reprise of its most basic concepts. Derrida’s approach towards 
the history of metaphysics is indeed indebted to Heidegger’s work on the 
same theme. Yet it would be wrong to think that Heidegger and Derrida 
aim for the same destruction, or that their respective positions towards 
metaphysics are the same. Derrida’s deconstruction of the history of meta-
physics harbors at least one crucial alteration of the Heideggerian theme, 
thus marking the difference between Derrida’s deconstruction and Heideg-
ger’s destruction. Not coincidentally, this difference highlights an issue that 
is crucial to technics in relation to the machine (of metaphysics).  
Heidegger believed it possible to leave the metaphysical era be-
hind by properly destructing it. His philosophy can be interpreted as an un-
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dertaking to free itself from the metaphysical tradition. This view is main-
tained by Richard Rorty among others. According to Rorty, ‘Heidegger is still 
doing the same sort of thing which Plato tried to do when he created a su-
persensible world from which to look down on Athens.’195 What Plato does 
to the world and the world of ideas, Heidegger does with regard to epochs 
and history, Rorty claims. Thus:  
 
the Heideggerian counterpart of Plato’s world of appear-
ance seen from above is the West seen from beyond 
metaphysics. Whereas Plato looks down, Heidegger looks 
back. But both are hoping to distance themselves from, 
cleanse themselves of, what they are looking at.196  
 
Though Rorty’s view is rather undifferentiated and would do well to take 
into account Heidegger’s admonition in Vorträge und Aufsätze that one can 
never simply leave the epoch of metaphysics behind, the overall point Rorty 
is making allows for a valuable distinction between Derrida and Heidegger 
on the issue.197 Derrida argues that Heidegger’s philosophy can still be in-
terpreted as belonging to the history of metaphysics precisely because Hei-
degger too easily thought he would be able to leave that metaphysical era 
by destructing it. The beginning of Of Grammatology reads as a reprise of 
Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics. The lever for deconstruction here 
is to deconstruct Heidegger’s reading of metaphysics along with the history 
of metaphysics itself. In the course of this enterprise Derrida introduces the 
idea of the closure of metaphysics. He distinguishes this closure from Hei-
degger’s end of metaphysics. As Eugenio Donato remarks:  
 
Derrida’s closure of metaphysics is a reading and a dis-
placement of the Heideggerian notion of end. The rewrit-
                                                 
195 Richard Rorty. Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge 1991), 67. 
196 Richard Rorty. Essays on Heidegger and Others, 67. 
197 Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze (Neske Verlag: Pfullingen 
1954), 72. 
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ing of the end of metaphysics into its closure necessarily 
problematizes its concomitant notion of origin.198  
 
This indicates that Derrida’s deconstruction of metaphysics differs in some 
essential ways from Heidegger’s destruction of the metaphysical tradition. 
Instead of stepping out the metaphysical machine Derrida remains within 
its closure. However, Derrida’s deconstruction from within the closure re-
veals ‘the yet unnamable glimmer beyond the closure [la lueur de l’outre-
clôture].’199 This is one of the points in which Derrida distinguishes himself 
from Heidegger. It is also a basic trait of deconstruction.  
In the context of my argument on the machine the relation be-
tween closure and end plays an important role. Both closure and end are 
present in the machine. They ought to exclude each other but in reality they 
work alongside each other. Working alongside each other they are effec-
tively working against each other, time and again displacing each other. 
The dynamics that result from this relation best describe what Derrida refers 
to as teleo-eschatology. Deconstruction begins with the knowledge that 
there is no escape from the metaphysical machine. The way in which the 
metaphysical machine captures will be explained in detail when analyzing 
the difference between a closure (which functions as a fence) and an end 
(toward which there is a teleological drive). Derrida’s analysis of metaphys-
ics is a major breakthrough in discovering the function of the machine, pre-
cisely because metaphysics has its own specific machinic functioning. In 
order to define the machine and clarify its relation to technics, Derrida’s 
analysis will have to be taken elsewhere, and it will even have to be modi-
fied in certain respects. 
Distancing himself from Heidegger, Derrida allowed himself to be 
caught up in the closure of metaphysics. This is one of the strengths of his 
analysis. He takes into account his own position as a both the subject and 
object of the metaphysical machine. But he also succeeds in glimpsing what 
remains outside the closure of metaphysics. This metaphysical ambiguity 
manifests itself even on the level of the concepts deconstruction deploys, 
displaces, and deconstructs. Derrida reflected upon ‘the theory of [his] task 
                                                 
198 Eugenio Donato, “Ending/Closure: Derrida’s Edging of Heidegger,” Yale 
French Studies, n° 67, 1984, 12. 
199 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 14. 
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[devoir].’ As a consequence, Jean-Luc Nancy remarks, ‘Derrida was forced to 
exhibit the reverse of this self-legitimization [auto-légitimation] and self-
obligation (this time due to a logical necessity, which would be the neces-
sity of what he himself calls “deconstruction”).’200 I would suggest that the 
essential ambiguity that haunts Derrida’s discursive and philosophical posi-
tion needs to be transposed on to the concept of the machine. In Derrida’s 
work the metaphysical machine is presented as a solid chain between con-
cepts – some of which I have introduced already, history, era, epoch, pres-
ence, logocentrism. But this does not yet account for metaphysics’ machinic 
functioning. Machinic functioning is precisely what I want to retain from Der-
rida’s analysis. Far from being restricted to such an elusive thing as the his-
tory of metaphysics, the machine is operative in politics and literature as 
well. Perhaps even more so there than in metaphysics, even if Derrida ar-
ticulated his own ideas through metaphysics. I will now go on to formulate 
my argument that the machine is what installs the teleology Derrida detects 
in metaphysics. It is only in this teleology that the chain of concepts that 
Derrida calls metaphysical becomes operative. Once this argument is estab-
lished it becomes clear that a similar machinic functioning is at work in poli-
tics. In his work of the 1990s Derrida has increasingly focused on the politi-
cal implications of his philosophy. In doing so, he relies on key concepts 
developed in his earlier work. This does not necessarily mean that Derrida 
analyzes politics as (directly or indirectly) inscribed in the metaphysical ma-
chine. That would risk leading back to Heidegger’s infamous 1933 mistake: 
to believe that philosophy could lead politics. Derrida’s deconstruction of 
Heidegger’s attempt to destruct metaphysics could bear equally well on 
their respective relations to politics.201  
Deconstruction in Derrida’s early works is thoroughly characterized 
by its tentative struggle with the history of metaphysics. It is clear to Derrida 
that this struggle with metaphysics cannot be won by simply declaring the 
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has argued in La fiction du politique (Christian Bourgois: Paris 1987), 34. 
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end of metaphysics, or by proposing to destruct the history of metaphysics. 
Metaphysics is an era that we cannot simply choose to leave behind. In Of 
Grammatology Derrida reproaches Heidegger for his attempt to destruct 
the metaphysical tradition and to construct a fundamental ontology that 
would subsequently ground all other regional ontologies. To grasp this 
connection, I want to take a look at a figure of Heidegger’s thought to 
which Derrida is greatly indebted, but which he has criticized thoroughly: 
Heidegger’s destruction (Destruktion) of the history of metaphysics. The 
difference between destruction and deconstruction preludes and under-
pins the difference between end and closure. In addition to being 
grounded in the interrelation of technics and différance, addressed in the 
previous chapter, Derrida‘s critique on Heideggerian destruction also forms 
the basis for the distinction between closure and end. Since this is central to 
my conceptualization of the machine it is important to take a closer look at 
this sequence in the discussion between Heidegger and Derrida. 
 According to Heidegger, the question of the meaning of being has 
fallen into oblivion. The entire history of metaphysics hitherto has failed to 
ask the question after the meaning of being, since it has failed to come up 
with a plausible concept of being as such. The notion of being employed 
throughout the history of metaphysics and which originates from the works 
of Plato and Aristotle, though ‘correct’, led to the forgetting of the question 
of being (Seinsvergessenheit). Throughout the history of western metaphys-
ics this primal forgetfulness of the question of being has remained un-
changed. To pose the question of the meaning of being anew, the meta-
physical tradition from Plato to Hegel needs to be destructed. By means of a 
self-assigned obligation Heidegger provides the following description of 
the task (Aufgabe) of a ‘destruction of metaphysics’: 
 
If the question of being is to achieve clarity regarding its 
own history, a loosening of the sclerotic tradition and a 
dissolving of the concealments produced by it is neces-
sary. We understand this task as the destructuring of the 
traditional content of ancient ontology which is to be car-
ried out along the guidelines of the question of being. 
This destructuring is based upon the original experiences 
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in which the first and subsequently guiding determina-
tions [Bestimmungen] of being were gained.202 
 
Jean-Luc Nancy’s admonition that Derrida is hostile towards the self-
proclaimed task that philosophy sets itself is important here. The disposi-
tion of deconstruction is to distance itself from such Heideggerian auto-
justification of philosophy. Derrida is indeed critical to Heidegger’s self-
imposed task of destructing metaphysics to regain an insight into the ques-
tion of being. He attacks the presupposition that lies behind Heidegger’s 
destruction of the metaphysical tradition. Heidegger argues that metaphys-
ics has not sufficiently answered the question of being and has forgotten 
the concept of being as such. It has covered up the original conception of 
being. The task for a destruction of the metaphysical tradition, Heidegger 
argues, is to bring back to the surface again Dasein’s original understanding 
of being, to make it explicit again. In contrast, Derrida questions the possi-
bility of uncovering such a primordial understanding of being. He rejects 
the primordial unity of being Heidegger presupposes to carry out his de-
struction of metaphysics.  
Commenting on Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, Derrida argues 
that  
 
we must above all not attempt to restore or make explicit 
a less naïve “ontology,” composed of profound ontologi-
cal intuitions acceding to some originary truth, an entire 
fundamentality hidden under the appearance of an em-
piricist or metaphysical text.”203  
 
Such a hidden ground – a primordial understanding of being that for centu-
ries has been covered up – is precisely what Heidegger presupposes. Un-
dermining Heidegger’s articulation of the hidden ground of metaphysics, 
Derrida demonstrates that Heidegger’s clinging to a hidden ground is itself 
a metaphysical gesture. This gesture in its turn is motivated by the meta-
physical  
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”naiveté” of a breakthrough which cannot attempt a step 
outside of metaphysics, which cannot criticize metaphys-
ics radically without still utilizing in a certain way, in a 
certain type or certain style of text, propositions that, 
read within the philosophical corpus […], have always 
been and will always be “naivetés,” incoherent signs of an 
absolute appurtenance.204  
 
In contrast to Heidegger, Derrida maintains that we cannot simply step 
away from metaphysics. Metaphysics is not a cape that covers our under-
standing of being, while all we need to do is throw off the cape. A decon-
struction of metaphysics acknowledges that it is itself captured within 
metaphysics. Instead of aiming for a radical break it utilizes metaphysical 
concepts to formulate a critique of metaphysics. 
Derrida goes on to show that Heidegger still falls prey to basic pre-
suppositions of metaphysics. Proposing a different reading of metaphysics 
as a history essentially characterized by the absolute priority it ascribes to 
logos and truth, Derrida expands the domain of metaphysics to include 
Heidegger in its scope. This is important for it draws attention again to a 
tendency of the metaphysical machine that results from its machinic func-
tioning, namely its tendency to incorporate everything. The metaphysical 
machine is present in every philosophy, even within Derrida’s. Likewise its 
political equivalent cannot easily be escaped. If the desire to escape the 
political machine exists in the same way as it does for the metaphysical ma-
chine, then it will need to be articulated in the same way as Derrida articu-
lates the latter: by finding a position of the margins of the machine. 
Central to the metaphysical machine, as Derrida understands it, is 
not a forgetting of the question of the meaning of being, as Heidegger held, 
but logocentrism. In logocentrism the word - one of the meanings of ‘logos’ 
- ‘is lived as the elementary and indecomposable unity of the signified and 
the voice, of the concept and a transparent substance of expression.’205 
Within this experience of the word as a transparent substance of expres-
sion, the word ‘being’ (which is yet another meaning of ‘logos’) occupies a 
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special place. It is, Derrida remarks, recasting one of Heidegger’s thoughts, 
’an “originary word” (“Urwort”), a transcendental word assuring the possibil-
ity of being-word to all other words.”206 If this is one of the presuppositions 
of metaphysics, as Derrida contends, it is easy to demonstrate that the 
metaphysical heritage is still lingering in Heidegger’s thought.  
In the opening chapter of Being and Time, Heidegger avers that we 
always have some conception of what being means. This can be easily 
demonstrated by looking at the use of the word being in everyday conver-
sation: ‘Everyone understands, “The sky is blue,” “I am happy,” and similar 
statements.’207 According to Heidegger, this is partly what has led the 
metaphysical tradition astray. Taking their cue from this implicit and vague 
understanding of being, philosophers from Plato to Hegel have concluded 
that being is the most self-evident and self-explanatory of concepts. But for 
Heidegger Dasein alone has an implicit and vague understanding of being. 
For this reason it is necessary to interrogate Dasein’s understanding to 
achieve a true knowledge of being. So although this vague understanding 
has led the metaphysical tradition astray, it at the same time warrants the 
possibility to pose the question of being as such. It indicates that Dasein 
already has a certain comprehension of being from which ‘the explicit ques-
tion of the meaning of being grows.’208 Both the forgetfulness of metaphys-
ics with regard to the question of being and Heidegger’s exploration of this 
question hinge on a certain conception of being. It is ‘indeed the question of 
being that Heidegger asks metaphysics,’ Derrida assures, and ‘with it the 
question of truth, of sense, of the logos.’209 With this new criterion in hand 
Derrida can reproach Heidegger that ‘the history of (the only) metaphysics’ 
does not simply reach ‘from Plato to Hegel (even including Leibniz) but also, 
beyond these apparent limits, from the pre-Socratic to Heidegger.’210 
Whereas Heidegger claims that this vague pre-comprehension of being is 
fundamental to the possibility of any ontology, Derrida’s reading under-
mines this claim. This brings him to develop an analysis and displacement 
of the metaphysical system from within metaphysics itself. This displace-
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ment, which is carried out from within metaphysics itself, only becomes 
comprehensible when we conceive of it as operating from within machinic 
functioning.  
In a second move, perfectly intertwined with the previous one, Der-
rida develops a second critique of Heidegger’s distinction between funda-
mental ontology and regional ontologies. Heidegger holds that the word 
‘being’ must be present in every language in order for language to be able 
to function properly. He considers the word ‘being’ an Urwort, a word that is 
the ‘logos of being, “Thought obeying the Voice of Being,” [that] is the first 
and the last resource of the sign, of the difference between signans and sig-
natum.’211 Derrida deconstructs the originary word by confronting Heideg-
ger with two possibilities, both fatal for the idea of being as Urwort. A first 
possibility is that linguistics as the science of language (including the sign 
and the word) remains enclosed in a classical modus of conceptualization in 
which the word is the non-decomposable basic unit of linguistics. In that 
case, linguistics remains a regional ontology subservient to a more funda-
mental ontology that would provide the ground for all regional ontologies. 
But the implication is that ‘all that is profoundly meditated as the thought 
or the question of being [is] enclosed within an old linguistics of the word 
which one practices here unknowingly.’212 Heidegger’s project of a funda-
mental ontology can thus only be achieved through classical linguistics, 
which is a regional ontology. Both linguistics and ontology will have ‘always 
had to share the presuppositions of metaphysics’ for they would ‘operate 
on the same ground [sol].’213 Consequently, Heidegger’s attempt at destruc-
ting metaphysics fails. The second possibility is that linguistics succeeds in 
escaping this metaphysical conceptuality with the word as its most basic 
unit. Linguistics will then have managed to deconstruct the word, which 
now no longer serves as an non-decomposable unit and ultimate basis for 
all possible linguistics. This possibility, too, has implications for Heidegger’s 
fundamental ontology. If the word as a basic unit is deconstructed in con-
temporary linguistics, then 
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that which, within this linguistics, deconstructs the unity 
of the word in general can no longer, according to the 
model of the Heideggerian question, as it functions pow-
erfully from the very opening of Being and Time, be cir-
cumscribed as ontic science or regional ontology.214 
 
Again Heidegger’s hierarchic divide between regional and fundamental 
ontology, introduced with the question of being as an original question 
inherent to Dasein, is undermined. Both possibilities suggested by Derrida 
deal with linguistics. To Derrida, it is the crisis in language (mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter) that justifies this move. Derrida’s critique of Hei-
degger is similar to his critique of Sigmund Freud. Derrida’s argument holds 
that both Freud and Heidegger want to figure out a way to destruct the 
history of metaphysics in their own way. However, such a destruction is im-
possible because 
 
all these destructive discourses […] are trapped in a kind 
of circle. This circle is unique and it describes the form of 
the relation between the history of metaphysics and the 
destruction of the history of metaphysics: there is no 
sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in or-
der to shake metaphysics; we have no language – no syn-
tax and no lexicon – which is foreign to this history 
[…].215  
 
In Of Grammatology archi-writing undermines a Heideggerian destruction 
of metaphysics by inaugurating a deconstruction of destruction.216 Now we 
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metaphysics. It uses these concepts, while at the same time, by using 
them, deconstructing metaphysics. As Spivak notes in the preface to her 
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stands for “the gesture that both frees us from and guards us within, the 
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are back at the initial theme with which Of Grammatology opens - the crisis 
in language. Just as contemporary linguistics, by letting go of the word as 
smallest unit, overflows the borders of regional ontology and contaminates 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, so language expands its domain to 
pervade contemporary discourse.   
At this point in the argument I wish to return to the machine. The 
machine needs to be understood in the same way. The machine grafts itself 
on difference in order to still it. In doing so it elaborates a chain of concepts 
that bear witness of an inherent solidarity that is only guaranteed by the 
machine. But the machine also operates like deconstruction in that it has a 
double point of origin. It posits the metaphysical desire for presence but it 
also lays the foundations of deconstructive reading: the machine operates 
as closure. This closure is opposed to the Heideggerian end in the same way 
as Derrida’s deconstruction is opposed to Heideggerian destruction. My 
main argument here, however, is that the machine itself installs the double 
point of insertion of both end and closure. It is the machine that creates the 
closure, even if at the same time it drives the metaphysical desire for pres-
ence that strives to go beyond the closure and therefore strives to go be-
yond itself – to end itself.  
The implications of this concept of the machine are also political. 
What Derrida reads as a thoroughly metaphysical process can also and just 
as easily be read as a machinic process or machinic functioning. The effects 
of this machinic functioning and its creation of a chain of concepts oper-
ated by closure and end can be witnessed in the political. By taking into 
regard the relation between closure and end that is operational in the ma-
chine, machinic functioning can account for the double process of increas-
ingly regressive nationalism and ever-emergent capitalist globalization that 
goes beyond the nation-state. It is not a matter of opposing nationality to 
trans-nationality, state to globalization.217 Operating as a machine, the state 
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217 See Ulrich Beck, “The Truth of Others: A Cosmopolitan Approach,” 
Common Knowledge, 10/3, Fall 2004, 430-449. In his conclusion, Beck 
argues that the term transnationality should indicate that there is no 
longer an opposition between the national and the global. On the 
contrary, he says, the term indicates the relative interdependency of the 
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produces the possibility of its own ending, its possibility to submerge into a 
global, transnational constellation. The ending of the state machine is pro-
duced within the closure of the state machine and the end itself remains 
captured in this closure. As Saskia Sassen argues, the ‘increasingly complex 
grid of macro- and micro-internationalisms involved the major state and 
corporate actors of the time as well as less formalized actors.’ This implies 
that  
 
the consolidation and extension of the national state and 
nationalism in the twentieth century took place in a far 
more dynamic international context than later state-
centered narratives of the past make visible.218  
 
Sassen’s analysis distinguishes several phases in the process of globaliza-
tion, based on economic and monetary differences as well on their in-
volvement of the state. But in each case she stresses that globalization is an 
interaction between state and transnational factors. The more general point 
I am making is that rather than seeing the state and the global as opposites, 
the global as a mode of capitalism only became possible through the state 
machine.  
Deleuze and Guattari formulated the dynamics of the state along 
the same lines when they introduced the concept of threshold of consistency 
to account for the interaction between various political assemblages. A 
threshold of consistency functions in a very similar way as the interlacement 
of end and closure in the machine. Every regime of power, Deleuze and 
Guattari argue, is a ‘function of a threshold or degree beyond which what is 
anticipated takes on consistency or fails to, and what is conjured away 
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ceases to be so and arrives.’219 The point is that the threshold functions 
within a constitutive regime: the regime is measured by the way it pro-
gresses toward the threshold while warding it off at the last instance. Politi-
cal assemblages stop at the ‘penultimate, the next to the last.’220 Once the 
threshold is crossed, the regime falls apart and new assemblages are 
formed. The threshold thus functions as a pole of attraction that defines the 
nature of exerted power in a regime, but at the same time it pulls this re-
gime beyond itself. However, the implications of Derrida’s analysis of the 
metaphysical machine are that, in the realm of metaphysics, the threshold 
can never be crossed. This implies that with regard to modern democratic 
nation-states the distinction between that ‘which keeps within the limits of 
what is permitted by the police’ and that what is ‘permitted by logic’ is no 
longer a clear distinction.221 Instead, these two antagonistic alternatives, 
one of which is never without the other, are intricately related to each other 
in the same way as the end and the closure, or the inside and the outside, in 
Derrida’s work on metaphysics. The implications are that machinic function-
ing makes for both the inside and the outside, and that it is precisely 
through this contradictory installment that the machine creates a dynamic. 
Machinic functioning is dependent upon this dynamic. In a later section of 
this chapter, it will become clear that this dynamics is understood by Der-
rida as a teleo-eschatology that is not only proper to the metaphysical ma-
chine, but also to the political machine. 
This double process of two agonistic operations within the machine 
is also active in the aporia of democracy that Derrida has articulated and 
analyzed with increasing vigor from the mid 1980s. Derrida argues that de-
mocracy is driven by the desire to unite several contradictory aims within its 
own rule. Democracy is defined by its desire to treat every citizen as a 
unique and singular being, while at the same time it tries to give everyone 
an absolutely equal treatment in which no discrimination is possible. These 
two desires, both of which are essential to democracy, are irreconcilable. 
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Therefore, democracy must forever be adjourned, postponed, it always re-
mains to come. This is the aporetic structure of democracy. The importance 
of this structure for my argument here is that it explains the dynamic that 
lies behind democracy. With reference to the machine, the dynamic of de-
mocracy-to-come can be understood in line with the desire to control terri-
tory (such as in ontopology). But whereas Derrida argues that democracy 
always remains to come because the desire to reach its own fulfillment is 
caught up in an aporetic structure that is driven by différance, I opt for the 
introduction of the (state) machine onto the economy of différance. The 
machine, by grafting itself on to différance, aims at stilling it. Only when the 
machine is grafted upon the placing and displacing process of différance 
does the aporetic structure of democracy start to actualize. Confronted with 
an incalculable play of forces that is interwoven and interlaced by dif-
férance, the machine tries to overcome it. It is différance that has assured the 
aporetic structure of democracy, but the machine actualizes democracy in a 
way that différance never could. For différance itself makes nothing happen: 
it does not do anything in the strict sense of the word. For something to 
happen we need the machine, which sets to work a paradoxical teleology.  
 
 
4. End / Closure, Wither the Metaphysical Machine (2) 
 
Derrida argues that ‘since these concepts [of metaphysics] are indispensa-
ble for unsettling the [metaphysical] heritage to which they belong, we 
should be even less prone to renounce them.’222 Instead, these concepts 
should be utilized in such a way that they themselves start to deconstruct 
the metaphysical machine. With regard to the metaphysical machine Der-
rida speaks of a clôture, which literally translated means ‘closure,’ but also 
has the meaning of an ‘enclosure’ or ‘fencing’. In her preface to the English 
translation of De la grammatologie, Gayatri Spivak gives a poignant descrip-
tion of the Derridean concept of closure: 
 
As he develops the notion of the joyful yet laborious 
strategy of rewriting the old language – a language, inci-
dentally, we must know well – Derrida mentions the “clô-
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ture” of metaphysics. We must know that we are within 
the “clôture” of metaphysics, even as we attempt to undo 
it. It would be a historicist mistake to represent this “clo-
sure” of metaphysics as simply the temporal finishing-
point of metaphysics. It is also the metaphysical desire to 
make the end coincide with the means, create an enclo-
sure, make the definition coincide with the defined, the 
“father” with the “son”; within the logic of identity to bal-
ance the equation, close to the circle. Our language re-
flects this desire. And so it is from within this language 
that we must attempt an “opening.”223 
 
The multiplicity of meanings in the original French word gives rise to a mul-
tiplicity of viable interpretations. Whereas Spivak interprets the closure as 
an enclosure, as an attempt at enclosure, John Protevi cautions that this 
would be a misreading. Protevi argues that the closure is ‘not to be con-
ceived on the model of a fence, an enclosure of a homogeneous interior by 
a heterogeneous exterior.’224 Instead, he argues, the closure should be un-
derstood as a margin, or even as a trace or supplement. Protevi’s suggestion 
conception of the closure as a margin is lucid since it immediately accounts 
for the quasi-outside-of-closure, the outré-clotûre, that Derrida says is con-
nected to the closure without relying upon an uncontaminated outside. In 
this way, the closure accounts for the analytical point of view that Derrida 
adopts in reading metaphysics. This is why the closure functions as a mar-
gin - a margin of metaphysics.  
Another possibility would be to assume that closure and end (of 
metaphysics) can exist alongside each other as two opposing yet inter-
twined tendencies. At the same time as imposing a fenced domain - an en-
closure that allows no trespassing - or an immanence that has no outside, 
the concept of end accounts for the destructive tendencies that Derrida 
detects in metaphysics. The end wants the closure to turn into a total clo-
sure so that it can get beyond metaphysics. The task of a deconstruction of 
the metaphysical machine is to work with metaphysical concepts from 
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within its closure. In so far as Derrida circumvents the possible closure of 
metaphysics from within, and with reference to metaphysical concepts, this 
closure itself remains metaphysical. This is precisely what Derrida is playing 
at. As Richard Beardsworth argues, ‘the closure of metaphysics remains a 
metaphysical concept.’225 At the same time, however, this poses a problem 
to Derrida’s work if we want to transpose it to the domain of technics and 
politics. If the closure is metaphysical then the question is whether it is pos-
sible to conceptualize politics and technics outside of the metaphysical ma-
chine. In other words: is it possible that technics or politics have an impact 
on the metaphysical machine in a similar way as the metaphysical machine 
– through its concepts and its teleo-eschatology – will have on them? If the 
closure of metaphysics is absolute, then to think politics in its own terms as 
a machine that is not determined by metaphysics is difficult. This leads 
Beardsworth to conclude that, ‘aware of the necessary failure of all thought 
and action, Derrida must end up incapable of taking political risks.’226 As the 
previous chapter demonstrated, that which supersedes and deconstructs 
the closure of the metaphysical machine is différance. Once the alteration 
from différance to technics is accomplished, we can begin to consider the 
transposition from the metaphysical machine to the political machine. This 
machine will operate with its own closure and its own end. But how should 
we conceive of its closure and end? 
 In The Inoperative Community, Jean-Luc Nancy works out his own 
particular logic of the closure. What is fascinating is that Nancy establishes a 
logic of closure to reflect on the possibility of community both from a 
metaphysical point of view and from a political point of view. The logic of 
closure that Nancy works out thus has implications for the way the relation 
between closure and end is constituted in the political machine: 
  
Its logic will always be the same inasmuch as it is without 
relation. A simple and redoubtable logic will always imply 
that within its very separation the absolutely separate en-
closes, if we can say this, more than what is simply sepa-
rated. Which is to say that the separation itself must be 
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enclosed, that the closure must not only close around a 
territory (while still remaining exposed, at its outer edges, 
to another territory, with which it thereby communicates), 
but also, in order to complete the absoluteness of its 
separation, around the enclosure itself.227 
 
In order to accomplish itself as enclosure, Nancy argues, the closure must 
also incorporate what lies around it and thus outside of it. In the case of the 
political machine, the territory that it needs to enclose will always need to 
be expanded; there is an ever-growing need for the machine to incorporate 
everything possible. In Nancy’s work the closure is presented as an attempt 
to enclose in such a way that the closure will be complete. This could be 
understood as an attempt to establish a radical immanence through clo-
sure. At the same time, Nancy avers, by incorporating the outside to estab-
lish a successful enclosure the closure communicates with the territories 
that edge it. Thus it is impossible to say that the enclosure establishes im-
manence, since it always communicates with a neighboring outside. What I 
want to retain from this discussion, and what to my mind is the most valu-
able aspect of Nancy’s remark, is the idea that the closure can strive to be-
come an enclosure and still remain a margin that has neighboring territo-
ries. In the political machine the drive towards an enclosure that encom-
passes everything in its scope is compatible with an attempt to reach an 
end that would fulfill the political machine’s ambition, and thus dissolve it. 
This dual ambition of immanent closure and transcendent end will be ad-
dressed later in this chapter as one of the essential features of the political 
machine in its modern guise.  
‘Within the closure,’ Derrida writes,  
 
by an oblique and always perilous movement, constantly 
risking falling back within what is being deconstructed, it 
is necessary to surround the critical concepts with a care-
ful and thorough discourse – to mark the conditions, the 
medium, and the limits of their effectiveness and to des-
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ignate rigorously their intimate relationship to the ma-
chine whose deconstruction they permit […].228  
 
It seems, then, that Derrida distinguishes some critical concepts from the 
machine to which they belong. This would make sense, for it is Derrida’s 
conviction that there is no such thing as a metaphysical concept. Concepts 
only become metaphysical by their arrangement and by the connections 
that are established from between the different concepts. The machine that 
Derrida is referring to orders the concepts in such a way that something like 
metaphysics comes about. This would imply, as I believe to be the case, that 
the machine is crucial to metaphysics. In fact, the machine is more impor-
tant to metaphysics than its concepts as such. After all, it is the machine that 
organizes concepts in such a way that they begin to take on their meta-
physical qualities. Given that concepts in themselves are never metaphysi-
cal, the metaphysical properties of the concepts Derrida has been studying 
must be located somewhere other than in these concepts themselves. It is 
my contention that what Derrida calls the metaphysical is in fact better de-
scribed as the machinic.  
What becomes clear now, is that it is precisely because the con-
cepts of the metaphysical tradition are not metaphysical in themselves that 
they can be used to deconstruct this tradition. In other words, by reordering 
and displacing these concepts at the same time as rearticulating the meta-
physical tradition, it becomes possible to deconstruct the metaphysical tra-
dition. It seems that this is precisely what Derrida’s deconstruction aims at 
doing. A passage that programmatically declares this ambition of decon-
struction, with regard to the metaphysical machine, is found in Margins of 
Philosophy. Near the end of “Signature, Event, Context,” Derrida writes that 
deconstruction is concerned with a general displacement of concepts. In 
doing so, its ultimate aim is to displace the very idea of philosophy itself:  
 
Despite the general displacement of the classical, “phi-
losophical,” Western, etc., concept of writing, it appears 
necessary, provisionally and strategically, to conserve the 
old name. This implies an entire logic of paleonymy which 
I do not wish to elaborate here. Very schematically: an 
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opposition of metaphysical concepts (for example, 
speech/writing, presence/absence, etc.) is never the face-
to-face of two terms, but a hierarchy and an order of 
subordination. Deconstruction cannot limit itself or pre-
cede immediately to a neutralization: it must, by means 
of a double gesture, a double science, a double writing, 
practice an overturning of the classical opposition and a 
general displacement of the system. It is only on this 
condition that deconstruction will provide itself the 
means with which to intervene in the field of oppositions 
that it criticizes, which is also a field of nondiscursive 
forces. […] There is no metaphysical concept in and of it-
self. There is a work – metaphysical or not – on concep-
tual systems. Deconstruction does not consist in passing 
from one concept to another, but in overturning and dis-
placing a conceptual order, as well the nonconceptual or-
der with which the conceptual order is articulated.229   
 
A paleonymy, a genealogical investigation into the use and meaning of 
concepts, is what Derrida proposes. The detection of opposites plays an 
important role in this investigation. To disturb the balance attained in 
metaphysics through the construction of conceptual oppositions and hier-
archies, deconstruction needs to start by investigating the arrangement of 
the concepts. Only from this point will a general displacement be possible. 
‘There is no such thing as a “metaphysical concept.”’230 Instead, the meta-
physical is a ‘certain determination or direction taken by a sequence or 
“chain.”’231 This chain needs to be investigated by researching the concepts 
it aligns and connects. It is precisely the machinic functioning of metaphys-
ics that gives these concepts their direction. When Derrida claims that de-
construction aims at revealing the non-discursive force field that in some way 
underpins metaphysics, this needs to be understood from the vantage 
point of the machine. The non-discursive force field, the system, and the 
machine: all these notions are essential to metaphysics, and are perhaps the 
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only essential things. It is this force field that not only structures all concepts 
in such a way that metaphysics comes about; the force field is also what 
cranks up the history of metaphysics. The machine sets the teleo-
eschatology of metaphysics to work. 
 
 
5. Speeding Time in the Machine 
 
Hierarchical distinctions are drawn between  
 
nature and institution; play of difference between symbol, 
sign, image, etc., a naïve concept of representation; an 
uncritical opposition between […] an objectivist concept 
of the body proper [corps propre] and of the diversity of 
sensory functions […]; opposition between analysis and 
synthesis, abstract and concrete […].232  
 
These discursive oppositions ultimately rely on the non-discursive force 
field from which the machine takes its cue. In the previous chapter, Der-
rida’s conception of force field was defined as différance, and it was argued 
that différance has to be rethought as technics. The machine grafts itself 
onto this force field and establishes a continuity between the different hier-
archical oppositions that Derrida determines as metaphysical, but which are 
also at work in politics. The justification for speaking of a machine in this 
case is given by the fact that a system of circulation is constructed that al-
lows one to go from one concept to the other in a continuous movement. 
In the machine concepts ‘form a system: we circulate from one to the other 
within the same structure.’233 This system is best described as a machine 
because by grafting itself onto a force field in which concepts are played 
out against and alongside each other, this system functions by itself with-
out any aid from the outside. This is the most important feature of a ma-
chine as it is commonly understood.  
A significant aspect of my reading of Derrida is that machinic func-
tioning installs teleology into this force field. The force field upon which the 
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machine grafts itself is that of différance as an intertwining of different 
forces. When there is talk about stilling différance, it is not the case that the 
machine actually halts différance or dissolves it. But the machine differs es-
sentially from différance in that the machine aims at dismantling what is 
incalculable in the play of différance in order to implant a calculable teleol-
ogy. For Derrida, this attempt to install a successful teleology that stills the 
play of différance is impossible. This is where Derrida’s theory of the aporia 
becomes relevant. Derrida argues that the teleology that the machine 
wants to establish and the ontological (self-)presence for which it strives are 
both structural impossibilities: the desire for presence is both inscribed and 
made impossible by différance.  
In what follows I work through the proposition that the combina-
tion of the non-linguistic force field of différance /technics and the machine 
engenders a linear time concept. This is where concrete technologies return 
to my argument. With regard to time the machine sets to work acceleration: 
it speeds up a conceptual linear time - by speeding toward an ‘end’. Recent 
tele-technologies have made possible such an acceleration in the transmis-
sion of sound and vision that we may now speak of real-time transmission. 
Such real-time transmission is precisely what is desirable in the machine. 
The functioning of the metaphysical machine is such that it inaugurates ‘a 
movement which attempts through an infinite acceleration to win time, to 
win over time, to deny it.’234 The machine is aided by technologies, but only 
in so far as these technologies can be reduced to techniques in the service 
of the machine. When these technologies impose their own laws, as they 
often do, machinic functioning is transformed from within. 
A starting point for an inquiry on time in différance/technics and the 
machine can be Derrida’s notion temporalization, which he introduced in 
his essay, “Différance.” Différance is a process of spacing and temporaliza-
tion. In defining différance, Derrida writes:  
 
Différer in this sense is to temporize, to take recourse, 
consciously or unconsciously, in the temporal and tem-
porizing mediation of a detour that suspends the accom-
plishment or fulfillment of “desire” or “will,” and equally 
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effects this suspension in a mode that annuls or tempers 
its own effect.235   
 
Différance is constitutive for the possibility of time, without affecting or set-
ting to work time as such. Temporization opens up the possibility of time. 
Yet, in this temporization in which it first emerges, time is always already 
left jolted, disturbed.  
Derrida argues that metaphysics constantly tries to deny this con-
cept of time as a displacement; and yet, at the same time, metaphysics has 
the greatest interest in time. The concept of temporization implies stalling, 
putting of, and thus absence or non-presence. The metaphysical machine, 
however, strives for full presence: only then will it have accomplished its 
goal, or its end. Thus, in one and the same movement, metaphysics tries to 
deny the concept of time as always differed/deferred, which follows from 
the notion of différance, by stopping its deferral; and it will try to overcome 
it by accelerating to such an extent that several points of deferral flow into 
one another and transform into presence. In order to overcome the stalling 
inherent in time, metaphysics creates a linear concept of time in which infi-
nite acceleration (as a reaction against stalling) becomes possible. Derrida 
uses basic concepts of Heidegger’s work on time to explain these processes 
of linearization and acceleration in metaphysics. 
Derrida argues that metaphysical time is linear time. Hand in hand 
with the development of metaphysics, a process of linearization, a lineariza-
tion of thought and time, takes place. Derrida contends that ‘[a] war was 
declared, and a suppression of all that resisted linearization was installed.’236 
In the epoch of metaphysics, ‘the traditional concept of time, an entire or-
ganization of the world and of language, was bound up with it [linearity].’237 
The construction of linear time and the construction of metaphysical history 
are intricately related. Both are affected by the machine that drives meta-
physics. This linearization of time has its implications also for history: ‘one 
may just as well consider […] linear thought as a reduction of history.’238 Far 
from being a reduction of history, metaphysics produces history; but it pro-
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duces history in a linear time frame. History belongs to metaphysics and can 
be seen as the direct effect of a linear concept of time. Explaining his view 
on history Derrida returns to the metaphysical desire for presence. For the 
era preceding metaphysics and linear time, ‘another word ought perhaps to 
be used.’ After all, Derrida continues: 
 
the word history has no doubt always been associated 
with a linear scheme of the unfolding of presence, where 
the line relates the final presence to the originary pres-
ence according to the straight line of the circle.239  
 
This fragment from Of Grammatology strikes at the core of the production 
of a teleo-eschatological drive in the machinic functioning of metaphysics. 
The desire for presence, powered by the metaphysical machine, goes hand 
in hand with the inauguration of linear thinking and linear time. Derrida is 
working toward the notion of ‘vulgar time’ developed by Heidegger to 
characterize metaphysics. According to Heidegger, great metaphysicians 
like Aristotle and Hegel maintained a notion of time that can be called ‘vul-
gar.’ They reach a concept of time that can only be captured within an apo-
ria: pressed to the extreme, Aristotle defines time, on the one hand, as that 
which has already been and what is yet to come (and thus as something 
that is never actually present), and on the other hand as the ‘now’. In his 
attempt at refuting this aporetic definition of time, Heidegger remarks:  
 
And thus time shows itself for the vulgar understanding 
as a succession of constantly “objective present” nows 
that pass away and arrive at the same time. Time is un-
derstood as a sequence, as the “flux” of nows, as the 
“course of time.”240 
 
According to Heidegger, it is the task of a fundamental ontology - as devel-
oped in Sein und Zeit - to destruct such a concept of time. This concept of 
time depends upon an immediate and unquestioned presence, or what 
Heidegger prefers to call ‘being-at-hand.’ In this way, it acts as a cover-up of 
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a more fundamental concept of time as ‘taking care.’ This would be a con-
cept of time that, for Heidegger, steps out of the metaphysical tradition. 
In his essay, “Ousia and grammē,” Derrida casts doubt on the possi-
bility of ever going beyond the vulgar, or metaphysical concept of time.241 
His critique should be framed in the context of the discussion of destruction 
and deconstruction, end and closure, analyzed earlier in this chapter. Here, 
too, Derrida disbelieves in the possibility to make a clean break with meta-
physics. Such a clean break would be all the more difficult when it comes to 
the question of time, Derrida argues, since time is the metaphysical concept 
par excellence. In contrast to Heidegger, Derrida maintains that there can 
be no non-metaphysical concept of time.  
What Derrida does agree with is that metaphysical time can be 
characterized as vulgar time. But to him the origin of vulgar time lies in a 
metaphysical longing for presence. Since metaphysics measures beings 
according to the standard of presence, it is forced to qualify time as a non-
being. When measured to the standard of presence, and following Aris-
totle’s definition, time is something that has been and is yet to come – that is, 
a succession – but not something that is here, present before us. Returning 
to Heidegger’s proposed alternative, Derrida concludes that 
 
if it appears that one demonstrate that time is no-thing 
(nonbeing), it is because one already has determined the 
origin and essence of no-thing as time, as nonpresent 
under the heading of the “not yet” or the “already no 
longer.”242  
 
From this point of view, Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysical time is still 
in line with metaphysical time itself. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology 
does not succeed in getting away from the desire for presence that deter-
mines both the vulgar concept of time and time as ‘taking care.’ Derrida 
concludes that perhaps there is no such thing as ‘a vulgar concept of time’: 
 
Perhaps there is no “vulgar concept of time.” The concept 
of time, in all its aspects, belongs to metaphysics, and it 
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names the domination of presence. Therefore we can only 
conclude that the entire system of metaphysical concepts, 
throughout its history, develops the so-called “vulgarity” 
of the concept of time (which Heidegger, doubtless, 
would not contest), but also that an other concept of time 
cannot be opposed to it, since time in general belongs to 
metaphysical conceptuality. In attempting to produce this 
other concept, one rapidly would come to see that it is 
constructed out of other metaphysical or ontotheological 
predicates.243 
 
In the metaphysical machine, the concept of time has as its sole objective 
the definition, capture, and arrest of the differential displacement of tempo-
rization, in order to turn it into presence. Derrida’s argument is that it would 
be impossible to find a concept of time in the history of the West that is not 
devised to capture presence. Derrida inscribes time within a ‘metaphysical 
conceptuality.’ He also argued, as I have shown above, that concepts are 
never metaphysical in essence. Metaphysics is nothing but a machine or a 
machinic process that grafts itself onto différance to install a telos. The end, 
or telos, which orients this teleology, is presence. In order to achieve this 
presence, Derrida argues, the machine puts concepts in a specific order, 
one after another, one upon another, connecting them in such a way that 
together these connections form the solid unity of metaphysics. The idea of 
linear time has been inherent to metaphysics since its very beginning and 
originates in the aporia of time that was first formulated by Aristotle and 
remained crucial to philosophy – including the philosophies of Hegel and 
Heidegger. How does the concept of time as linearity come about then, ac-
cording to Derrida? 
 Aristotle tried to solve the problem of time as something that is as a 
‘now’ on the one hand, and as something that already-has-been and only 
will-be on the other. It is here, Derrida contends, that Aristotle relies on the 
concept of grammē, the trace or line. He tries to solve the problem dialecti-
cally in a manner that, according to Derrida, prefigures a veritable Hegelian-
ism. The ‘now’ or ‘moment’ could be seen as a point that does not reach 
beyond its own ‘place.’ But, Aristotle argues, this would imply that there can 
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only be one point and that therefore there is no progress. Another view on 
time needs to be introduced to be able to think its progress. Derrida articu-
lates this idea by saying that ‘the now, presence in the act of the present, is 
constituted as the impossibility of coexisting with an other now, that is, with 
an other-the-same-as-itself.’244 However, the argument that time is never 
really there, that it is always in between points of presence, is certainly not 
an option. This would forfeit definitively the presence of time. Thus, Aris-
totle needs to find another manner in which he can say that time is. The 
solution that Aristotle comes up with is highly interesting. Time, he argues, 
is only partly like a point: it goes from one point to another and thereby 
forms a line. In one respect, then, time is a ‘now’ comparable to a point; but 
in another way, time is the passing from moment to moment, a linear de-
velopment in which it has already been and is yet to be. Both conceptions 
of time – as a point and as a line – need to be thought together, as two pat-
terns laid out over each other.  
It is the work of the metaphysical machine to create a linear pattern 
of time in which time is nonetheless fully present as if it were a point of 
presence. Metaphysics envisions time as a line because it wants to conceive 
of time as something that is. But in order for time to be truly present in the 
paradoxical play between the line of flow and the point of presence, the 
flow must be sped up, rushing from one point of presence to the next with 
infinite speed. Hence, Derrida speaks of the linearization of time in the 
course of metaphysics. This is where the teleo-eschatology that Derrida sees 
at work in metaphysics originates.  
In Of Grammatology, Derrida claims that 
 
[i]f one allows that the linearity of language entails this 
vulgar and mundane concept of temporality (homogene-
ous, dominated by the form of the now and the ideal of 
continuous movement, straight or circular) which Heideg-
ger shows to be the intrinsic determining concept of all 
ontology from Aristotle to Hegel, the meditation upon 
writing and the deconstruction of the history of philoso-
phy become inseparable.245  
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Linearity and the line are related in Derrida’s view. Whilst linearity is one of 
the main processes that went hand in hand with the development of meta-
physical thinking, Derrida argues that the concept of the line had to remain 
invisible to metaphysics itself. Heidegger again plays a crucial transitory role 
in the era of metaphysics, even though he too remains enclosed within the 
realm of metaphysics.  
Heidegger reflects on the concepts of the line in his essay, “On the 
Question of Being.”246 In this essay - a response to an essay by Ernst Jünger, 
written two years earlier on the occasion of Heidegger’s fiftieth birthday - 
Heidegger unravels the problem of modern nihilism and the role played in 
it by metaphysics. Addressing metaphysics and the language used 
throughout the history of metaphysics, Heidegger asks the following ques-
tion:  
 
What if even the language of metaphysics and metaphys-
ics itself, whether it is that of the living or of the dead 
God, as metaphysics, formed that barrier which forbids a 
crossing over [Übergehen] the line?247  
 
Derrida’s own attempt at crossing the lines that fence off metaphysics is 
different from that of Heidegger. According to Derrida, it is only when we 
see that line that it becomes clear that it forms a closure for the metaphysi-
cal machine. Derrida uses the concept of the line in order to illustrate how 
metaphysics works. As long as metaphysics was in its full reign, it was im-
possible to see the line: to see the line expresses the stretching of a phi-
losophical boundary.  Or, as Derrida puts it: ‘the enigmatic model of the line 
is thus the very thing that philosophy could not see when it had its eyes 
open on the interior of its own history.’248 Derrida’s deconstruction aims at 
unraveling precisely how the concepts within metaphysics are ‘controlled 
                                                 
246 Martin Heidegger, “On the Question of Being,” in Pathmarks 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1998). 
247 Heidegger, “On the Question of Being,” quoted and translated by 
Spivak, “Translator’s Preface,” in Derrida, Of Grammatology, xiv-xv.  
248 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 86. 
 123 
reciprocally, minutely, laboriously.’249 The line thus gets its place in a set of 
reciprocally controlled concepts.  
But the line is not just any concept in the metaphysical machine. As 
Derrida avers in the above quote, the line is the very thing that metaphysics 
itself cannot see. In contrast to history and epoch, for example, the line re-
mains the blind spot of the metaphysical machine. The crux of his argu-
ment, then, is that this blind spot, the line, is directly related to a metaphysi-
cal concept of time. Derrida argues that the line and a privilege for linearity 
are connected to the concept of time that Heidegger calls ‘vulgar’ in Being 
and Time. This concept of linear time as vulgar is recuperated by Derrida to 
characterize metaphysics. By characterizing vulgar time as linear time - even 
though this is not the primary trait that Heidegger attributed to this con-
cept of time – Derrida succeeds in creating an interpretation of metaphysics 
as a temporal and teleological process. Relating the problem of vulgar time 
to metaphysics’ longing for presence, Derrida then tries to show how Hei-
degger himself still remains within metaphysics. And, he concludes, if this is 
the case, then it follows that – as I already quoted above but will quote 
again here – ‘the meditation upon writing and the deconstruction of the 
history of philosophy become inseparable.’250 Derrida continues: 
 
every history of writing that has been written up until now 
has received its guiding concepts from other human sci-
ences or, what nearly amounts to the same thing, from 
traditional metaphysics.251  
 
The humanities, in their relation to traditional metaphysics, have long fa-
vored a technical and scientific economy, he argues.252 Derrida claims that 
the motor of the metaphysical machine, and all that came with it, ‘has been 
structurally bound up with that of economy, that of technics, and that of 
ideology.’253 It is this structural connection that I want to examine in the 
final part of this chapter. By elaborating upon Derrida’s analysis of the 
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metaphysical machine, it can be argued that the machine is not solely 
metaphysical. Technics can be understood as an interlacement or contami-
nation between aspects of literature and aspects of politics, but the teleo-
logical determinations are proper to the machine. Diverse elements are in-
terlaced by technics, but they only start to form a teleological unity in the 
machine. Incorporated into a machine, concepts can be understood only by 
looking at how the machine that powers them functions. In order to analyze 
this set-up, it becomes necessary to scrutinize certain fundamental political 
concepts in much the same way as Derrida scrutinizes metaphysical notions 
such as epoch and history in his analysis of metaphysics. Thus, in the re-
maining chapters, I analyze concepts such as legitimacy, justice, torture, 
civic disobedience, and the right to information. But these concepts, how-
ever seminal, only operate as ‘reciprocally controlled concepts’ that form 
operative constellations, much in the same way as concepts within the 
metaphysical machine. In the mutual grafting of technics and machine 
these concepts take on their function and start to operate together.  
 
 
6. Linear Machinic Technologies / Circumventing Technopolitics 
 
Derrida argues that desire for presence brings about linearity in the meta-
physical concept of time. This is a function of the machine, which by provid-
ing metaphysics with its telos also constructs ways to achieve this telos. The 
line and linearity are exemplary in this regard. They are crystallizations of a 
machinic function that is looking for a way to create presence as directly 
and as quickly as possible. Another way in which the machine tries to estab-
lish presence is by instrumentalizing technologies. I have made my argu-
ment on the instrumentalization of technology at length in the previous 
chapter, but I want to return to it here, now that a definition of the machine 
can help us understand the factual implications of this instrumentalization. 
The instrumentalization of technics runs through the machine. Like lineari-
zation, instrumentalization is processed by the machine. The machine 
closes down the possibilities of technological artifacts to incorporate them 
in a larger structure, that of the machine. Here, once again, we can see the 
incorporative immanence at work in the machine. Technologies become 
techniques as soon as they are incorporated by the machinic functioning. 
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The point here is that technology loses its potential goals and receives just 
one goal, or telos – the one impressed upon it by the machine.  
 In Derrida’s work, there are two major additions to be made to this 
argument. The first is that he overdetermines the telos of the machine as 
always being that of a desire for presence. Thus, every technology, once 
drawn in the machine, is reconfigured as an instrument or technique that 
can further the metaphysical desire for presence. Technologies become 
techniques for presence, for making present. A second addition is that this 
strategy can never work. Technologies cannot be used as techniques for 
attaining (ontological or metaphysical) presence. They are unable to do so 
because these technologies, even when they are reduced to techniques, 
remain media. That is to say, every technology (however convincing) is only 
a mediation of presence; it is never a factual presence but a crafted pres-
ence. This is not what metaphysics desires. Of Grammatology provides a 
good example of Derrida’s view on these matters. Here, he explains how 
new technologies can help realize the metaphysical subject as immediately 
present to itself and subvert the very possibility of such a self-present sub-
ject:  
 
the constitution of electronic card-indexes and reading 
machines, [which] enlarges difference and the possibility 
of putting in reserve: it at once and in the same move-
ment constitutes and effaces so-called conscious subjec-
tivity, its logos, and its theological attributes.254 
 
Derrida has described these kinds of operations as a pact made between 
metaphysics and technology in their desire for presence. What remains un-
clear in his work is how this pact is actually brought about. Drawing and 
reflecting on my own analysis of the machine, I would now say that it is not 
so much a pact as it is a synthesis or process. And this process is brought 
into effect by the machine incorporating both metaphysics (as it deter-
mines metaphysics in its desire for presence and its eschatology) and tech-
nology (placing them into a relationship of servitude under metaphysics, 
but also politics). The claim that metaphysics and technology strive for 
presence could even be turned upside down, arguing that it really is the 
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machinic functioning that gives them their desires: the desire for presence 
and immediacy that can be witnessed in all sorts of technologies (tele-
technologies such as televisions or telephones, but others as well) is insti-
gated by the metaphysical machine; it is the drive of the metaphysical ma-
chine as a drive for immediacy and presence that propels these technolo-
gies in their quest for presence and immediacy. What is less clear, however, 
is whether presence really is the only drive that the machine sets to work. In 
other terms, pertaining more directly to Derrida’s political work, we might 
ask: does the political desire to control its subjects and its territory indeed 
constitute itself through the desire for presence? Derrida makes this argu-
ment in Specters of Marx and Rogues, but having established a concept of 
the machine it is not clear whether this is the only teleo-eschatological op-
tion for the machine.255 As Donna Haraway notes: 
 
technological determination is only one ideological space 
opened up by the reconceptions of machine and organ-
ism as coded texts through which we engage in the play 
of writing and reading the world.256 
 
Derrida’s question is whether these technologies that have made a pact 
with metaphysics succeed in attaining immediacy and presence. As the 
quote from Of Grammatology suggests, such a metaphysical-technological 
project can only be partially successful. After all, technology is something 
that makes present, but at the same time it stands for absence. This is what 
Derrida is hinting at when he writes that technological devices like a writing 
machine in one and the same movement construct classical metaphysical 
concepts like the logos and the subject, as well as destruct these concepts. 
The subject wants to be present to itself, the logos longs to become and to 
remain an absolutely unmediated knowledge. Technology is used to over-
come the non-present, but technology itself is also always mediation and 
thus something that inevitably destroys presence.  
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In his later work, Derrida gives a striking example of how such tech-
nologies are functioning according to the laws of the machine. The example 
he gives deals with the use of visual tele-technologies. As technologies al-
ways have, visually oriented tele-technologies create what Derrida calls ar-
tefactualities.257 Within the realm of the artefactual, ‘“reality” (to which “ac-
tuality” refers) – however singular, irreducible, stubborn, painful, or tragic it 
may be – reaches us through fictional constructions [factures].’258 Thus, Der-
rida avers, the presence with which the artefactual claims to provide us re-
mains a fiction: ‘The “live” communication and “real time” are never pure: 
they permit neither intuition nor transparency, nor any perception un-
marked by interpretation or technical intervention.’259 In this case, too, the 
subject along with its demand for presence is simulataneously created and 
forfeited, constructed and deconstructed. This is the inevitable process of 
an exappropriation: the interlacement of an appropriation that makes the 
subject belong to itself; and the expropriation that pulls the subject out of 
its proper place. The machine proposes speed to overcome the faltering of 
presence, to constitute true presence. As Derrida explains in Memoires for 
Paul de Man: ‘Through an infinite acceleration’ the machine tries ‘to win 
time, to win over time, to deny it.’260 By gaining speed, the machine hopes 
to overcome the absence of presence that is inherent to it. The machine 
strives for an end in which it would accomplish its purposes and annihilate 
itself in the same movement. A paradoxical feature of this speeding towards 
an end is that it wants to put the machine outside of itself. This is exactly 
why speeding up time will never work: it would annihilate that which 
speeds it up. My argument is that the impossibility of accelerating time to the 
point of absolute presence is taken into account by the machine itself. This is 
the closure that the machine imposes. The machine imposes a closure that 
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functions as a fence so that there can be no escape from the machine, even 
for the machine itself. The outside of closure that Derrida alludes to in his 
study of metaphysics is generated by the ambiguity of the co-existence of 
end and closure. Two seemingly contradictory operations are at work in the 
machine: on the one hand, it strives for an end that would put it outside of 
itself; and on the other, it counters such an end by installing a closure that 
encloses everything within its boundaries. The end works as a transcendent 
outside towards which the machine aims. The closure maintains the imma-
nence that the machine equally strives for. The combined effect could be 
termed transdescendance.261  
Deleuze and Guattari have argued that the modern capitalist state 
machine displays both a tendency towards absolute immanence (effected 
by an absolute deterritorialization connected to capitalism) and a re-
introduction of a despotic transcendence (effected by re-inscribing relative 
deterritorializations onto the capitalist deterritorialization to transform the 
territory into an earth that can be ruled by the state).262 Both must be 
brought together to understand the logic by which the state machine op-
erates. Power over social formations such as the state, they argue, does not 
function through modes of production, but precisely through such ‘ma-
chinic processes.’263 Elaborating on this idea, Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri have tracked down the formation of modern sovereignty and its 
transformation in and beyond the nation state. Their argument implicitly 
relies on the teleo-eschatology of end and closure, transcendence and im-
manence, that is proper to the machine: 
 
In politics, as in metaphysics, the dominant theme [in 
modernity] was thus to eliminate the medieval form of 
transcendence, which only inhibits production and con-
sumption, while maintaining transcendence’s effects of 
domination in a form adequate to the modes of associa-
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tion and production of the new humanity. The center of 
the problem of modernity was thus demonstrated in po-
litical philosophy, and here was where the new form of 
mediation found its most adequate response to the revo-
lutionary forms of immanence: a transcendent political 
apparatus.264      
 
The insertion of such a transcendent political apparatus into the immanent 
political field of modernity, Hardt and Negri argue, will determine the mod-
ern concept of sovereignty. Modern sovereignty is defined by them as a 
‘sovereignty machine’ that will have fulfilled its task only ‘when the synthe-
sis of sovereignty and capital is fully accomplished, and the transcendence 
of power is completely transformed into a transcendental exercise of au-
thority.’265 From that moment, the sovereignty machine dissolves into a ‘po-
litical machine that rules across the entire society.’266 But such an accom-
plishment, which would propel power outside modernity, can never take 
place. 
One of the points of dispute between Derrida and Hardt and Negri 
might concern the reality of transcendent domination. While Hardt and 
Negri argue that this is a mere effect that is upheld, thus giving the impres-
sion that it might just as well be an illusion, the desire for end (versus clo-
sure) is real in the machine – and most certainly in Derrida’s metaphysical 
machine. Translated back to the discussion on the acceleration of time, it 
takes on a veritable eschatological dynamic. Nevertheless, it is an eschatol-
ogy that, although inaugurated by the machine’s end, is held back by the 
machine’s closure. In Rogues, Derrida investigates the functions of sover-
eignty in contemporary society. He argues that the characteristics of sover-
eignty are bound up with the claims of reason and rationality in the West. 
The principle of reason has long functioned as that which would legitimate 
the forceful application of sovereignty. At the same time, there is a teleo-
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eschatology at work in reason as ground for sovereignty.267 Derrida distin-
guishes between two forms in which such a teleo-eschatology might mani-
fest itself. These two forms are played out in the difference between the 
verbal modes ‘to let oneself strand’ (échouement) and ‘to strand oneself’ 
(échouage). While the first implies passivity, the second implies activity. The 
two possibilities of stranding or running aground are equally real to Derrida. 
Together, precisely in their inextricable intertwinement, they establish the 
oscillation between two kinds of eschatology: an active one of self-
stranding; and a passive one of being stranded. 268 The difference is that the 
first mode (l’échouement) is passive, and therefore allows for something 
totally unexpected to take place that would not be affected by reason run-
ning aground. Here the possibility of the event is kept open. The second 
mode (l’échouage) is active and implies that sovereign reason is actively 
(though not necessarily deliberately) running itself aground. This process is 
further described by Derrida as auto-immunity.  
 
 
7. Conclusion: Artefactualities in the Deconstructive Machine 
 
Continuing his reflection on artefactuality, Derrida avows that he has been 
drifting off, stalling time by not answering the questions directly: ‘Some 
might say: he’s wasting time, his time and ours. Or he’s playing for time, he’s 
putting of answers. And that would not be entirely false.’269 Derrida avers 
that there is more to his deliberative stalling of time than becomes appar-
ent at first blush.  
 
The one thing that one cannot accept these day – on tele-
vision, on the radio, or in the papers - is an intellectual 
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taking his time. And perhaps this is what needs to be 
changed about actuality: its rhythm.270  
 
Derrida’s critique of tele-technology consists of an analysis of the rhythm it 
installs, the economy by which it accelerates the rhythm and tries to make 
present a time and space that can never be fully present. To the rhythm of 
technologies as such he opposes the (a)rhythmic spacing and temporizing 
of différance. Différance acts as a medium in which difference first becomes 
possible. Rhythm is understood by Derrida as a process of differing made 
possible through the act of temporalization in difference. As such, Derrida is 
making a performative move by saying that he has been stalling time. For 
not only does he stall time in the interview, he has devised a theory in 
which time as deferral plays a crucial role in understanding and conceptual-
izing all things technical – technics, the machine, technology, and tech-
nique.  
An interview with philosopher Bernard Stiegler brings to light an 
important consequence of Derrida’s priority of différance over technology. 
Stiegler suggests that the discrete image, though an artefactuality in the 
strict sense of the word, has the potential to expand our notion of intelligi-
bility because it is exact. The exactness of discrete images, coded by the 
digital, gestures towards 
 
a certain mode of accumulation, in an “exact” form, pro-
ducing a sense of exactitude and of authenticity, that is 
to say, of presence, [that] would be the condition of a 
certain form of intelligibility.271  
 
The answer that Derrida gives to Stiegler introduces a large part of the 
problematic that has been at stake in this chapter. Derrida concedes to 
Stiegler’s suggestion that a new intelligibility arises from the exactitude of 
technical media, such as the film composed of 24 frames per second or digi-
tal code; nevertheless, he maintains a certain reserve toward what it is that 
makes this intelligibility. At stake here is the status of différance: 
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This extends the field of what you call intelligibility, the 
field of knowledge, the field of meaning itself, but in or-
der to accommodate the opposite effect within it: mean-
ing and intelligibility can be extended – on the scale of 
what you have called the “discrete,” the spacing of the 
discrete – only by multiplying the conditions of this very 
discreteness, in other words, spacing, non-sense, the 
blank, the interval, everything that bounds [borde] sense 
and non-sense as it were, exceeds [déborde] or splits it. 
The origin of sense makes no sense.272 
 
That which constitutes intelligibility is itself not intelligible. It is the rhythmic 
play of spacing and temporization; the interweaving play of forces that is 
enacted by différance. The possibility of separation that is precisely neces-
sary in discrete images, and even more so in the digital code, is guaranteed 
by the blank, or the interval. This interval, which is put to work by différance, 
articulates what cannot be captured in terms of sense or meaning. This is 
why Derrida, from his earliest essays onwards, makes the distinction be-
tween force and meaning (signification, or sense). Focusing on différance 
enables Derrida to map the economy that underlies technologies, even 
those that are characterized by the discreteness of images or by a digital 
code. For discrete images to function as they do it is still necessary for an 
interval to separate them, so that discreteness becomes possible. As Derrida 
puts it in “Différance”: 
 
an interval must separate the present in and of itself, 
thereby also dividing, along with the present, everything 
that is thought on the basis of the present, that is, in our 
metaphysical language, every being, and singularly sub-
stance or the subject.273  
 
Derrida will hold on to this interval, even if this means that he risks missing 
something essential in the interplay between technics, the machine, and 
teletechnologies. 
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 The analysis of rhythm also refers back to the relation between the 
metaphysical machine and time already discussed in this chapter. The 
metaphysical machine is what constructs the linear time in which its atti-
tude towards concrete technologies will be formed. Teletechnologies are 
inserted in the machine to effectuate the acceleration of time that the ma-
chine sets to work to overcome absence. However, for Derrida, there re-
mains a certain silence immanent to every medium, to every technology or 
transmission – “a silence coming from the other side.”274 This silence is there 
for those who read as well as for those who “see the news.” But the rhythm 
of the former differs from that of the latter. This rhythm, along with its si-
lences, is what Derrida calls “the law of time” - and he adds: “It is terrible for 
the present; it always leaves one to hope or to count on the untimely.”275 
This is why Derrida believes that even in the performative act of stalling 
time during an interview, there is the possibility of a critical stance toward 
the recuperation of teletechnologies in a machinic functioning. It is a first 
step towards asking for a reflection on the effect of teletechnologies. Der-
rida declares his point of view more fully in his interview with Stiegler: 
 
It is necessary to fight, today, not against teletechnolo-
gies, television, radio, e-mail or the Internet but, on the 
contrary, so that the development of these media will 
make more room for the norms that a number of citizens 
would be well within their rights to propose, affirm, and 
lay claim to – particularly those “intellectuals,” artists, 
writers, philosophers, analysts, scientists, certain journal-
ists and media professionals, too, who would like to say 
something about the media or analyze them at the same 
rhythm at which we are trying to do this together, here 
and now.276      
 
 
Derrida is calling for a change of rhythm. However, what he seems to forget 
in this passage is the relation between teletechnologies and the machine. 
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This chapter argued that only the machine can account for the instrumen-
talization of technology. It is precisely this instrumentalization that fore-
closes much of its possibilities.  
If we look back at Derrida’s analysis of the concept of history as per-
taining to metaphysics, it is now clear that the concept of history is mod-
eled by the constructions of linearity and linear time carried out in the 
metaphysical machine. This history is linear and monolithic. Within the lin-
ear template that the metaphysical machine constructs, a question imposes 
itself: where is this history leading to? This is where the paradoxical inter-
twinement of a radical end (that would place us outside the history of 
metaphysics) and an immanent closure (that captures all in its machine, 
including the political) emerges. This paradoxical interrelation can be ac-
counted for in an adequate conceptualization of the machine. It is also in 
the interplay of end and closure, as we have seen, that a teleo-eschatology 
is established: an ‘eskhaton, the end, or rather the extreme, the limit, the 
boundary, the last, that which closes a history - a genealogy, or very simply 
a quantifiable series - in extremis.’277 What is at stake in the machine’s teleo-
eschatological functioning is a mobilization in which the political finds its 
particular modern feature. The machine is certainly not only ‘the Kampfplatz 
of metaphysics,’278 it is that of politics as well. Derrida himself is at least pre-
pared to admit that it is also to be found ‘in poetics (between poetry and 
philosophy), concerning the death or the future of philosophy.’279 The next 
chapter inquires into the relation between fiction and the legitimacy of vio-
lence. 
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Chapter Three 
The Modern Political Machine 
_________________________ 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The concept of legitimacy has a fairly short history in the philosophy of law 
and politics.280 In a treatise entitled De Regimine Principum, attributed to 
Thomas Aquinas, a distinction is made between ‘legitimate force’ (legitima 
potestas) and tyranny.281 His distinction calls upon a previously untheorized, 
or undertheorized, concept of legitimacy. While the force (potestas) used in 
a kingdom is a justified, legitimate force, the force used in a tyranny is an 
unjustified, illegitimate force. Aquinas makes no use of the concept 
‘illegitimate.’ That concept will only begin to circulate several centuries 
later. But Aquinas’ use of ‘tyrannical’ already points to what is at stake in the 
distinction between legitimacy and illegitimacy, or tyranny: it differentiates 
between two kinds of force. There is a legitimate force and a tyrannical 
force. An economy of forces is discerned in which there is a difference 
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between legitimate force and illegitimate, tyrannical force. Since it concerns 
the distinction between a legitimate political regime and a tyranny, this 
economy of forces is a political one: the differentiation that this economy 
makes – between legitimate and illegitimate force – is a political 
differentiation. How such an economy works can be clarified by close-
reading a passage from Derrida’s Glas. This passage can be read as a 
preliminary sketch for an economy of forces, which would be one that does 
not rely on the distinction between mediate and immediate, natural or 
unnatural. Its notion of force would have to escape those oppositions as 
well as displace them.282 Through this economy, Derrida argues, we would 
have to experience 
 
a recognition that is not natural and yet that passes 
through no conflict, no injury, no rape: absolute 
uniqueness, yet universal and without natural singularity, 
without immediacy; symmetrical relation that needs no 
reconciliation to appease itself, that does not know the 
horizon of war, the infinite wound, contradiction, 
negativity.283 
 
In a similar vein, the forces that Aquinas distinguishes and that will play an 
increasingly constitutive role in the build-up of the modern political 
machine are not ‘natural’. But they are not the result of direct ‘conflict’ 
either. Neither are they the result of a rupture with the natural order.  If 
anything, they make possible such a conflict (the conflict between 
legitimate and tyrannical force) and they make it possible to establish any 
rupture. An example of such a rupture would be the transition from the 
state of nature to the law of state guarded by a legitimate force, to which I 
will return below. The distinction between legitimate force and illegitimate 
force is required so that a distinction can be made between the state of 
nature and the state of law. Therefore these forces do not constitute a 
‘violation’ of any kind of natural law. Instead, the distinction between 
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legitimate and illegitimate force will lie at the origin of any construction of 
law, society, or any political regime. They have no ‘natural singularity,’ but 
they are ‘absolutely unique.’ The forces and the distinction made among 
them are not immediate, but neither are they mediated. They are not 
immediate because their political nature implies an economy in which the 
political is first introduced; something extra is needed that will set up such 
an economy. They are not mediated because these forces only appear as 
forces once they are differentiated by this economy, and hence they 
immediately appear as political forces – as legitimate force and illegitimate 
force. In other words, there is no pre-political point of origin from which one 
could trace the becoming-political of these forces. Instead, something 
deeper is at work that makes these forces political by operating already 
from within the economy of forces, setting it to work: the political machine. 
In the course of this chapter it will become clear what the nature of this 
machine is.  
 The distinction between legitimate force and illegitimate force is 
fully employed during the sixteenth century. At that time the opposition 
between these two is explored and becomes part of the everyday 
functioning of political regimes. Michel de Montaigne takes up the 
discourse on legitimacy in his essay, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 
where he relays the legitimacy of government back to the legitimacy 
derived from the origin of law.284 The origin of law functions as the decisive 
moment at which the distinction between legitimate force and illegitimate 
force is made. In the same movement the modern state is established as a 
viable, justified form of government. But Montaigne’s position is a skeptical 
one. In his essay he distrusts this discourse on the origin of law as the origin 
of legitimacy and the justification of the state. He cautions his readers and 
suggests that we look for the social conditions that allow for such a 
discourse on the origin of law to emerge. What sort of transition took place 
between Aquinas’ treatise on government and the legitimization of political 
regimes in the sixteenth century? What allowed the opposition between 
legitimate force and illegitimate force to move toward the center of the 
political? What social conditions brought the discourse on legitimacy to the 
center of the state? Answering these questions means asking about the 
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conditions under which the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
force becomes central; it implies looking into the economy of forces and 
showing that the central position of legitimacy was made possible by a 
politico-technical change in government that resulted in the modern state; 
answering these question implies realizing that the centralization of a 
discourse on legitimate force and illegitimate force veils a more profound 
event: the constitution of the modern political machine. The advent of 
political modernity equals the becoming-machinic of the political. 
 Within the modern political machine the economy of forces is set 
up to correspond to the distinction between legitimate force and 
illegitimate force. Instead of pointing towards the economy of forces of 
which they are a part, these forces draw attention to the juridical 
constitution of the state. The distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate force occupies a central place in modern political theory, 
accompanied by the emergence of a conceptualization of the origin of the 
state. What this discourse of legitimacy is unable to observe is the economy 
of forces that is set to work in the modern political machine. The focus on 
the fictional origin of the state and its possible legitimacy leads away from 
the machinic in modern politics. Following Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 
I will call this act of diversion state thinking.285 Some of Montaigne’s writings 
from the sixteenth century clearly indicate and tacitly criticize the 
construction of such a state thinking. He criticizes the regime of his time 
and contrasts it with primitive society, praising that society for its 
‘egalitarian and libertarian position.’286 I will return to state thinking and 
legitimacy below. First, I will elaborate a concept of the modern machine in 
relation to an economy of forces by looking at philosophies of technology 
from Bertrand Gille, Bernard Stiegler, and Gilles Deleuze. Having done so, I 
will assess the transformation from feudal order to modern state from the 
point of view of a modern political machine. 
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2. Constitution: Disadjustment, Machinic Point, and Executive Function 
 
In the centuries between Aquinas’s legitimate and tyrannical forces and de 
Montaigne’s skeptical account of legitimacy a politico-technical 
disadjustment took place that disassembled,287 deconstructed,288 or 
deterritorialized289 the feudal order and led to the formation of the modern 
state. Bringing into balance this disadjustment, a machinic functioning was 
constituted that did not exist previously: it erected the bureaucracy of 
kingdoms, enabled the centralization of military force and organized the 
territorialization of land by means of a centralized military apparatus.290 The 
result of this disadjustment was that the forces of technics had the 
opportunity to enmesh themselves in a new way. In the process of doing so 
a machinic functioning was constituted. In order to understand how the 
modern political machine took form and determined the concept of the 
political in modernity, a more profound understanding of machine and 
machinic functioning is required. Two concepts from the philosophy of 
technology are useful in this respect: disadjusment and machinic point. In 
many ways the modern political machine is the machine par excellence 
since it makes the political depend on executive functions (bureaucracy, 
police, military apparatus); that is to say, on the machinic function. This is 
why the modern state machine equals the becoming-machinic of politics: in 
the very process of effectuating a centralization of power, the modern state 
machine depends entirely on its executive functions. These executive 
functions cannot be overseen by one sole sovereign who holds power and 
surveys his kingdom; neither can it be localized in one origin of the law and 
the state. Instead, the modern political takes the form of a machine because 
it operates through several heterogeneous elements that are brought 
together, connected to each other, and related.  
As a concept for studies of technology, disadjustment was 
introduced by historian Bertrand Gille and taken up by Bernard Stiegler to 
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account for the way a crisis in a given system causes this system to 
transform, and thus become able to adapt to a new situation.291 
Disadjustment occurs when one system within a broader network of 
interconnected (social, economic, military) systems is evolving faster than 
the systems that are related to it. The faster evolving system will then no 
longer be on a par with the other systems connected to it. As a result, it 
causes a disorder in the interconnected network of systems: ‘In these 
periods of crisis the system evolves at great speed, which causes 
“disadjustments” with the other social systems – law, economy, education, 
religion, political representation, etc.’292 The system will have to find a new 
stability that restores the balance between the systems to which it is 
related. Bertrand Gille argues that technology always exists in the form of a 
technological system, understood as a set of interrelated techniques and 
technical capacities. ‘It is one of the characteristics of advanced technical 
civilizations [des civilizations techniques avancées] to have constituted their 
own technology.’293 A technological system is related to other systems, for 
example a social system, an economic system, an educational system, a 
political system. According to Gille, the position of a technological system in 
the set of systems is almost always that of the faster evolving system. 
Therefore it is the technological system that will cause a disadjustment, 
which forces the other systems to transform themselves to find a new 
equilibrium. The possibilities for technological progress depend on the 
ability of the interrelated systems (social, economic, political) to keep up to 
speed with the technological system. Progress is only possible within such 
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an interrelation of systems, Gille argues.294 He distinguishes between 
‘technical progress’ and ‘adjustments’ called forth by a ‘new technological 
system’:   
 
Whilst technical progress takes uncertain or apparently 
uncertain tracks [voies aléatoires], the adjustments of 
new technological systems with other systems are carried 
out as well as possible by the play of a certain number of 
freely operating forces, with all the mistakes, all the 
after-effects that this can entail before establishing a 
satisfactory equilibrium.295 
 
According to Gille, the tracks by which technical progress proceeds are 
‘uncertain’ because they are not properly related to a system of technology. 
Only when there is a technological system is innovation possible. But in that 
case the possibility of innovation is tied up with a political system, a social 
system, an economical system. In short, in Gille’s analysis, technology is 
always interdependent with economy, politics, and related domains. For 
progress to be possible an equilibrium must be established between the 
systems. It is in finding such an equilibrium that a technological innovation 
can be made. Since finding an equilibrium between a rapidly evolving 
technological system and slower evolving interdependent systems (social, 
political, economical) requires an adjustment of the other systems, it is only 
in searching for such an equilibrium that a societal, systematic 
transformation occurs.  
The decisive moment – the moment of disadjustment, called 
‘tipping point’ by Saskia Sassen296 – occurs as ‘the play of a certain number 
of forces.’ I would argue that while these forces were previously interwoven 
and enmeshed in a machinic functioning, they are set free again through a 
disadjustment. The play of forces described by Gille is reminiscent of my 
interpretation of différance as technics in the first chapter of this study. The 
‘play’ mentioned by Gille could refer to what is at stake. It represents the 
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wager set by the imminent transformation evoked by a technological 
innovation. But it also refers to a free play of forces, to ‘a certain number of 
forces operating freely.’ These freely operating forces, which will almost 
immediately start to interweave and give rise to a new machinic 
functioning, are what I call technics. Whilst the operation of these forces is 
free, it is not wholly uncoordinated. The free pay of forces operates from the 
interstices of the network of systems that has been disadjusted.  
The merit of Gille’s account of systems is that it shows how 
technological transformations, occurring at those decisive moments in 
which forces operate freely, are always dependent upon other factors (and 
other systems) rather than merely technological ones. Continuing this line 
of thought I would say that what is technological and what is political within 
the freely operating play of forces is yet to be determined. In this decisive 
moment the two categories enmesh on a sub-technological and sub-
political level. Technics interweaves heterogeneous forces and these 
include political, technical, and other elements. At this moment, there is an 
interweaving of several heterogeneous elements but there is not yet a strict 
economy. Technics is on the verge of establishing an economy, but a fixed 
(generalized and stabilized) economy only occurs when the interplay of 
forces is ordered in machinic functions. The machine moulds technics into a 
fixed pattern, transforming it into a political technology. The political 
machine constitutes a rigid economy in which a distinction first can be 
made between legitimate forces and illegitimate forces. In other words, the 
differentiation between forces only becomes possible after they are 
ordered and made operational in a political machine. The constitution of 
the modern political machine, then, consists in a specific way of ordering 
and distinguishing forces according to the legitimate and the illegitimate, 
and according to the executive function and the law-giving function of 
state. The modern state is based on these distinctions and hence is the result 
of the modern political machine. In technics there is a first ‘mobile, 
immanent principle of auto-unification through a nomadic distribution, 
radically distinct from fixed and sedentary distributions.’297 The interplay of 
these forces then establishes an economy, what Gille and Stiegler - 
borrowing from the natural sciences - refer to as an equilibrium. Machinic 
functioning makes this economy operational, distinguishing it from a mere 
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free play of forces. It is also this machinic functioning, interrelated with the 
constitution of the political regime of modernity, that will make this 
economy into a modern machine. 
 The disadjustment in the centuries between Aquinas and 
Montaigne sets to work a free play of forces. It took place as a historical 
turning point in which the restructuring of the military apparatus, the 
territory over which power is wielded, and the bureaucratic machinery used 
to maintain that power all played a decisive role. In the process of 
reestablishing equilibrium, a political machine was constituted. This 
machine defines and determines modern politics. The breakdown of the 
feudal order enabled the build up of the modern state. As Sassen points 
out, ‘a given factor in the decomposition of an order, in this case the feudal 
order, can become a capability once it gets lodged in a novel organizing 
logic.’298 Breakdown and build up join forces in disadjustment: the point at 
which the feudal order299 breaks down or deterritorializes is also the point 
at which the modern state is constructed and territorialized.300 What 
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distinguishes the modern political machine from the feudal political order is 
still its machinic function. During the disadjustment that took place 
between Aquinas and Montaigne a machinic point is reached at which the 
political becomes machinic. The machinic point is the moment at which the 
changing (military, economic, and bureaucratic) apparatuses shaped the 
conditions for the passage from feudal order to modern state. At that point 
the state is created and can begin to assemble these changing apparatuses 
into the state machine. In a seminar from March 1973, Gilles Deleuze 
introduces the concept of a machinic point (point machinique) to designate 
a historical turning point that is evoked by a change of machines: 
 
At a given moment, for reasons that, of course, must still 
be determined, it is as if a social space were covered by 
what we would have to call an abstract machine. We 
would have to give a name to this non-qualified abstract 
machine, a name that would mark its absence of 
qualification, so that everything will be clear. We would 
call it – at the same time, this abstract machine, at a given 
moment, will break with the abstract machine of the 
preceding epochs – in other words, it will always be at the 
cutting edge (à la pointe), thus it would receive the name 
“machinic point” (pointe machinique). It would be the 
machinic point of a group or a given collectivity; it would 
indicate, within a group, and at a given moment, the 
maximum of deterritorialization as well as, and at the 
same time, its power of innovation. […] [I]t’s this 
machinic point of deterritorialization that is 
reterritorialized in this or that machine, or in this or that 
military machine, amorous machine, productive of new 
statements.301 
 
The modern machinic is indeed at the cutting edge - à la pointe - it 
constitutes a veritable turning point. It has assembled a relatively stable 
territory larger than the territories mastered by lords in the feudal order. 
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The assemblage of larger territories deterritorialized the smaller territories 
of the feudal order. This process was necessitated by an advance in military 
machines and economic markets. So while the smaller regions of the feudal 
order broke down – in Deleuze’s terminology, deterritorialized – a power of 
innovation was unleashed that would lead to the territorialized, larger 
region that constitutes the modern state. Kingdoms were established that 
reigned over this larger region. But what brought about the modern state 
was the growing power of bureaucratic and military systems. These were 
developed to control the larger region of the state – which was 
considerably larger than the regions controlled by the lords during the 
feudal period. In other words, one of the central features of the modern 
state is the need to organize the territory. In order to do this, kingdoms 
needed to erect the bureaucratic and military machinery capable of 
keeping the social, economical, and political transactions of the state under 
control.302 Power in the modern political machine is located in the executive 
machines like the military, the police, the bureaucracy.303 Two operations 
merge into one another here. In short, the modern state is characterized by 
a process of centralization (the unification of the large territory that would 
become the state), but this centralization required erecting executive 
machines (military and bureaucratic) that decentralize power, making the 
maintenance of power dependent on the executive functioning. The total 
of this operation is what constitutes the modern political machine. It created 
the state, but it is only when incorporated in the state that the different 
apparatuses (military, bureaucratic) become a machine with a designated 
machinic functioning. 
For these reasons the modern political is determined by a 
becoming-machinic. On the one hand, the modern political form of 
government – the state – resulted from a change in machinic functioning: 
from regionalized feudal warlords to unifying military apparatuses that 
were finally incorporated by the state. As Nisbet points out, ‘the state is 
indeed hardly more than the institutionalization of the war-making 
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apparatus.’304 The state is the assemblage of machinic functions that were 
developed at the end of the feudal period, at the beginning of the modern 
period. On the other hand, as the assemblage of all these machinic 
functions, the state is also what orders and controls them. In other words, as 
soon as the state established itself as a political form of government, it 
began to enhance the machinic functions through which it exerts its power: 
the military machine, the bureaucratic machine. In doing so, the modern 
state becomes a state that depends on its decentralized mechanisms of 
control; that is, it depends on its machinic functions. The becoming-machinic 
of the modern political takes place here: at the point where the state is 
assembled by the machinic functions and that the machinic functions are 
incorporated in the state. The machinic point of the state is the moment at 
which the military and bureaucratic apparatus, having erected the state as a 
political institution, are in turn institutionalized by the state. As Stuart Hall 
points out in his analysis of the modern state:  
 
Though the state may be an abstract and general force, 
its power has to be materialized – i.e., it must acquire 
real, concrete, social organizational forms, with real 
tasks, using and disposing of real resources through a set 
of practices in the apparatuses of the modern state 
machine.305 
 
Hall’s argument implies that there is, first of all, a state that operates as an 
‘abstract and general force,’ and that with this force comes the need to 
materialize the state in its institutions. My argument runs that the abstract 
and general force that was operative during the period of disadjustment, 
which occurred between the breakdown of the feudal order and the build 
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up of the modern state, was put in a machinic function that would only 
afterwards lead to the state – not the other way around. Once constituted, 
the state would give a proper teleology to these machinic functions.306 As 
an idea and as a starting point for theoretization, the state is not the place to 
begin. The proper place to begin is the disadjustment in which machinic 
functions were taking shape (like the military apparatus) that enabled the 
possibility to construct a state. The modern state resulted from the change 
in institutions; that is, from the change in its machinic functions – military, 
economic, and political. Thus, the executive functions of the state, which are 
often called the state machine, preceded the actual abstract idea of the 
state. The abstract idea of the state, and hence the idea of such a political 
order as the state and its conceptualization, is an after-effect of a change in 
machinic functioning.   
 
 
3. Territorialization and Centralization in the Modern State Machine 
 
Comparing medieval and modern states Samuel Finer makes a useful 
distinction between the two. His distinction highlights the double 
operation of centralization and moving away from centralization that 
determines the modern state and what I call its machinic functioning. Finer 
argues that ‘territorially, the medieval state was differentiated,’ while its 
‘public and private functions were consolidated in one and the same office 
and individual.’307 In the case of the modern state, he continues, it was the 
other way around: its territory was consolidated, but its functions were 
differentiated. The rise of the early state depends on a process of 
centralization and territorialization.308 Centralization implies the 
interlacement of various heterogeneous elements of social and economic 
life, which were still distinct in feudal society, existing alongside one 
another. Their modi operandi become interdependent and interconnected. 
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In this centralization the modern political machine comes into being.309 
Historically this centralization is the result of transformations of structures in 
power. More specifically, executive power becomes organized in an efficient 
and more functional way in this period. The centralization of power in 
politics was in close connection to a process of territorialization. ‘A clearly 
defined territoriality is one of the things that mark off the state from earlier 
political forms, such as premodern empires.’310 In the establishment of the 
state, politics comes to be understood as the control over a certain, well-
delineated territory. This territory can then be articulated in the idea of ‘the 
national’. The ontopological politics that Derrida discerns in Specters of Marx 
is an essentially modern phenomenon. It makes no sense to speak of 
politics as essentially ontopological if it is not first placed in the context of 
the centralization and territorialization that constructed the modern state 
machine. Through this construction the modern state machine becomes 
exactly that: a machine that operates on a certain topos, the nationally 
defined and delineated territory. The modern political machine is formed in 
a process of deterritorialization that affects its concept of being, truth, and 
politics: it is by becoming a modern political machine which organizes 
territory that politics becomes rational and ontopological. As Michel Serres 
puts it, ’instead of letting the possible roam free’ - that is to say, instead of 
opening up the forces of technics -  modern politics tries to be ‘right and 
rational,’ modern politicians become ‘functionaries of the truth.’311 Such a 
specific type of politics becomes possible in the modern political machine 
and its territorialization.  
At first sight, centralization by the state would seem to go against 
everything that has been said about machinic functioning so far. Machinic 
functioning implies that there is no single controlling instance, no supreme 
power that rules over the others. Instead, the machine takes on its 
functioning because it is an assemblage of heterogeneous elements and 
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forces. Functioning means that these forces are directed in a routine that 
can be repeated and modulated. This is what we have called machinic 
functioning. This is why it is important to distinguish between the 
centralization that is operative in the state machine and the idea that there 
is a single instance that controls the machinic functioning, which would 
appear to contradict the definition of machinic functioning given in the 
previous chapter. First of all, the centralization that took place in the state 
was the unification of several distinct territories, which in turn was the result 
of the unification in military powers. This centralization does not imply a 
central point from which all machinic functions can be controlled; rather it 
implies that such a unified point is no longer maintainable. The specific 
feature of the machinic is that it connects heterogeneous elements without 
there being one element from which we could get an overview of the entire 
machine. The several executive powers or functions of the modern state are 
such elements of the machine - they are what could properly be called 
machinic functions. The centralization that these machinic functions 
constitute therefore does not imply centralization in the sense of one 
absolute locus of power. On the contrary, the centralization of the state 
implies that the several distinct elements that are brought into machinic 
function in the state begin to function as a machine. Hence, centralization 
implies the disappearance of one locus of power. It also implies the increase 
in power of the executive functions of the state.  
Continuing this line of argument, it would be necessary to consider 
the absolutist states that were established in early modernity as transitory 
forms of political government. The centralization enacted in the political 
form of the state is machinic because it is a process that orders and stratifies 
social, economic, political, and military forces and elements that, until then, 
had been unconnected. It is because these forces are connected and 
ordered into a routine that the state begins to take form. Centralization 
therefore does not imply absolutism, and neither does the state form. In 
political theory it is commonly agreed upon that ‘[a]bsolutism is perhaps 
best seen as a transitional form, albeit one that spanned several 
centuries.’312 But it is not necessary to conceive the absolutist state as a 
transitory form of government, as Pierson and others argue, in order to 
understand why the modern political is defined by a becoming-machinic of 
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politics. The absolutist state is just as dependent upon its huge coercive 
apparatus, and its tightened bureaucratic web. Without these executive 
functions the absolute monarch would not be able to stay in power. ‘The 
centralized state power characteristic of bourgeois society arose in the 
epoch of the fall of absolutism. Two institutions are most typical of this state 
machine: the bureaucracy and the standing army.’313 Through its 
centralization absolutism enacted a break-down of the older, fragmented 
regimes of power. But this centralization, in turn, became possible thanks to 
the establishment of a permanent police force and military apparatus. The 
monarch was an important element in the modern political machinery, but 
no more important than the military and bureaucratic apparatuses. 
Once the state was established as the dominant political regime it 
would continue to functionalize the military and bureaucratic machinery by 
which it controlled its territory. ‘Life is the object of the police’: Foucault’s 
phrase only holds in the modern political machine with its executive 
functions – one of which is the police, a modern invention indeed.314 
Starting out from the newly established state it became possible to use the 
executive functions to enforce the authority of the state. One of the clearest 
examples of how the executive functions of the state machine are perfected 
and used to further enhance the machinic function of modern politics is the 
increase in military power during the sixteenth and seventeenth century. 
Perry Anderson explains that the territorializations operated by the French 
state  
 
were backed by a massively augmented coercive 
machinery. A permanent police force was created to keep 
order and repress riots in Paris (1667), which was 
ultimately extended throughout France (1698-9). The 
Army was enormously increased in size during the reign, 
rising from 30-50,000 to 300,000 by its end. Regular 
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pay, drill, and uniforms were introduced by Le Tellier and 
Louvois; military weaponry and fortifications were 
modernized by Vauban. The growth of this military 
apparatus meant the final disarming of the provincial 
nobility, and the capacity to strike down popular 
rebellions with dispatch and efficacy.315 
 
Anderson argues that the territorialization needed to institutionalize the 
state as a form of political government was done by directing the military 
apparatus to disarm the remaining ‘provincial nobility’. It is precisely 
because executive functions like the military apparatus and police force 
made the territorialization of the state possible that they have their import 
in the analysis of the state as a state machine; they are constitutive for what I 
call the modern political machine. This political machine develops the state 
machine and its executive functions, and peaks at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. At that time Karl Marx also introduces the notion of the 
state machinery in his treatise on the 18th Brumaire of Napoleon Bonaparte. A 
distinctive feature of the state machine, Marx argues, is its executive 
function. He affirms that the machinic feature of the state lies in the 
executive role of the military and the bureaucracy. Marx dates the 
emergence of the state machine back to the formation of absolute 
monarchies:  
 
This executive power with its enormous bureaucratic and 
military apparatus, with its widespread and ingenious 
machinery of state [Staatsmaschinerie], a compliment of a 
half million officials alongside an army of another half 
million, this fearsome parasitic body, which traps French 
society like a net and chokes it at every pore, sprang up 
in the days of the absolute monarchy, accelerating the 
decline of feudalism.316 
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Under the category of executive power Marx allocates the bureaucracy of 
the state and the military apparatus of the state. These two are not the only 
elements of the executive power, but they do form its core. Together they 
make up the ‘widespread and ingenious machinery of state,’ or state 
machine. Thus, Marx’s analysis of the modern state as a state machine is 
motivated by the ‘widespread’ executive powers of the modern state. It is 
not the result of an analysis of the sovereignty of kings or statesmen. 
Neither does it emerge from a philosophical inquiry in the origin of law. In 
his analysis of the state as a machine Marx avoids any reference to political 
theory. Instead, his determination of the modern state as a machine is 
based on numbers: ‘half a million officials’ and ‘an army of another half a 
million.’ These figures indicate the existence of a ‘parasitic body’ that has 
encroached itself upon French society. This parasitic body is not centered; 
instead it functions like a net.   
To conclude this section, I have argued that the central feature of 
the modern political machine is the increase in executive functions. The 
power of the modern state machine depends on these executive functions, 
and up to a certain point these executive functions are responsible for 
erecting the state machine. Once constituted, the state machine will 
continue to depend on these executive functions, which now operate from 
within the larger political machine of the state. On a more abstract level, but 
still starting out from the executive machinic functions that arose in the 
fourteenth century, the modern political machine can be defined by its 
capacity to create a machine that arrests social, economic, and geographic 
forces. Such a political program cannot be seen distinct from the machine 
that is created in politics. Politics itself is a machine, meaning that it brings 
together the heterogeneous elements to link them together so that they 
can start to operate in a machinic function that will determine politics. The 
state implies a move toward hierarchical structures and territorialization. 
Another outcome of the machinic functioning of the state is its emphasis on 
the judicial apparatus that grounds the legitimacy of the state. It is through 
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the law that the state legitimates its monopoly of violence and thereby its 
centralization and territorialization. 
 
 
4. State Thinking and Skepticism 
 
The machinic functioning that consolidated in the modern political 
machine had its impact on the economy of forces with which I began this 
chapter. At this point I would like to return to the economy of forces and 
look at how this retroactively reconstituted the concept of the state. The 
economy of forces operative in the modern political machine is no longer 
that of natural sovereignty. In any case, the sovereignty of the state 
operates by a different economy of forces. This economy will now be 
regulated by the machine analyzed in the preceding section. In a similar 
way, Michel Foucault differentiates the economy of sovereignty from the 
economy of the modern disciplining societies. The theory of sovereignty, he 
writes, is a theory which ‘can found absolute power on the absolute 
expenditure of power, but which cannot calculate power with minimum 
expenditure and maximum efficiency.’317 The capacity for absolute 
expenditure belongs to the economy of forces sketched by Aquinas in his 
distinction between legitimate force and tyranny. In that economy it is 
possible to continue to draw from the legitimate force to establish a 
(justified) sovereignty because it relies on a telos of nature. Political laws will 
derive from the ‘divine natural laws,’ which in turn are derived from the 
‘divine will’ that establishes the telos of nature.318 In the modern political 
machine, on the other hand, the economy of forces is not set up by a telos 
of nature but by the machinic functioning, that is to say by the executive 
function of the state. The calculation of the use of force, and its capacity for 
expenditure, operate according to a different economy. The economy of 
force in the modern political machine will ‘calculate power with minimum 
expenditure and maximum efficiency.’ Foucault argues that this 
‘nonsovereign power, which is foreign to the form of sovereignty, is 
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‘disciplinary power.’319 My argument has been that the economy of force 
itself, in the modern political machine, is installed and maintained by the 
machinic functions that make up this modern political machine. In more 
concrete terms, the economy of forces that is operative in the modern 
political machine is situated in the military apparatus, the police force, and 
the bureaucratic machinery that make up the modern state. Because the 
economy of forces now operates via these machinic functions, this 
economy itself becomes machinic. What is witnessed here is the passage 
from technics to machine.320  
 This does not mean that the distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate force disappears; but it does mean that this distinction works 
from within the new economy that functions by disciplining institutions (in 
Foucault’s terms), or via the machinic functions of the modern political 
machine. Any discourse on legitimate force and illegitimate force will have 
to situate itself within a modern economy of forces set up by the machinic 
functions of the state. It turns out, then, that such a discourse on legitimate 
and illegitimate force is of increasing importance for a number of reasons 
directly or indirectly related to the becoming-machinic of the political in 
modernity and its redistributed economy of forces. It is because the 
becoming-machinic of the modern political depends upon the executive 
functions that the legitimacy of the force exerted by these executive must be 
warranted – even if retroactively. The discourse on legitimate and 
illegitimate force therefore starts to play a role in modern state machine 
precisely because the legitimacy of the executive function of the state 
needs to be established: such a discourse will need to account for the 
economy of forces by drawing a distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate force. In modern political theory this is done with rigorous 
precision, but not by scrutinizing the proper functioning of the executive 
functions of the state machine. The discourse that is developed in modern 
state thinking moves away from these executive functions. Instead, it tries 
to legitimate the use of force in the executive functions of the state by 
accounting for a legitimate origin of the state machine. The argument is 
that if the force originally used to establish the state is legitimate, then the 
use of this force (by its executive functions) to maintain the state form will 
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also be legitimate. In other words, the question concerning the legitimacy 
of the force used by police, military apparatus, or bureaucracy is relayed to 
the legitimacy of the force that founds the state. This original force - also 
called original violence - that founds the state does not base itself on the 
historical emergence of the state. For as I have argued above, the historical 
emergence of the state is largely dependent upon a centralization and 
territorialization that only became possible thanks to the executive, 
machinic functions that would only be afterwards be incorporated by the 
state machine. Instead, a fictional or hypothetical ideal origin of the state 
must be constructed. In doing so, attention is led away from the modern 
state machine, away from the machinic functioning of modern politics, and 
directed toward the law and the social contract as that what founds the 
state. Such a theory that leads away from the machinic functioning of the 
political, and the role such a theory takes on in this state machine itself, is 
what I call state thinking: a theory that not only disguises the machinic 
functioning of the state and the political in modernity, but also redistributes 
the economy of forces operative within the state and reintroduces the 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate force. On this subject Pierre 
Bourdieu has remarked that 
  
to think the state is to take the risk of taking (or being 
taken over) a thought of the state, that is, of applying to 
the state categories of thought produced and guaranteed 
by the state and hence to misrecognize its most profound 
truth.321  
 
The crucial feature of state thinking is inscribed in the machinic functioning 
of the state but also disguises it. According to Deleuze and Guattari, such a 
state thinking signals the recuperation of reason by the modern state. The 
state gives reason a form of universality, which can then be used to 
legitimate the state as the universally just form of government: 
 
The state gives thought a form of interiority, and thought 
gives that interiority a form of universality. […] The 
exchange that takes place between the State and reason 
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is a curious one; but that exchange is also an analytic 
proposition, because realized reason is identified with the 
de jure State, just as the state is the becoming of reason. 
In so-called modern philosophy, and in so-called modern 
or rational State, everything resolves around the legislator 
and the subject.322 
 
The effect of state thinking, as Deleuze and Guattari remark, is that the state 
now revolves around the legislator and the subject. The machinic 
functioning of state is obfuscated while its juridical status is brought to the 
fore. Compliance with the modern tendency toward immanence, while 
maintaining a transcendent source of authority, is characteristic of such 
state thinking. Modern political philosophy has a particular aptitude to 
balance on the verge of state thinking. This implies that ‘political 
philosophy (…) structures implicitly all philosophy.’323  
The modern state machine creates its own reason: ‘If it is 
advantageous for thought to prop itself up with the state, it is no less 
advantageous for the state to extend itself to thought, and to be sanctioned 
by it as the unique, universal form.’324 This is why the construction of a 
theory of social contract and the origin of law are typical for the modern 
state machine. These strategies are executed in thought; they operate as 
experimental cogitative constructions. Historically they are possible 
because of the centralization and territorialization that mark the state as a 
modern political machine. The construction of one single origin that 
justifies the construction of the state machine as the ordering principle for 
the social strata is the extension of the characteristics of the state into 
thought. In the same movement, the construction of such an origin that 
would justify the state obfuscates the increasing importance of its executive 
functions. It therefore misses an essential characteristic of the machinic 
functioning of the state. But this is precisely why the construction of a 
historical origin of the law fits into the machinic functioning of the state 
itself: by focusing on such an origin the executive functions of the state 
disappear from sight; the state becomes a cogitative idea and the violence 
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performed in the state through its executive functions are obfuscated. 
Hence the state does not appear as a machine. The distinction between 
legitimacy and illegitimacy plays a particularly important role here.  
 
 
5. Law and Legitimacy in the Modern Political Machine 
 
In his book State, Power, Socialism, Nicos Poulantzas argued that the 
constitution of modern law, including its economy of legitimate and 
illegitimate forces, was a direct result of the political machine of the modern 
state. ‘It is precisely through a system of general, abstract, and formal rules 
that law regulates the exercise of power by the state apparatus.’325 The 
roots of such a law do not go back to an ancient origin that would justify 
the modern state as the best form of government; but rather, as I argued 
above, ‘its roots go back to the Absolutist State and the seventeenth 
century European monarchies.’326 The legitimacy of the law is of a 
conceptual nature. But it is here that the efficacy of concepts and their very 
real imprint becomes apparent. Legitimacy is a concept that is intertwined 
with the physical reality of political violence: it is intertwined with the 
concrete functioning of the political machine (the military and the police). 
For this reason, the conceptual genealogy of the distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate force is bound up with the formation of the 
modern political machine. Illegitimate force gets defined as violence, while 
legitimate force effaces violence. For example, actions visited upon a 
subject in so far as they are legitimate actions of the law cannot be called 
violent. Thus, the concept of legitimacy has a crucial function in the political 
machine: while some actions are presented as violent, others are presented 
as legitimate and therefore non-violent (albeit coercive). Legitimacy 
functions within an economy of forces that structures and organizes the 
forces of technics in a given society. A distinction is made between violence 
and the just coercion of the law. The physical act that underlies the ‘just 
coercion of the law’ is, strictly speaking, a form of violence no different from 
any other form of violence. But because these physical acts are enmeshed 
in the political machine of the modern nation state, with its acquired 
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monopoly on violence, its violent nature is effaced. This effacement is 
enacted by legitimacy, as a part of the economy of forces. The conceptual 
framework of legitimacy thus immediately brings forth concrete effects that 
structure the modern political machine. 
Michel de Montaigne is one of the first to explicitly refer to the 
legitimacy of the law in his essay, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond.” As 
Montaigne puts it, the legitimate is but a fiction that serves to found the 
truth of justice.327 He writes: ‘And it has been said that even our law has 
legitimate fictions upon which the truth of its justice is based [Et nostre 
droict mesme, a dict-on, des fictions legitimes sur lesquelles il fonde la verité de 
sa justice].’328 In his essay, “Force of Law,” Derrida quotes this extremely 
complex remark by Montaigne to elaborate upon the difference between 
justice and law. Derrida asks: ‘What is a legitimate fiction? What does it 
mean to found the truth of justice?’329 These questions, along with the 
quote by Montaigne, prepare the reader for Derrida’s interpretation of the 
force of law, the foundation of the law, and the meaning of justice. Derrida’s 
essay puts into question the possibility of finding a foundation of the law; 
yet, at the same time, it argues that it is impossible to do without such a 
foundation.330 Therefore, the origin of the law needs to be fictional and 
historical at the same time. Its legitimacy depends on these mutually 
excluding conditions. In my reading of legitimacy and the law I will use 
Montaigne’s quote to develop a reading that is close to Derrida, but also 
differs from it in some distinct ways.  
Montaigne’s dealing with the law has to be read as an intervention 
that deals with the emergent modern political machine of his time, the 
economy of forces that is established by it and the discourse on legitimacy 
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and illegitimacy that accompanies it. In articulating what can be 
understood as the first traits of positive law, Montaigne places the workings 
of legitimacy in a broader, political framework: that of the becoming-
machinic of the political. On a political level, the foundation of the law is 
necessary to legitimate the state and its monopoly of violence. Dwelling on 
Derrida’s analysis I want to approach the problem of legitimacy as a twofold 
problem that forms part of the state machine and has a machinic 
functioning in its own right. Both aspects of the problem of legitimacy take 
part in setting up the economy of forces operative within the modern state 
machine; and both aspects of the problem are constitutive for state 
thinking. Legitimacy is a twofold problem in the sense that it deals with two 
interrelated kinds of violence: the violence necessary to found the law, and 
the violence necessary to maintain the law. The legitimization of the law, 
when taken to its extreme, is the problem of legitimizing the violence that is 
needed to found the law. This will subsequently legitimate the violence that 
is needed to enforce the law. So legitimacy concerns violence that precedes 
the law but also founds the law, standing at the origin of the law. The 
violence used to maintain the law is made credible by relaying it to a more 
originary violence that founds the law.  
Derrida’s essay inquires into the status of an originary violence that 
precedes and founds the law. First, he deconstructs the originarity of this 
violence. As a result, originary violence is carried over to the law itself, 
where it starts to intermingle with the violence that maintains the law. 
While the latter depends on originary violence, it must also remain clearly 
distinct from it. The originary violence is of a different order than that used 
to maintain the law. Since it precedes the law it also precedes legitimacy 
and therefore it cannot be legitimate itself. But if the legitimate force or 
violence to maintain the law is itself based on a violence that is not 
legitimate, how then can one distinguish between legitimate violence and 
illegitimate violence? This is the question that Derrida asks throughout his 
essay on the force of law, and that will guide him through the wilderness of 
violence and legitimacy to a notion of justice that marks a différance from 
the law: 
 
How to distinguish between the force of law [loi] of a 
legitimate power and the allegedly originary violence that 
must have established this authority and that could not 
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itself have authorized itself by any anterior legitimacy, so 
that, in this initial moment, it is neither legal nor illegal – 
as others would quickly say, neither just nor unjust?331   
 
Because this violence that imposes itself upon ‘the mystical foundation of 
the law’ (as the subtitle of Derrida’s essay has it) is central to Derrida’s 
analysis, legitimacy is implicitly at the heart of Derrida’s inquiry. The 
profoundly modern economy of legitimatization is best described as a 
strategy of distinction, restricting violence to a period where the law did not 
yet exist – and not beyond it. Once the law is founded, however violent the 
foundation may have been, the law itself becomes a criterion that 
legitimates the violence used to maintain the law. This specific violence 
exercised by the law is no longer violence, it is the force of (the) law and 
therefore legitimated. Legitimization is what allows for this distinction 
between violence, as an unjustified use of force, and the force of law, as a 
justified use of force. 
One modern aspect of legitimizing the violence of the law in the 
modern political machine lies in its finely tuned responsiveness to the 
historicity of the state machine and to the foundation of the law that 
supposedly legitimates the state machine as the only justified political 
order. An intricate relation between law, fiction, and history necessitates the 
extraordinary move, the ‘economy of legitimization’ that the law in the 
modern political machine employs to justify the violence that founds the 
state. The state is in fact a historical construct but it does not tolerate its 
own historicity. Its historicity reveals contingency, its machinic functioning 
as well as the priority of the machinic. It thus threatens to undo the 
justification of the violent foundation of the state; it demystifies the idea 
that at the origin of the state lies the foundation of a just law to resolve a 
state of total war of everyone against everyone. Once we investigate the 
history of the state machine we can trace it back to its executive functions, 
its process of territorialization and the contingent political factors that 
allowed for the emergence of the state. Likewise, if we trace back the 
historical origin of the modern law that legitimates the violence of the state 
machine and of its executive functions, we would find that this law is the 
result of habitual and historical circumstances. Neither state nor law is the 
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result of a universal subject that acts as the legislator of the state machine, as 
state thinking has it. This is to say that as soon as we trace back the law to its 
origin, we find that it is without origin, without proper foundation. To relate 
the state machine back to its origin in a historical and political way means 
destructing it as a foundational juridical order: the law of the state can no 
longer maintain itself as something that is justified in and for itself on a 
trans-historical basis. Instead, what comes to the fore are the executive 
functions that the law tries to legitimate retroactively. For the state machine 
and the law of the state to be justified it needs to be a-historical; its 
installment may, therefore, never take place within history, but must be 
placed outside of history, the installment itself being an event that never (at 
no historical moment) takes place. This moment is presented as a fictional 
origin of the law that, in one single stroke, founds the state machine. The 
installation of the law brings with it legitimacy and the power that wields 
this legitimacy – the state. 
The single stroke by which the judicial state machine is founded 
obfuscates the machinic function of the state because it draws attention 
away from the executive function of the state. The single stroke, the absolute 
emergent order to which the fictional foundation of the state machine 
adheres is typically modern, and closely engaged with a modern 
conception of the law. I would now like to take a closer look at the way such 
an emergent order or foundational act is structured, and what this implies 
for the modern state machine and its juridical order. In an essay on Kafka, 
entitled “Before the Law,” Derrida gives an example of the relation of the 
law to history, the history of its own origin. Derrida describes how the law 
always tries to efface its own history: 
 
The law, intolerant of its own history, intervenes as an 
absolute emergent order, absolute and detached from 
any origin. It appears as something that does not appear 
as such in the course of history. At all events, it cannot be 
constituted by some history that might give rise to any 
story. If there were any history, it would not be 
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presentable nor relatable: the history of that which never 
took place.332 
 
The conceptualization of a radical rupture between the period before and 
the period after the foundation of the law of the state bears witness to the 
necessity of effacing the history of law and state. Legitimizing the 
foundation of the law must be done through the a posteriori (re)construction 
of a hypothetical original situation, not by reconstructing a concrete 
historical situation, whose circumstances can be fully accounted for. This 
hypothetical original situation depicts the transition from a violent 
unregulated order to the order of the modern state. The law, embodied as a 
social contract, thus stands at the origin of the modern state machine. The 
event by which the law is founded is an event to which there can be no 
direct relation. As Derrida has it, the ‘reality of its historical referent is, if not 
annulled, at least irremediably fissured.’333  In this attempt to efface its own 
historicity, the law risks transforming its own origin into a fiction. In 
becoming a fiction the justification of the law is threatened a second time. 
Now there is a lack of reality that is equally intolerable to the law. The 
‘quasi-event’ with tangible consequences that never took place, 
necessitated by the need to legitimate the violence of the law, is both 
‘demanding and denying the story.’334 It is demanding it in the sense that it 
needs to be a-historical, and to achieve this the law turns itself and its own 
history into a fictitious event, a quasi-event. 
The fiction at the origin of state and law cannot be reduced to an 
ideological need to cover-up a supposed real violence at the origin. The 
relation between the historical event and the fictitious quasi-event is not 
one of simple contrast, as if between truth and fiction. Slavoj Žižek, in For 
They Know Not What They Do, gives an ideological account of the fictitious 
moment at the origin of the law. In his reading the law is a cover-up for the 
Real of violence: 
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“At the beginning” of the law, there is a certain “outlaw”, a 
certain Real of violence which coincides with the act itself 
of the establishment of the reign of law: the ultimate 
truth about the reign of law is that it is an usurpation, 
and all classical politico-philosophical thought rests on 
the disavowal of this violent act of foundation. The 
illegitimate violence by which the law sustains itself must 
be concealed at any price, because this concealment is 
the positive condition of the functioning of law: it 
functions in so far as its subjects are deceived, in so far 
as they experience the authority of law as “authentic and 
eternal” and overlook “the truth about usurpation.”335  
 
Žižek describes the violence of the law as the Real not because it happened 
at a certain point in time, but because it must be presupposed for setting in 
place the law.336 Fiction, then, is what substitutes this Real to make us 
believe that it did not happen. It is because one must not uncover the 
infamous origin of the law – which is in itself nothing but an illegitimate 
violent act – that fiction is introduced, Žižek argues. This fiction is a ‘fantasy 
constructed by bourgeois ideology to account for the origins of civil society 
– that is, of the reign of law.’337 In dealing with what he designates as one of 
the more obsessive interests in politico-philosophical thought, Žižek relies 
heavily on a concept of ideology. Such an ideological reading of the law 
makes a distinction between the real violence and the ideological fiction 
that is supposed to veil this violence. Derrida’s analysis, however, has the 
advantage of demonstrating that the distinction between the fictitious 
event and the historical event cannot be maintained. The two are 
interrelated, deconstructing each other.   
The foundation of the law is depicted as a fable, a myth or a fiction 
because it needs to efface the concrete historical circumstances of its 
foundation. Yet, at the same time, ‘the law as such should never give rise to 
any story. To be invested with its categorical authority, the law must be 
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without history, without genesis, or any possible derivation. That would be 
the law of the law.’338 The quasi-event of the foundation of the law denies its 
fictitious status because the law itself must be real and not fictitious. (A 
fictitious law would not be a law, since it cannot be enforced.) This ‘law of 
the law’ reveals a tension, even an aporia that can be brought to bear upon 
the legitimization of the law itself. At the same time, the legitimate 
existence of the law depends upon this tension.  
 The difficulty in narrating the origins of law as a strategy of 
legitimization is a characteristic feature in modern theory of law and state 
which originates within the modern state machine. This is one of the 
intricate complexities of state thinking. The penultimate example of a state 
thinking, which tries to justify the state by a fictional origin of the state 
machine as the institution of law, is exemplary for the social contract. The 
law acts as a central function in a broader conception of society. Its 
importance in the context of an analysis of political machinic functioning is 
that it not only serves to legitimate the law but also the state machine itself, 
in which the law takes part. The fiction Derrida ascribes to the origin of the 
law takes on its political significance when placed within the context of the 
machinic functioning that brings together the first formative figurations of 
the state in early modernity. My emphasis on Montaigne’s use of the phrase 
‘legitimate fiction’ is motivated by the conviction that it gives an idea of the 
modern concept of legitimacy in the formation of the state machine – and 
not merely as a principle of law. Derrida quotes Montaigne for another 
reason, namely for his articulation of an idea of justice that is no longer 
founded on a mystical origin. With this in mind, I now return to Montaigne’s 
statement about legitimacy and fiction. 
In Montaigne’s reading, an origin of the law is lacking. Montaigne 
denies the story that founds the law and subsequently the state. This does 
not mean that the law or the state loses its legitimacy. For Montaigne, this 
opens up an analysis in which the law is studied as a part within a larger 
machinery that is brought into being: the modern political machine with its 
tendency toward immanence and its need for a transcendence that will 
secure its sovereign power. This tendency between immanence and 
transcendence, between closure and end, is what is articulated in the 
fictitious quasi-event that lies at the origin of the law. As such, it is part of 
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the larger constitution of the social and political realm of the modern 
political machine. Its functioning is in compliance with this machine. By 
merely focusing on the relation between justice and the law as a problem 
belonging exclusively to the theoretical question about the origin of the 
law, Derrida’s analysis risks losing sight of the larger political and machinic 
context in which Montaigne’s statement should be placed. The origin of the 
law should be seen as a part of state thinking, which functions in an 
economy of forces of the political machine. It is not only the case that the 
origin of the law legitimates the maintenance of the law; it is also the other 
way around, the maintenance of the law justifies its origin even if that origin 
is lacking. This is the seeming ‘juridical paradox that constitutive power can 
be defined only by constituted power.’339 It leads to the emergence of 
positive law in modernity, of which Montaigne may be a first forebear.   
 
 
6. Demystification and Machination: The Modern State Machine 
 
Let me return to the quote by Montaigne: ‘And it is said that even our laws 
are legitimate fictions upon which the truth of their justice is based.’340 As 
the quote indicates, the distinction between the law and justice is itself 
marked by a distinction between truth and fiction. Montaigne argues that 
there is a ‘legitimate fiction’, namely the law, which is necessary to found 
justice. Justice is then depicted as truth founded by fiction. Pairing fiction 
with legitimacy and truth with justice, Montaigne’s quote reveals the 
precariousness of the law: for its very existence just law seems to depend on 
a legitimate fiction. This implies that the ultimate foundation of the just is 
itself something that is not just but legitimate. Montaigne thereby reverses 
the usual order that goes from the just to the legitimate and that bases the 
legitimate on the just. Along with this reversal Montaigne also plays a trick 
on the relation between truth and fiction. Truth is based on a fiction. In 
Montaigne’s rendering of the law, its justice only becomes a truth by being 
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founded upon a fiction that is itself merely legitimate. From a contemporary 
perspective on concepts such as justice and legitimacy, truth and fiction, 
this strikes one as an odd statement. 
In his essay on the force of law Derrida takes Montaigne’s 
indictment as a starting point to argue that the possibility of the law is alike 
in structure to the possibility of literature. He secures his claim via two 
rhetorical questions in which he notes a structural analogy between law 
and literature. The first question focuses on the structural relation of the law 
to the subject of law and asks: ‘What if the law, without being transfixed by 
literature, shared the conditions of its possibility with the literary object?’341 
Derrida is arguing that we never have access to the ontological core of the 
law itself. In this sense the law is structurally like the literary object: it cannot 
really represent itself since its existence remains indeterminable. For its 
justification the law needs to narrate its own origin. Yet it does not tolerate 
any story. The law cannot relate its own origin and hence it cannot relate its 
own foundation. In its structure, Derrida argues, the law is dependent upon 
the impossibility of recounting its own story. Such a story is nevertheless 
necessary for the justification of the law. This is why in order to be effective, 
the law must be alike in structure to the literary object, even if this means to 
risk haphazardly contaminating the law with fiction. Both depend upon the 
productive insertion of fiction into their build-up to become operational. In 
the case of literature, this is obvious. In the case of the law, it is necessary for 
the whole machinery of legitimacy to take its course. 
Even if the law is in principle different from fiction, the possibility of 
fiction cannot structurally be ruled out. This is a consequence of the 
construction of state thinking that both constructs and destructs the idea of 
the origin of law and state. The double move we see at work between the 
law as fiction and the law as intolerant to any fiction regarding itself, returns 
in Derrida’s second question. The second question focuses on the structural 
relation of the subject of law to the law and asks:  
 
Is not what holds us in check before the law […] also what 
paralyzes and detains us when confronted with a story: is 
it not its possibility and its impossibility, its readability 
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and unreadability, its necessity and prohibition, and the 
questions of relation, of repetition and of history?342  
 
Derrida again stresses the inaccessibility of the law. We cannot get hold of 
the supposed ontological core of the law. Although the law clearly exists, its 
precise nature and determination remain intangible. For the law to have an 
effect on its subjects, it has to depend upon the inaccessibility or 
suspension of the story of the law. So again, according to Derrida, the law 
needs this structural affinity with fiction in order to be effective. This reveals 
the precariousness of the law, but also its force. Once Derrida relates this 
possibility of fiction to the essential readability and unreadability of the law, 
as is suggested in the second question, he has cleared the road for a 
deconstruction of the law as carried out in his essay “Force of Law”. 
The distinction between truth and fiction, and between justice and 
legitimacy, also implicates a more profound distinction: that between 
nature and artifice or technique, mediated through the concept of the 
supplement. The fictional legitimacy installed to found the truth of justice is 
characterized by Montaigne as a supplement analogous to the supplement 
of nature. He compares the need for a fiction in law with the need for a lady 
to mask her missing teeth with artificial ivory ones.343 Montaigne suggests 
that there is only a supplement, a legitimate fiction, and no original natural 
justice that precedes this fiction. Justice only comes afterwards. The 
legitimate fiction then becomes a strategy of the supplement. Through this 
reading, Montaigne is rendered as a precursor of the doctrine of positive 
law that was conceptualized in the nineteenth-century and has since taken 
on an important position in the theory of law. For Derrida, what is at work in 
Montaigne’s use of the supplement is an alignment of technique with the 
unnatural, the supplementary. This would make it possible to reduce law to 
a technique, a move which Derrida criticizes. However, the complex relation 
between law and technique in Montaigne’s statement entails more 
complex alignments than merely that of technique and supplement. 
Montaigne is not so much reinstating such an alignment - which 
supposedly can be traced in philosophy from Plato to Heidegger. Rather he 
is articulating the singular political condition of his age in which the modern 
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political machine begins to take shape. His turn away from the origin of the 
law enacts a demystification of the law and legitimacy. It opens up the 
possibility to see them at work as two elements in the machinic functioning 
of the state. This makes the reference to Montaigne of critical importance as 
a marker of a constitutive moment in the modern political machine. 
In Of Grammatology, Derrida conceives of the supplement as a 
cumulating abundance and substituting for a shortage or a lack. This 
double meaning of the supplement is described as follows: 
 
The supplement adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude 
enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of 
presence. It cumulates and accumulates presence. It is 
thus that art, technè, image, representation, convention, 
etc., come as supplements to nature and are rich with this 
entire cumulating function. […] But the supplement 
supplements. It adds only to replace. It intervenes or 
insinuates itself in-the-place-of; if it fills, it is as one fills 
a void. If it represents and makes an image, it is by the 
anterior default of a presence. Compensatory [suppléant] 
and vicarious, the supplement is an adjunct, a subaltern 
instance which takes-(the)-place [tient-lieu]. As 
substitute, it is not simply added to the positivity of a 
presence, it produces no relief, its place is assigned in the 
structure by the mark of an emptiness.344 
 
Derrida designates two aspects of the supplement which, while not exactly 
contradictory, create a tension, or even infighting: the supplement adds 
and enriches, but it also replaces and fills. This implies that the supplement 
is at the same time the accomplishment of an overabundance of presence, 
an ‘extra,’ as it were, and a necessity that is needed to fill a lack of presence.  
Such structural tension installed by the supplement is found in 
Montaigne’s plea for a legitimate fiction. Montaigne asserts that we need a 
legitimate fiction to secure justice. Hence he implies that whilst justice 
certainly exists in the world and does have some kind of foundation, the law 
that is needed to attain justice cannot be founded in nature. Parting with 
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the doctrine of natural law that was still maintained by Aquinas, Montaigne 
moves toward a doctrine of positive law and depicts the law as founded on 
a historical and social contingency.345 The theory of positive law was coined 
by legal theorist John Austin, arguing that ‘the existence of law is one thing; 
its merit or demerit is another.’346 Austin argues that instead of focusing on 
the justification and hence the origin of the law, it is better to study the law 
as it is actually functioning in society. This implies that the legitimacy of the 
law will not depend on the justice that underlies it but on its efficacy in 
modern society. ‘A law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to 
dislike it, or though it vary from the text, by which we regulate our 
approbation and disapprobation.’347 In positive law the legitimacy of the 
law depends on the correct regulation it has in society. Here the legitimacy 
of the law is truly on the side of technique: forced into an instrumental 
relation the law is legitimate if this instrumental relation is adapted 
correctly, serves the right goal. Positive law is installed under the pretext of 
a supplement, that is to say it is because the origin is left out of the analysis 
that the function of the law becomes the focus of the legitimacy of the law. 
As I explained in the first chapter, the conceptualization of the supplement - 
like the pharmakon - is part of a teleological determination that installs the 
schema of means and ends. By aligning technology with the supplement it 
is reduced to technique, that is to say a means oriented toward an end. Both 
natural law and positive law can be read as using the supplement to reduce 
the complexities of the law to a mere technique. In the case of natural law, 
the supplement - as a means - is firmly oriented toward the origin that 
functions as its goal and justification. The law here refers back to the natural 
institution that is mediated by it and that justifies its force. In the case of 
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positive law, the supplement is used to study the law as a means without 
relating this back to its end or origin.  
In Montaigne the move toward a theory of positive law is still 
attenuated by the ‘legitimization’ of this fiction by a just end, which is more 
typical for natural law theory. Montaigne’s fiction finds its justification not in 
the correctness of its application - typical for positive law theories - but in 
the just end that it serves, namely the foundation of justice (typical for 
natural law theory). In his important study on Montaigne, Jean Starobinski 
has appropriately positioned Montaigne in between positive and natural 
law. He points out that the legitimate fiction Montaigne proposes leads us 
toward a human duty that is founded neither on nature nor on strict 
convention: 
 
What Montaigne has brought to light is a “duty of 
humankind,” a “mutual obligation” that applies to all who 
share the same experience of the senses, even though it 
is impossible to state any positive law that is not open to 
debate and controversy: the sense of felt similarity 
justifies the repudiation of violence. The apparent 
paradox is that acquiescence in the inherited order is 
based, for the enlightened mind, on the infinite variety of 
usages and customs, among which no criterion of 
superiority enables one to choose: no criterion, that is, 
except for that of public tranquility and the survival of the 
community. Yet the convention to which the war-weary 
skeptical mind rallies is unlike the convention earlier 
denounced: it is the same in appearance but henceforth 
deprived of the foundation it once claimed, and which 
guaranteed it a timeless, not to say transcendent, 
authority. What had been the object of attack and 
criticism, and what continues to be held suspect, is the 
“mystical” authority that the civil and religious order had 
claimed.348        
 
                                                 
348 Jean Starobinski, Montaigne in Motion (Chicago University Press: 
Chicago 1985), 253. 
 171 
Montaigne accepts the rule of law in the new political figuration. But it is 
precisely because of this new political figuration that he will argue that the 
law is a supplement that lacks an origin. Hence, he is able to demystify the 
foundation of the law. This opens the way for an analysis that will focus on 
the positive function of the law. Montaigne’s conceptualization of 
legitimacy does more than foreshadow the future development of the 
concept of legitimacy. His view serves as a point of orientation in the 
development of the modern political machine that is in the process of 
constituting itself. In this machine the law starts to take on a function that is 
embedded in a new political context. This is the modern political machine 
with its end and closure, its tension between immanence and 
transcendence.  
The conceptualization of the origin of the law as a fictitious event 
and the conceptualization of this origin as a supplement without an origin 
both need to be placed in the context of the modern political machinery. 
The obsessive interest in the social contract as a fictitious starting point that 
legitimates law and state is one outcome of the process of the formation of 
the state machine. The state machine itself is thereby pushed back to its 
singular, foundational principle: the origin of the law as the origin of the 
social stratum that is ordered and structured in the political machine, that is 
to say the modern state machine. The grounds for such a foundation or 
origin of the law are political, that is to say the construction of such an 
origin functions as a political strategy: it is state thinking. The paradoxical 
relation between the necessity for the onto-historical reality of this origin 
and the need for fiction in the relation of the origin can be understood once 
we realize that the origin is a construction of the political machine. The 
modern political machine constructs both the fictitious and the onto-
historical status of the origin. It does so to legitimate its own political order. 
Derrida focuses on the original foundation of the law and shows that it is 
ultimately untenable. In his work on politics, Derrida takes the same 
strategy. He leads the essence of the political back to its desire for a pure 
and stable presence (a metaphysical tendency). He then argues that politics 
seeks such a solid presence in the construction of a stable territory (which 
will most often be the territory of the nation state). Both the desire to find 
an ontologically stable origin of the law and the desire to find an 
ontologically stable territory are impossible to fulfill. As a result, Derrida 
argues, politics is caught up in a double bind that deconstructs the political. 
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But even more important, this conceptualization of politics depends upon a 
profoundly modern formation of the political – determined as it is by the 
historical and structural formation of the state machine.  
Quite a different outcome follows from the implicit turn toward 
positive law as witnessed in Montaigne. This initial turn to positivism is still 
far removed from the legal positivism of the nineteenth century motivated 
by utilitarianism. Montaigne’s underlying drive is still justice. Moreover, 
Montaigne is not the only political theorist who reconfigured the relation 
between nature and law through the broader formation of the political 
machine. According to Pierre Macherey, in Spinoza we find a negotiation 
between natural principles to which all political forms tend and a sort of 
political realism that forbids leading all forms of society back to one 
universal principle or origin. Macherey writes that:  
 
Philosophy leads all kinds of societies back to common 
principles, which are those of nature, but it abandons 
privileging in any absolute way a certain structure of 
power and constituting this structure into a universal 
paradigm.349  
 
In a double movement Montaigne at the same time denies the relation 
between nature and the law, by arguing that we need a fiction and cannot 
fall back upon any natural law to assure justice, and yet draws an analogy 
between justice and nature: both are in need of a supplement. In the case of 
justice, fiction is the supplement that is required. This fiction serves as a 
supplement as it is described by Derrida in Of Grammatology: the 
supplement is an overabundance of fiction, but one that has the primary 
task to make up for the lack of a definite foundation of justice. 
As Derrida reads him, ‘Montaigne proposed an analogy between 
this supplement of a legitimate fiction, the fiction necessary to found the 
truth of justice, and the supplement of artifice called for by a deficiency of 
nature.’350 The connection between the deficiency of nature and the fiction 
of the law is established through the absence of natural law that lies at the 
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core of Montaigne’s argument. Derrida argues that Montaigne derives the 
necessity of fiction from the absence of natural law, ‘as if the absence of 
natural law called for the supplement of historical or positive (that is to say, 
an addition of fictional) law.’351 Again we find the intricate relation between 
the historical contingency of the law and the supplement of fiction that 
remains essential to that law even if it is argued that the law cannot endure 
fiction. However, the preceding analysis of the modern state machine 
shows the problem posed by Derrida to be a typically modern problem. A 
growing emphasis both on the executive function of the state and on the 
conceptualization of the origin of the law as the origin of a just ordering of 
the social strata that make up the state, is what results from the formation 
of the state machine. This is why I believe that the origin of the law is 
neither ontologically or historically real, nor fictitious. Both the ontologically 
real and the fictitious status of the law are constructed from within the 
modern machine of the state. It is but one of the many ways of the machinic 
functioning of the state, albeit an important one, that of legitimacy.  
Montaigne’s argument exemplifies the way that both a historical 
and a fictional account of the law gain ground because of the absence of a 
natural origin. This historical approach to the law, which can lead to all 
kinds of theories of positive law, opens up the possibility for a focus and 
critique of the state and the law that is situated in the violence that they 
enact. Derrida believes that, at best, this can lead to a kind of judirical 
ideology critique that ‘will always be possible and [will] sometimes be 
useful.’352 But he argues that this type of historically oriented ideology 
critique is not enough in itself, since it threatens to make abstraction of the 
most pertinent problem in modern theory of law: the legitimization of the 
violence that founds the law, and hence the justice of the law itself. I have 
argued, on the other hand, that the analysis of the origin of the law and the 
supposedly performative violence that is enacted there, are themselves 
constructions of the modern political machine extending itself into 
thought. An all too narrow focus on the origin of the law cannot place this 
theory of the origin of the law in the context of the machinic functioning of 
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the state. Therefore it runs the risk of unwittingly turning into ‘state 
thinking’353 - a theory that ratifies the state even if it seems to criticize it.  
 
7. Constitutive Violence and Performative Fiction 
 
If we exclusively focus on the foundation of the law and the violence 
enacted by it, a moderate move toward positive law, such as the one made 
by Montaigne, does not reach up to the mark. Such a historical critique of 
the law is unable to deal with the intricacies posed by the foundation of the 
law. In “Force of Law,” Derrida criticizes positive law precisely because of its 
neglect for the problem of the origin of the law. This is because the violence 
that is used to found the law is of a special, performative kind that cannot 
be accounted for by historical or economical analysis. It is here that Derrida 
introduces fiction as something that is crucial to the law but cannot be 
reduced to something purely historic. Derrida’s reserve for a positive theory 
of law is expressed in the following passage from “Force of Law”: 
 
The very emergence of justice and law, the instituting, 
founding, and justifying movement of law implies a 
performative force, that is to say always an interpretative 
force and a call to faith [un appel à la croyance]: not in 
the sense, this time, that law would be in the service of 
force, its docile instrument, servile and thus exterior to 
the dominant power, but rather in the sense of law that 
would maintain a more internal, more complex relation to 
what one calls force, power or violence. Justice – in the 
sense of droit (right or law) – would not simply be put in 
the service of a social force or power, for example an 
economic, political, ideological power that would exist 
outside or before it and that it would have to 
accommodate or bend to when useful.354  
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Derrida distinguishes between applications of the law, which would 
certainly benefit from standards set by positive law, and the foundation of 
the law that demands a different reflection on the law and cannot be 
limited to simply setting the standards for applying the law correctly. For 
Derrida, the application of a rule may bring the correct and legitimate 
solution to a certain judicial dispute, but it will not bring justice. Focusing 
on the problem of the origin of the law, Derrida rules out the correct 
application of the law as a minimal definition for justice. His definition of 
justice emerges from a reflection on the origin of law. At the same time, 
Derrida presents a concept of fiction that is characterized by the modern 
conditions for its emergence. If the concept of fiction that he employs in his 
analysis can be shown to be the outcome of the formation of the modern 
state machine, then the concept of justice he develops also needs to be 
replaced in the context of the modern machine of the state. The question 
that arises for Derrida is: what is the role of fiction in the legitimacy of the 
law? He will argue that the role of fiction is related to the performative force 
of constitutive violence. Digressing from Derrida’s interpretation, I want to 
emphasize the role of fiction in the formation of the modern machine of the 
state. I do so by relating Derrida’s focus on the origin of the law back to the 
executive functions of the state, for this is where the machinic functioning 
of the state can be witnessed.     
Emphasizing the performative violence that marks the foundation 
of the law, Derrida runs the risk of reintroducing a quasi-mystical 
foundation of the law. At the core of Derrida’s reading lies the belief that 
the origin of the law can be neither demystified by a historical reading, nor 
completely mystified – again by posing it as somehow historically real. The 
risk of a renewed mystification of the origin of the law lies in the structural 
likeness that Derrida sees at work between the law and fiction. By 
overemphasizing Montaigne’s rejection of the foundation of the law as its 
legitimation, Derrida can criticize Montaigne in order to propose a 
reevaluation of the foundation of the law. He then shows how the origin is 
ultimately problematic. The question is whether this strategy does justice to 
the law in relation to the modern political machine. Starobinski’s comment 
demonstrated that Montaigne’s turn to a positive conception of the law is 
moderate. Above all, it is motivated by the new political context in which 
Montaigne is situated. In the political machine one encounters a narrow 
focus on the performative force of the foundation of the law. In itself this 
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can be a strategy of diversion that leads attention away from the machine 
itself. At the same time, the conceptual utensils that are needed to bring the 
origin of the law into scope are provided by the modern political machine 
itself: a turn to historicity and a modern conception of fiction as that which 
has the right to say everything. 
What needs to be studied is how the performative force of law is 
brought into relation with other political elements, how it forms a part of 
the centralization and territorialization of the state. All these elements form 
an operative interlacement that is not so much concerned with denying or 
covering up the origin of the law as with structuring the forces at work in 
society. The political turns into a machine with complex but interlaced 
machinic functionings not because it is a superstructure – that would be to 
misinterpret the centralization of the state completely – but because it 
forms a network of distributing forces, producing legitimacy in its economic 
and military operations. The essence of this power, and the economy of 
forces to which it pertains, is described well by Foucault: 
 
It seems to me that the eighteenth century also 
succeeded in creating – and the disappearance at the end 
of the eighteenth century of the monarchy, of what we 
call the Ancien Régime, is precisely the confirmation of 
this – a power that is not part of the superstructure but 
that is integrated in the play, distribution, dynamic 
strategy, and effectiveness of forces; a power, therefore, 
that is invested directly in the distribution and play of 
forces.355     
 
It is in the context of this political regime of the eighteenth century that the 
modern concept of literature emerges, along with the increasing interest in 
the origin of the law and the social contract. The idea that the law cannot 
tolerate its own history, as Derrida argues, only becomes a pertinent 
problem in modernity with its increasing awareness of the importance of 
history and historicity. If the historicity of the law is what Derrida is basing 
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his argument upon, then his conceptualization of the law only holds for the 
modern political machine. 
Derrida argues however that what holds us in check before the law 
is something different from the history of the law, something that is 
intricately related to fiction. What Derrida – digressing from Montaigne – 
calls the mystical foundation of the law expresses the idea that what stands 
at the origin of the law is not merely something historical but something 
that transgresses a historical approach to the law. Neither can the concept 
of legitimacy be useful in determining the violence that is needed to found 
the law. An inquiry into the origin of the law will get stuck on this point: the 
common juridical standards for the legitimacy of the law, which entail the 
legitimacy of the force that is needed to apply or enforce the law, are no 
longer sufficient to determine the nature of the violence (or force) that 
founds the law. The origin of the law is marked by a performative force that 
is not just a force in the usual sense of the word. This force cannot be called 
just or unjust, nor legitimate or illegitimate, since there is no law prior to it 
according to which it could said to be just or unjust. This force is 
indistinguishable from the law itself, and it cannot be contradicted or made 
undone by any kind of justice. Derrida concludes: 
 
[T]he operation that amounts to founding, inaugurating, 
justifying law, to making law, would consist of a coup de 
force, of a performative and therefore interpretative 
violence that is in itself neither just nor unjust and that 
no justice and no earlier and previously founding law, no 
preexisting foundation, could, by definition, guarantee or 
contradict or invalidate.356 
 
Literature, as Derrida understands it, is intricately tied up with this modern 
theme of legitimacy, if only because ‘the set of laws or conventions which 
fixed what we call literature in modernity was not indispensable for poetic 
works to circulate.’357 It already becomes apparent that the legitimacy of the 
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law in modernity is installed in the machinic functioning of the political 
machine of the state. This is why fiction should be understood from within 
this machine, as a part of this machine. 
When dealing with the status of fiction in relation to the law, 
Derrida makes no clear distinction between fiction and literature. For that 
reason his arguments are sometimes accidentally confused. Moreover, 
Derrida easily switches from the essence of fiction, which he argues is that 
of the lack of essence, and the position of fiction in a social or political 
machine. This goes to show how easily the historical or social function and 
position of fiction is mixed up with a philosophical reflection on the lack of 
essence. For my own inquiry in the machinic functioning of the modern 
political machine it is important to keep these two as strictly separated as 
possible. In the next chapter I undertake a more profound inquiry in the 
narrative function of literature and the privileged site it can have in a 
machinic function. For now I track Derrida’s conceptualization of literature 
and fiction while trying to position his argument in the context of the 
modern machinic functioning of politics.   
Derrida makes a distinction between literature in the broad sense 
and literature in the strict sense. In the broad sense, literature stretches 
from Homer to the present day. In the strict sense, however, literature is 
distinctly modern and emerges in the highly singular political context of 
modern Europe. Continuing this line of thought Derrida even argues that 
’Greek or Latin poetry, non-European discursive works, do not, […] strictly 
speaking belong to literature.’358 Derrida makes this categorization on the 
basis of a political condition: if we take literature as a narrative and social 
practice to be the result of the possibility of ‘being able to say everything,’ 
then literature only emerges in European modernity. The law or principle so 
tied up with literature and modernity as Derrida understands is that of 
‘being able to say everything.’  Strictly speaking, literature begins in 
modernity, marked as it is by the desire to be able to say anything. This does 
not imply that in reality it has always been able to say anything it wants. In 
practice literature has always faced censorship. In my argument I want to 
hold on to Derrida’s conceptualization of literature in the strict sense to give 
a more precise definition of what literature is, as opposed to fiction. 
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Nonetheless, the tradition of literature cannot be detached from its 
Latin origin and future. Literature stems from, and strives toward a world 
literature that remains dominated by the Latin-Christian tradition. When 
speaking about this tradition in a broader sense Derrida often refers to 
mondialatinisation.359 With regard to literature this Latin-Christian tradition 
can also be found in the laws of literature – the desire to be able to say 
everything and the project of a global literature. Thus, although Derrida has 
confirmed that only modern literature can strictly speaking be called 
literature because of its place in the modern political context, he has also 
stated that in a broader sense literature is tied up with its Latin roots: 
 
There is no thought, no experience, no history of 
literature as such and under this name, no world 
literature, if such a thing is or remains to come (…), there 
is no passion of literature that must not first inherit what 
this latinity assumes and thereby show itself capable of 
receiving it and, as I would say in French, of suffering it, 
which is to accept, to receive, to capacitate, to invite, to 
translate into itself, to assimilate, but also to contain, to 
keep thus within its boundaries.360  
 
The combination of the broad and the strict view on literature together 
form Derrida’s specific insight into the structure of literature. In both cases 
the law is intricately involved with literature. Time and again, Derrida’s 
conception of literature and the law hovers between this broad view and 
the strict view. Shuttling back and forth between the strict and the broad 
view allows him to establish connections between literature, society and 
the law.  
 The emphasis that Derrida puts on the juridical-historical principle 
of being able to say everything is itself the result of the specific conditions 
in which literature developed in Europe since the sixteenth century. The 
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fact that Derrida takes this specific evolution of literature as its principle 
would seem ample evidence of the claim that he is conscious of the 
historical and specifically modern circumstances in which literature arose. J. 
Hillis Miller points to Derrida’s concept of literature in order to argue against 
the claim that deconstruction’s relation to literature is ahistorical:  
 
here is an exigent historicizing if there ever was one. It is 
a historicizing of literature that would make big problems 
with current (and much older) attempts to universalize 
the Western concept of literature.361  
 
This may be true, but what remains clear beyond this justifiable claim is that 
the historical exigency demonstrated by Derrida in his reading of literature 
remains scarce. Although Derrida historicizes, he does not directly place his 
historicized idea of literature in a political context. He does so indirectly by 
pointing out that literature depends on democracy; but he never traces the 
formation of literature in relation to the state machine. In Derrida’s work, 
literature in its operative function is not related to the modern political 
machine. For Derrida the historical emergence of literature in the political 
and historical formation of Europe is related ‘in a unique fashion to what is 
called truth, fiction, simulacrum, science, philosophy, law, right, 
democracy.’362 The operative function of literature is related to the concepts 
that are used to deconstruct ontology (such as simulacrum and fiction). As a 
result, the operative function of literature finds its place within this 
deconstruction of ontology. However, whereas literature takes part in the 
deconstruction of ontopology, it does not take part in explaining the 
formation of the machinic functioning of the state. Derrida’s thinking of 
politics grapples with the ontopological formation of the state, but at the 
same time it cannot get past state thinking. 
With this in mind I want to turn to the distinction between the 
violence used to maintain the law and the violence used to constitute the 
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law. It is through this distinction that the relation between fiction and 
legitimacy becomes visible in the clearest possible way. To reach the 
predominantly modern kernel that underlies the problem of legitimacy and 
the violence of the law we need to draw upon an intricate understanding of 
its emergence. This emergence is structurally related to the emergence of 
the state as a political and social order. I have designated this ordering 
principle as the modern political machine. One of the state’s machinic 
functions is to draw the distinction between positive law (with an increasing 
awareness of the executive functions of the state) and natural law (with the 
risk of falling into a state thinking). The distinction made in modern 
philosophy of law between the violence that maintains the law and the 
violence that founds the law is in line with the distinction between the 
executive functions of the state and the founding principle of the state.  
Most modern theories of law will argue that the problem of 
legitimacy is more difficult to resolve in the case of the violence that founds 
the law. This can be either because there is no origin of law (as Montaigne 
would have it), or because the origin of the law itself is subject to a 
deconstruction (because of its need for fiction and history, as explained 
above). The problem of the justification of violence, and along with it the 
need to legitimate the violence enacted by the law, is considered more 
problematic in the case of violence used to found the law than in the case 
of violence used to maintain the law, because in the first case there are not 
yet any rules to hand that enable one to draw the specific distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate violence.  
In a pre-modern economy of legitimate and tyrannical forces there 
is no rupture between the origin of these forces and the natural order – and 
neither is there a distinction between the tyrannical and the legitimate. 
Thomas Aquinas still grounds the legitimacy of royal power in the telos of 
nature, arguing that ‘there needs to be something that directs all things 
ordained to an end [...] so that they might achieve the due end by a direct 
path.’363 Hence, Aquinas does not draw any distinction between pre-
juridical or pre-statist human life and juridical human life within the state. 
For Aquinas, the ordered, legitimate society follows naturally from God’s 
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well-disposed natural plan. Modern theories of law, on the contrary, do not 
accept this fluent and natural transition. Even proponents of natural law 
stress the rupture between what is given prior to the foundation of the law 
and what is posterior to the foundation of the law. In modern political 
theory the transition from the (imaginary) state of nature in which every 
man does as he thinks best and obeys no law, to a society with a legislation 
upon which all members can agree, is conceived of as a rupture. This 
rupture is installed in the modern political machine. In order to proceed 
from the natural conditions to those of civilized society a rupture must be 
made: the necessary enforcement of a set of laws that found the state as a 
form of political government. To enforce the law for the first time requires a 
performative violence that is not legitimated by the existing laws. 
Therefore, the question that state thinking will ultimately have to address in 
order to legitimate the modern state as the most just form of political 
government is a legal question, a question asked in modern theory of law: 
how can laws be set in place without enacting a violence that in itself is not 
legitimate (and it cannot be legitimate since there are not yet any laws that 
could legitimate it), so that a state can emerge? The rupture between the 
natural condition and the state of law is typical for the modern political 
machine. It fences off the origin from the current political situation. 
Whereas in the previous chapter I dealt with the teleo-eschatological 
closure of the modern political machine towards its end, here we can see 
the closure of the origin. The modern political machine desires to become a 
closed system of complete immanence. Yet the authority of its laws and 
functions depends on a transcendent force that compels one to obey from 
beyond the formation of the social contract. The authority of the law is tied 
up with its origin and at the same time this origin must remain intangible in 
the strictest sense.  
Immanuel Kant was the first philosopher to really pay attention to 
the rupture that distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate forces in 
modernity, and thus to use this rupture explicitly to legitimate the originary 
violence that founds the law and the state. Kant explains that violence can 
never be legitimate, but he then immediately asks how it would be possible 
to arise from the state of nature to the civil state with its well-ordered laws. 
If the laws are founded they must be preceded by a violence that was not 
legitimated by the laws. Kant argues, however, that this violence was 
founded; not by the laws as such, but by the morality that is intrinsic to our 
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common human nature. Kant argues that it is our natural tendency toward 
freedom that allows for the violence that installs the law. He concludes: 
 
Hence we must assume that nature allows for the 
reconciliation [...] of man’s free will with the general law 
of freedom; and thus we have found a natural law that 
allows for the violence used.364 
 
Thus, in the last resort, Kant founds the laws in human morality and 
legitimates violence by reverting to a quasi-metaphysical explanation. The 
absolute rupture that is characteristic for the modern political machine is 
thereby bridged by human morality. Since Kant, the relation between law 
and human morality has become a central object of concern in political 
philosophy. This is witnessed in John Rawls’ theory of justice. Rawls 
acknowledges that his theory of justice is strongly influenced by Kant’s 
theory of right and morality. In the introduction to A Theory of Justice he 
divulges that his work can be read as an attempt to overcome some of the 
weaknesses that are inherent to Kant’s theory. Rawls argues that whilst Kant 
held that ‘a person is acting autonomously when the principles of his action 
are chosen by him as the most adequate possible expressions of his nature 
as a free and equal rational being,’ Kant did not have any way of assuring 
the autonomy of a person’s actions.365 In contrast to Kant, Rawls argues, ‘the 
veil of ignorance deprives persons in the original position of the knowledge 
that would enable them to choose heteronomous principles.’366 The ‘veil of 
ignorance’ compels all persons in the ‘original position’ to act on behalf of 
autonomous, rational principles. Moreover, it allows Rawls to dispose of the 
quasi-metaphysical nature of Kant’s argument (in which people are only 
free - that is to say, autonomous - when they act in accordance to the moral 
law that lies within them, and in which the moral law is the foundation of 
the legal laws) by not reverting to man’s ‘nature,’ but remaining within the 
limits of what might be called a thought experiment.  
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Kant’s foundation of law in morality ultimately leads back to a 
modern version of natural law that tries to look beyond the rupture 
installed by the economy of forces of the modern political machine. As such 
he is deeply involved in state thinking. This is where fiction proves to be 
useful: to go beyond the rupture and closure of the modern political 
machine, natural theory of law constructs fictions that sketch the situation 
that preceded the foundation of the law. Rawls avoids reference to any 
speculation on the situation before the rupture. Instead, he constructs a 
completely ahistorical situation through his ‘veil of ignorance.’ 
Nevertheless, his ideal situation is strongly indebted to theories of natural 
law such as Kant’s. In Rawls’ theory, the principles of justice can be deducted 
from an original position that is fictitious but still serves as a viable starting 
point for the justification of the law. This makes his thought experiment 
radically modern. From the ‘original position,’ behind the ‘veil of ignorance,’ 
the principles of justice and a just society are agreed upon. These principles 
then serve as the guidelines for concrete, everyday rule-making. Rawls’ 
theory allows for a foundation of the law, since the principles for the 
foundation of the law can be derived from the principles of justice upon 
which all persons in the original position will agree. However, at the same 
time, his theory does not directly confront the problem of legitimating the 
originary violence used to found the law. This is because Rawls positions his 
thought experiment within the already existing modern political machine. 
His theory does not try to recuperate the moment before this political 
machine took effect. Instead, he uses a strictly fictional situation to 
legitimate the already existing political machine. Starting out from Rawls’ 
theoretical framework, the problem of legitimating the violence that founds 
the law does not seem to pose itself, since the principles of justice are 
deduced from a fictional thought experiment (the ‘original position’) that 
holds no direct implications for the concrete actions one has to undertake 
in reality. 
In A Theory of Justice John Rawls takes an approach similar to that of 
Kant, but he tries to sidestep the metaphysical traces still inherent to Kant’s 
approach through the construction of a strictly imaginary original situation 
behind a veil of ignorance. It could therefore be argued that Rawls’ theory is 
in compliance with the tendency toward immanence characteristic of the 
modern political machine. His fictional thought experiment tries to 
establish a transcendent authority for the principles of justice. But this 
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project is launched within the immanent political machine: the 
transcendent source that judges the just principles for a society is created in 
a fictional environment. Nevertheless, Rawls’ work starts out from a belief in 
human reason that exceeds the political order. The fictional ‘veil of 
ignorance’ professes a faith in human reason that founds the political and 
judicial order. This is why Rawls argues, in Political Liberalism, that violence 
is legitimate when it is in compliance with the constitutional idea of the 
modern political machine. This constitutional idea is something that ‘all 
citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of their 
common human reason.’367 Ultimately, then, Rawls’ theory is grounded on 
the same principles as most political theories of legitimacy and justice 
crafted within the modern political machine: it bases itself on a state 
thinking.  
Derrida’s query regarding the foundation of the law unfolds in two 
steps. In a first step, he undermines the foundation of the law so that, in a 
second step, he is able to point to the performative violence that lies at the 
origin of the law. First, he does not exactly argue that the law is without 
ground, but rather writes that ‘the founding or grounding [la foundation ou 
le fondement], the positing of law cannot by definition rest on anything but 
themselves.’368  Thus, given that these laws are their own grounds, they ‘are 
themselves a violence without ground [fondement].’369 Derrida maintains 
that it is precisely because the law is without ground that it can be 
deconstructed, that it is even essentially deconstructable. His argument is 
based on two possibilities, two routes that are both marked by the absence 
of ground. On the one hand, the law is essentially deconstructable precisely 
because ‘it is founded, that is to say constructed, upon interpretable and 
transformable text.’370 On the other hand, it is essentially deconstructable 
because this textual foundation can still be deconstructed, so that ‘its 
ultimate foundation is by definition unfounded.’371 In Derrida’s argument, 
the ultimate absence of an ultimate foundation results from the textuality 
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of law. Laws are necessarily written and therefore they can be 
deconstructed, for what the law is ultimately concerned with can never be 
written down and can never be said clear enough. The law cannot but be 
written and therefore it cannot but be imperfect, contestable, perfectible, 
and deconstructable. This is why both the state and the law depend on a 
foundation that cannot be grounded. Here performative violence enters the 
economy of forces. Derrida drives state thinking to its extreme and renders 
it ultimately groundless. This then shows the economy of forces that is 
operative in state thinking, without discarding it for being an effect of 
ideology. 
 
8. Conclusion: The Executive Functioning of the Modern Political 
Machine 
 
The argument that Derrida develops concerns the violence used to found 
and ground the law; it has no direct relation to the legitimacy of violence 
used to exercise and maintain the law. In this chapter, I have demonstrated 
that the concept of legitimacy is often called upon in order to justify the 
violence of the law within the state machine. As I showed at the beginning 
of the chapter, the concept of legitimacy belongs to a specific economy of 
forces that only starts to take shape with the emergence of the modern 
political machine. The modern political machine is marked by a turn toward 
executive functions, which allow the state to take shape in the first place. It 
is within the executive functioning of the modern political machine that the 
concept of legitimacy is introduced. With it, a state thinking is introduced. 
By focusing on the emergence of the concept of legitimacy one can see the 
two strategies in which legitimacy plays a prominent role, both of which are 
part of a state thinking. On the one hand, there is a political philosophy that 
returns to the origin of the law to establish the legitimacy of existing 
executive laws in the foundation of the law. This move, I have argued, is 
typical for state thinking: the origin of the social stratification that is 
operated by the state machine is brought back to a fictional origin that 
makes possible a philosophical reflection on the emergence of the state. 
The complex set-up for this fiction is analyzed by Derrida in his essay, “Force 
of Law.” At the same time, by focusing on this problem, Derrida downplays 
the significance of Montaigne and others, who tried to conceptualize a 
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different element of the modern state machine. What Montaigne’s ideas 
show, on the other hand, is the first sign of a turn away from the origin of 
the law toward the actual functioning of the law. It is here that the modern 
political machine begins to emerge on a conceptual level. As I have argued in 
this chapter, what makes this turn to positive law important is that it opens 
up the possibility to look at the operative machine of the state. Thus, it 
becomes possible to recognize the distinctive features of the modern 
political machine.  
Montaigne argues that whilst it may indeed be true that the law 
enacts violence, these laws themselves are justified (and their violence 
legitimated) because they serve the cause of justice. Thereby he takes up an 
intermediate position, in between natural law and positive law. The laws, he 
argued, are a direct and above all concrete result of our concept of justice. In 
this sense, we can interpret Montaigne’s remark as saying that even if the 
legitimacy of the violence used by the law is indeed a fiction - and the 
violence problematic - it nevertheless remains the sort of fiction that is 
necessary to maintain - and also, found - the justice that it serves. This points 
us toward the modern solution for legitimating violence: violence is used 
for a just cause or a just end; and in this way, it is legitimated. The concept 
of legitimacy expresses the belief that, as Goyard-Fabre puts it, ‘in the 
exertion of force there must be something that lies beyond force itself and 
that founds and justifies this force.’372 What has become clear in this chapter 
is that this belief is not located on a natural, pre-conceptual level, but is itself 
already the outcome of the political stratagems of the modern political 
machine. This modern political machine invests thought with the 
conceptual fiction of the natural contract and the foundation of the law. 
State thinking is the result of the machinic, executive functioning of the 
state, itself a historically contingent phenomenon. ‘The state gives thought 
a form of interiority, and thought gives that interiority a form of 
universality.’373 In reality, however, this illusion of universality is the effect of 
machinic functioning of the state. 
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Chapter Four 
Subject / Exappropriation / Technics 
On the Terminal Exappropriation of Language 
and Technics  
_________________________ 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter examined the construction of the modern state ma-
chine. The machinic functioning of the state in modernity, I have argued, is 
related to the construction of a societal form that divides itself into several 
segments that can function autonomously. This implies a turn toward ex-
ecutive functioning, which is characteristic for the modern state. It also im-
plies the construction of a stable territory over which the state machine can 
exert its power. The executive functioning of the state machine is depend-
ent on the construction of such a territory. Central is the control of a terri-
tory by means of the deployment of a state machine. Today, this deploy-
ment is effectuated through the use of media-technical assemblages com-
prised of communication media, scanners, digital registration, and others 
elements. In the first two chapters, I explained how machinic functioning is 
what first organizes (or orders) technics into a set of techniques, a set of 
technologies. The recent increase in tele-technologies pose specific prob-
lems for the machinic functioning of the state, but it also opens up specific 
possibilities. 
 I want to take my analysis one step further by drawing in a more 
concrete case in which the operative interlacement of technics in politics 
can be seen at work. I aim to do more than merely show how information 
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systems such as radio, television, or computers are appropriated by a politi-
cal regime, or even show that they partake in the construction of a modern 
political machine. Instead, I want to demonstrate how these information 
systems on a political level and on a subjective level are always tied in with 
language. I started this study with language and technics, and now, after 
the exposition on the modern political machine, I would like to return to it. 
In so far as there is such a thing as political technique it is often related to 
language as much as to technics. Indeed, language and technics would 
seem to be constitutive for the (political) subject. For this reason I now want 
to pay particular attention to political techniques and their effect on the 
subject. To be clear, as I explained in the first chapter, techniques, tech-
nologies, and technics all designate different things. I speak of techniques 
when a technical constellation is set in place that has a specific goal or end 
that it wants to attain. Such techniques need the machinic to introduce a 
telos, teleology, or better yet tele-techno-logic according to which a tech-
nique becomes operable. Technologies, by contrast, are artifacts such as 
televisions, automobiles, videogames, and so on. It follows that technolo-
gies can be techniques (a car can be a means to get to work), whereas tech-
niques are not necessarily technologies in the strict sense. An assemblage 
of interlaced techniques can set up a political regime that, when structured 
rigidly enough, starts to function as a political machine. The political ma-
chine is what sets to work an interlacement of several techniques. In this 
chapter I will study one concrete instance in which an interlacement of sev-
eral techniques can be observed. More specifically, I will look at how lan-
guage in a political regime is interlaced with more direct political machinic 
functions (such as the military apparatus and the police) to achieve an ex-
propriation of the political subject.  
Although technics and language are far from identical, the inter-
weaving of heterogeneous forces that I have called technics in the preced-
ing chapters does maintain a privileged relation with language. In the first 
chapter I demonstrated how literary language constructs its own machine. 
Language also plays a crucial role in the constitution and maintenance of a 
political machine, since it is decisive in the creation (and if necessary, the 
subjugation) of political subjects. The interlacement between language and 
political techniques, wherein language itself is recuperated as an element in 
a political technique, works to ensure that the subjects forming a commu-
nity are within the control of that community. In the course of this chapter I 
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will analyze Assia Djebar’s novel, La disparition de la langue française, as a 
tangible example of how such an exappropriation of the political subject 
operates.374 This example will provide a clearer analysis of how the interrela-
tion between technics and language enable the modern political machine 
to exercise control over the ‘self,’ in so far as this self is politically invested as 
‘subject.’ 
 The intricate involvement of language in political techniques 
makes it possible for the political machine to expropriate the self of an in-
surgent subject. Such an expropriation of the self is possible due to the way 
the language interweaves the ipseity (or selfhood) with the larger political 
constellation of which language is a part. The convoluted and mutually 
constitutive relation between language and self is assured by technics. The 
machinic functioning of the state taps into the potential of language and 
uses it to decode and recode the insurgent subject. This is only possible due 
to an inherent characteristic of language. Derrida has analyzed at length 
how language, as that which is most proper to oneself, appropriates (brings 
that what is proper to man) and expropriates (pulls one out of oneself) at 
the same time. As such, language has a capacity to destruct the self. At least, 
such is the risk that belongs to it and from which all speaking and commu-
nicating commence.  
Derrida has called this exappropriation, a neologism that contracts 
expropriation and appropriation. This chapter will test this neologism and 
its conceptual articulation to see whether it enables a more complex analy-
sis of the interrelation between politics and technics. This interrelation is 
able to graft itself onto the insurgent subject via language and its capacity 
to exappropriate. Technics comes in here as that which, convoluted in lan-
guage itself, relates language to other, extralinguistic techniques that to-
gether construct and consolidate a political machine. It is because language 
is so closely related both to the subject and the machine that it takes on a 
privileged role; it is located somewhere in between technics and technique. 
The political functioning of the ‘ontological machine of production and re-
production’375 becomes possible because of the direct interlacing of lan-
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guage with politics and the tele-technological impetus of contemporary 
society. This interlacing is the result of technics, which makes language a 
seminal element in the current ‘network of control.’376 This could be called a 
technological network in the sense that information technologies play a 
crucial role in it. However, these information technologies are themselves 
enmeshed with language in an immediate way: first, because communica-
tion is still takes place with and through language; and second, because it is 
via language that these technologies can tap into the self. As a result, an 
exappropriation is set to work that is seminal to contemporary society. 
 
 
2. Exappropriation: Interlacing of Technics and Language 
 
Forging a neologism is a risky business. It is particularly risky when two ex-
isting words are contracted, for there is a danger of effacing the singular 
effect and meaning that each word separately conveys. Such an outcome 
would lack the force that ought to have given this concept its drive; that is, 
its particular aptitude for analyzing a certain problem. Jacques Derrida’s 
neologism, exappropriation, is a contraction of two existing words: expro-
priation and appropriation. Both words in their original meaning express an 
action or an act that takes place upon something or someone. This act con-
cerns the ‘proper,’ and by extension, ‘property’. The English word, ‘expro-
priation,’ is first and foremost related to the act of depriving someone of her 
or his personal property. It is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as  
 
The action of expropriating. a. The action of giving up 
one's whole property. Also the action of giving up control 
of. b. Removal from the ownership or dominion of. c. The 
action of depriving (a person) of property; deprivation; an 
instance of this. d. The action of taking (property) out of 
the owner's hands (esp. by public authority); an instance 
of this. 
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Conversely, appropriation is the act of acquiring property. It expresses that 
move by which something becomes proper to someone or something. The 
two axes around which expropriation and appropriation evolve are the 
proper, or property, and the self. Derrida uses the concept to undermine an 
idea of the self as that which is proper to oneself. For Derrida it is the pos-
session of language that belongs most intimately to the self. Language is 
staged by Derrida as that which defines and gives what is proper to the self, 
while at the same time it is language that will inaugurate the double move 
that exappropriation expresses. But what is essential in the working of this 
double move, which allows it to expropriate the proper that it has just given 
us, is that it is related to politics and technics. In the final analysis, I will ar-
gue, it is exappropriation that is a technics, an operative constellation in 
which both the power of language and politics are consolidated.    
The most elaborate conceptualization of exappropriation by Der-
rida is found in Monolingualism of the Other and Of Hospitality. In both these 
works Derrida introduces the word when accounting for the double move 
in politics, language, and technology. His argument is that these three are 
closely intertwined. Derrida characterizes this intertwinement first and 
foremost as an operation, that is to say as a double move (both appropria-
tion and expropriation) that can seen at work and theorized through de-
construction. This double move is articulated in a different way each time - 
depending on the perspective taken and the particular case studied. Cen-
tral to Derrida’s use of exappropriation is the role language plays in it.  
I would argue that the efficacious and displacing effects of this 
double move comes in to view once we realize that the capacity of lan-
guage to exappropriate intricately depends upon the build-up of the con-
temporary political machine. Technics is a process of interlacing; it brings 
heterogeneous elements into a specific constellation. From thereon it be-
comes possible to consolidate the specific elements that are interlaced by 
technics. In the previous chapters I have argued that the consolidation of 
the heterogeneous interlacements of technics creates a machinic function-
ing. The second chapter showed how, starting from technics, machinic 
functioning establishes a teleology and even a teleo-eschatology that is at 
play in media and technology. This is the temporal effect of machinic func-
tioning: it is the linearization of technics. The third chapter showed how the 
state machine constructed a territory and executed a centralization of 
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power that allows for supple, machinic segmentarity. This is a spatial effect 
of machinic functioning. The exappropriation that is at work in language 
introduces another element: a spatial and temporal deployment of technics. 
Language cannot be reduced to a mere machinic functioning. It has a de-
gree of indetermination to it that prevent it from being completely recuper-
ated in a machinic functioning. At the same time, language has an originary 
technicity that makes it possible to tie language in with other elements that 
together start to form a machinic functioning. The role that language plays 
in this machinic functioning is not always machinic, but it is a vital role nev-
ertheless. Consequently, I argue that language is placed between technics 
and machine, yet it belongs to neither. Technics interlaces it with other 
elements, out of which a machinic functioning can be created. Exappropria-
tion expresses the fact that this both gives a proper placement of the self (a 
machinic functioning) and also inaugurates a displacement.  
In Monolingualism of the Other Derrida deals with the exappropria-
tion of language in relation to politics; whilst in Of Hospitality he emphasises 
its relation to tele-technologies. This is not to say that he does not deal with 
politics in the latter work, but rather that it is through tele-technologies that 
politics both takes place and is being displaced in his interpretation of hos-
pitality. This interpretation that Derrida laboriously works out through a 
series of seminar lectures will return as the closure of this chapter, but it is 
also a good place to begin my interpretation of the concept. I then move on 
to explicate the function of exappropriation in relation to my own concept 
of technics. Finally, I give a close reading of Assia Djebar’s La disparition de la 
langue française. 
Exappropriation allows Derrida to situate the advent of recent tele-
technologies in a political context. He argues that two different effects re-
sult from them, both of which are operative at the same time. First, recent 
information technologies function as mechanisms of control that help to 
secure and stabilize the territories that over the centuries have consolidated 
as nations and as states. A state can use new technologies to control, se-
cure, and safeguard the political public space in which it manifests itself. 
The emergence of television is a case in point. It has reshaped the public 
sphere in which politics and culture operate. From a political perspective, 
this opened up an endless array of possibilities. It becomes possible to exert 
a greater amount of control over citizens because it widens the public 
sphere in which politics manifest itself. With the introduction of television, 
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political debates blurt into every household. The emergence of national 
television, especially in European countries, was motivated by the political 
potential of television. National television served to consolidate the nation 
and thus secure its real and imaginary territory.377 In this sense, as Jérôme 
Bourdon points out in his article on French national memory and television, 
the word television ‘refers both to a technological and an institutional ap-
paratus.’378 The argument I have developed in this study is that the institu-
tionalization of a technological apparatus forces it to become a machine in 
the larger machine of the state. Tele-technologies do not stand on their 
own; they are enmeshed in a larger political and technological machine that 
is assembled from the technics of interlacing. 
Specific to tele-technologies is their ability to transmit information 
from one place to another (often many places at the same time, as in the 
case of television). The result is a new sense of place that emerges, one that 
might be characterized as tele-topological. In the case of television, this 
new concept of place opens up a new realm for political public space. The 
machinic restructuring of public space into a tele-topology opens up impor-
tant possibilities for the political machine. Television and other tele-
technologies created a spatio-temporal environment in which the political 
machine takes shape. Focusing on the temporal effects of tele-technologies 
Bernard Stiegler has argued that ‘television constitutes an enormous ma-
chine of synchronization.’379  
However, the problem with the spatio-temporal environment cre-
ated by hyper-industrial machines, or tele-technologies, is that is not easily 
controlled. The ambition of the political machine is to stabilize this spatio-
temporal environment. This is possible up to a point. But these machines 
not only create a spatio-temporal environment; they also displace it. This 
conclusion is drawn by Samuel Weber in his analyses of television. Weber 
argues that  
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the more technology seeks to put things in their proper 
places, the less proper those places turn out to be, the 
more displaceable everything becomes and the more fre-
netic becomes the effort to reassert the propriety of the 
place as such.380  
 
The proper is exappropriated by the political and technological machine. 
There is both a placing and a displacing at work in the machinic functioning 
of tele-technologies such as television. This implies that the proper is also 
expropriated from the political.                    
This brings me to the second characteristic of tele-technologies and 
their effect on politics. Tele-technologies not only construct a spatio-
temporal environment, a new public space upon which the political ma-
chine can act, they also disturb the public space of the political machine. 
They displace the place over which the political machine of the state exerts 
power. When today the political takes shape through televisualized debates 
and representations, as I have argued, the political itself is also shaped 
through the technologies it uses. As Derrida writes in Specters of Marx, the 
fact that tele-technologies have nestled themselves deeply in the realm of 
politics goes far beyond a mere restructuring of place. They even risk taking 
politics to the brink. Derrida argues that this disturbance of politics through 
technology can be traced back as far as the end of the First World War:  
 
Let us recall the technical, scientific, and economic trans-
formations that, in Europe, after the First World War, al-
ready upset the topological structure of the res publica, 
of public space, and of public opinion. They affected not 
only this topological structure, they also began to make 
problematic the very presumption of the topographical, 
the presumption that there was a place, and thus an 
identifiable and stabilizable body for public speech, the 
public thing, or the public cause, throwing liberal, parlia-
mentary, and capitalist democracy into a crisis, as is often 
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said, and opening thereby the way for three forms of to-
talitarianism which then allied, fought, or combined with 
each other in countless ways.381    
 
The more recent development of tele-technologies such as scanners and 
the internet open up endless possibilities for surveillance, but at the same 
time they cannot be controlled by a single power, such as that of the nation 
state. Here, too, an exappropriation of both politics and technology is at 
work. This functioning of technology in the contemporary political realm is 
constantly in a double register: at the same time that these tele-
technologies open up the possibility for an appropriation of the place of the 
political, they also expropriate this very same space. This is what Derrida has 
called exappropriation. It is also here that the need to deconstruct technol-
ogy is felt the most. Indeed, recent technologies are deconstructing the 
state, the political, and the self. 
Derrida believes that the exappropriation that is activated by recent 
tele-technologies can also be found in language itself. In “Force of Law,” 
Derrida explains that he is ‘forced’ to speak in English. He himself does not 
control this force and obligation, and more generally, it is never controlled 
by the speaker. It is always forced and implemented upon the speaker. An 
appropriation of language inevitably takes its course, as Derrida intimates:  
 
A sort of polémos already concerns the appropriation of 
language: if, at least, I want to make myself heard and 
understood, it is necessary [il faut] that I speak your lan-
guage; je le dois, I have to do it.382  
 
This testifies to Derrida’s conviction that exappropriation is laboring within 
language itself. While language hands down one’s most intimate identity, 
language itself also works as a tool of expropriation. And it is this double 
move that makes language a tool of exappropriation. At the same time that 
it provides a medium through which one first finds ones self in the world, 
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through an act of appropriation, language also displaces the subject, pull-
ing it out of its proper place, excentering it and marginalizing it.  
This experience has been the subject of a recent novel by French-
Algerian writer Assia Djebar, La disparition de la langue française (The Disap-
pearance of the French Language). In this novel the main character, Berkane, 
who grew up in Algeria but migrated to France in his adolescence, returns 
to his native country Algeria after approximately thirty years of absence. 
Whilst traveling he keeps a literary diary – or what might possibly be the 
beginning of a novel - in which he reflects on his past life in Algeria, while 
frequently digressing on his recent life in France. The novel recounts his 
childhood in Algeria, his relation to his father, and the trouble he got him-
self and his father into when one day at school he had to draw his country’s 
flag, and ‘accidentally’ drew the Algerian instead of the French national flag. 
In the novel, this childhood narrative is enmeshed with another narrative, 
namely that of his recent life in France, where he lives in Paris and fell in 
love with Nadjia. The encounter with Nadjia increases Berkane’s awareness 
of the split between the two languages he speaks and lives: French and 
Arabic. Whereas Nadjia is schooled in Arabic and masters the language flu-
ently, Berkane had to speak French in school and had to restrict his use of 
Arabic to the private sphere. In Paris, too, French is the language he uses for 
his everyday affairs. The different languages he speaks shape his persona, 
and even more they shape the different personae that inhabit Berkane and 
through which his ambitions are articulated. Throughout the novel Berkane 
tries to come to terms with the multilingual situation that defines him as a 
person, yet ambushes him in his ambition to be a writer. The reverence he 
has for French - a language that he respects and that he wants to write in - is 
accompanied by a sense of fear, loss, and displacement. Berkane intimates 
that French is not really his language, even if it is the only one he really has 
(certainly on a literary level). Berkane, speaking and writing in French, but 
also in Arabic, is never entirely at home in one of the two languages. In 
other words, Berkane is inevitably exappropriated by the languages that 
define him.  
In the novel, the feeling of displacement that defines Berkane will 
come to a climax in his own narration of his past, at a decisive moment in 
the Algerian narrative. But earlier in the novel, in his account of his life in 
Paris, there is a telling passage on the relation that Berkane maintains with 
language. Berkane is reminiscing how not so long ago, in his Paris apart-
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ment, he had been awaiting his beloved, and meanwhile trying to conceive 
the project for his novel and writing. The exappropriation of language here 
falls upon him with full force: 
 
I write in French in a state of fever and insomnia, in the 
wake of evaporated voluptuous instants. My Latin alpha-
bet is, all the same, that which on this earth, has trav-
ersed the ages; it has been hollowed out on scorched 
stones, then forgotten in ruins.  
 
J’écris en français dans la fièvre et l’insomnie, sur le sil-
lage des instants de la volupté évaporée. Mon alphabet 
latin est, tout de même, celui qui, sur cette terre, a tra-
versé les siècles; il fut creusé sur des pierres rousses, 
puis oublié dans des ruines. 
 
Yet Berkane avers that, when thinking of his beloved, he writes and remi-
nisces and lives in Arabic, and the singular accent of his beloved comes to 
live while his French is minimizing itself: 
 
That voice of such nearby languishing: displacing those 
Arab words, making them glide to keep them as a second 
language? I hear her words, uttered in our mother tongue, 
in their particular music: and French becomes a narrow 
door for me, so as to maintain the avowal of voluptuous-
ness that sparkles within the space of my room.        
 
Cette voix de si proche langueur: déplacer ces mots ara-
bes, les faire glisser pour les garder en langue seconde? 
Ses mots, proférés dans notre langue maternelle, je les 
entends dans leur musique particulière: et le français me 
devient une porte étroite pour maintenir l’aveu de volup-
té, qui scintille dans l’espace de mon logis.383 
      
                                                 
383 Assia Djebar, La disparition de la langue française (Albin Michel: Paris 
2003), 169-70. (My translation.) 
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The experience Berkane relates is close to what Derrida sees unfolding in 
language as exappropriation. Berkane is not losing one language for the 
other; he is inevitably lost between two languages.384 In this lingering be-
tween two languages he is not exchanging one self for the other, but he 
does feel the pressure of different personae that take shape within him. 
These personae are only able to figurate in language - they belong to lan-
guage. But they are also displaced by language. The experience of Berkane 
is both a gain and a loss, a keeping in between. It is in this vein that Derrida 
defines language as an exappropriation in Of Hospitality: ‘If it seems to be 
both, and by that very fact, the first and the last condition of belonging, 
language is also the experience of expropriation, of an irreducible exappro-
priation.’385 It is of crucial importance here that Berkane’s experience of lan-
guage stems both from his factual displacement as a French-Algerian citi-
zen, the singular circumstances of his life, and from the structure of lan-
guage itself. There is no ontological priority one way or the other: the fac-
tual displacement of Berkane and the inherent displacement of language 
perfectly collide here. This is operative exappropriation.  
 Later in the novel, however, Berkane will experience a second, bru-
tal moment of exappropriation. This moment, which is far more political in 
nature, also works through language. But here language and the exappro-
priation of the self are interrelated with an extreme political situation. This 
situation, I will argue, is able to do more then merely exappropriate Berkane 
in language. It goes much father than that: it expropriates Berkane entirely. 
This becomes possible through a constellation of language, different tech-
niques of incarceration, and the infliction of pain upon the body. Interlacing 
these things for political purpose, a machinic functioning is set to work that 
expropriates Berkane, and finally, makes him disappear. Language – the 
French language - disappears with him. 
                                                 
384 In describing the situation of Berkane as ‘in between,’ I am aware of 
the intricacies that this expression entails in postcolonial discourse. For a 
brief exploration of this issue, see Paul Carter, “Naming Place.” In Bill 
Ashcroft, Helen Tiffin, and Gareth Griffiths (eds.). The Postcolonial Studies 
Reader (Routledge: London / New York 1995), 402-6. 
385 Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality, transl. R. Bowlby (Stanford University 
Press: Stanford 2000), 89. 
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 In order to understand how such a thing is possible, it is useful to 
draw upon Derrida’s account of language as exappropriation. It allows me 
to undo the idea that language is solely concerned with the meaning of 
things, or that there is no technics operative within it. To carve out this dis-
cussion, I now turn to Derrida’s recent work on language, specifically Les 
yeux de la langue and The Monolingualism of the Other. An analysis of Ber-
kane’s experiences will allow me to connect this concept of language more 
closely to technics and politics. The efficacy of language to function in 
combination with other techniques, such as that of incarceration for exam-
ple, is made possible through the operative interlacements of technics. The 
institutionalizations of this interlacement in the use of torture are part of 
the machinic functioning of the state in the 1950s in France and Algeria. 
The very real nature of technics - as that which makes the interlacement 
possible, and constitutes the techniques used - becomes clear in this analy-
sis. 
 
 
3. The Eyes of Language as Technics 
 
In Les yeux de la langue [The Eyes of Language], a commentary on an unsent 
letter by Gershom Scholem to Franz Rosenzweig, Derrida criticizes 
Scholem’s idea of language. Instead, he gestures toward the technicity pre-
sent in language, which determines language in its uses and effects. While 
Scholem maintains that there must be a moment in language that precedes 
its instrumentalization, wherein body and spirit of the letter are in unity 
without yet being intrumentalized, Derrida rebukes that it would be wrong 
to believe in a moment in which ‘an instrumentalizing technicization (it-
erability) or desacralization has not always already happened to lan-
guage.’386 Although Scholem divulges that it would be wrong to conceive 
of the spirit of the letter as separate from its body, since this professes a 
Christian attitude that disavows the body and praises the superiority of the 
spirit as a pure presence, he nevertheless maintains that the economical use 
of language in contemporary life might possibly have disastrous effects. 
Thus, in the final instance, the problem that Scholem detects in the every-
                                                 
386 Jacques Derrida, Les yeux de la langue (L’Herne: Paris 2005), 63. (My 
translation.)  
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day use of language is that its originary sacral nature has been sacrile-
giously defamed in the modern economical use of language. This means 
that language will sooner or later turn itself against its users.387  
In an essay concerning the name of God and the language theory in 
the Jewish Kabbalah, written by Scholem much later, he concludes his 
analysis with a more subtle phrasing of this basic intuition. Scholem here 
argues that, according to the Kabbalah, meaning is infused in language by 
the name of God. Thus, God is present in the words we use and that are 
brought to us by tradition. The divinity of God forms an undercurrent for 
the use of language. However, it may happen that the tradition fades away. 
As a result, the divinity of God that is professed to us through language 
would also fade: 
 
That which speaks to us from the Creation and the Reve-
lation, the Word of God, is infinitely explainable and is re-
flected in our language. Its rays or sounds which we re-
ceive are invocations rather than communications. That 
which has meaning, sense and form, is not this very word 
but the tradition of this word, its transference and reflec-
tion in time. This tradition, which has its own dialectic, 
transforms and possibly turns into a soft and slowly ex-
tinguishing whisper, and there may be times such as 
ours, where transmission [überlieferen] is no longer pos-
sible and tradition falls silent. That, then, is the great cri-
sis of language in which we stand, and we can no longer 
grasp even the smallest corner of the secret that used to 
live in it.388 
 
For Scholem, the crisis of language is related to something more original, 
something sacred that used to be present in language, but has now disap-
peared. Derrida argues that, on the contrary, there has never been such a 
sacred originary fund in language. At least, this fund is never devoid from a 
certain economic use of language. The instrumentalization of language has 
been there since its inception.  
                                                 
387 Cf. Derrida, Les yeux de la langue, 9. 
388 Gershom Scholem, Judaica 3, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1973), 69. 
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Derrida’s reading of Scholem opposes two different views on the 
efficacy of language within economic and political everyday life. For 
Scholem, the sacred origin of language professes its incompatibility with its 
economic use, and thus language is divorced from such an economic use – 
with possibly disastrous results. For Derrida, the economy of language is 
determined by its inherent technicity. Economical use of language is made 
possible by the iterability of language and utterances made in language. On 
the other hand, a pure economical use of language, where it is conceived as 
a means for communication of pure meaning, is made equally impossible 
by the technical nature of language. There is an indetermination operative 
in language that forbids its purely economic use. This indeterminateness 
cannot be erased. What Derrida, following Scholem, designates as the eco-
nomic use of language might therefore perhaps better be called language’s 
capacity to function in a wider machinic functioning. In the following sec-
tion, I will show how language in Assia Djebar’s novel is bound up with a 
political machine that uses language in an economic-political way. 
Derrida is articulating a view on language in which the materiality 
of the letter cannot be separated from meaning. Instead, the two are inter-
twined. In order to extend this argument, I will argue that the intertwine-
ment of the material inscription of the word and its meaning, which marks 
the utterance as an unbridgeable passage from noise to voice and from 
sound to meaningfulness, is where the ‘proper’ in both ‘appropriation’ and 
‘expropriation’ becomes the subject of exappropriation. On the one hand, 
this is the operation of a technics that intertwines the materiality and the 
meaning of the letter. Yet, on the other, there is a technics operative here 
that interlaces the material inscription of language with the exertion of 
power and violence. This technics makes an economic use of language both 
difficult and possible. 
 
 
4. The Expropriation of language: Assia Djebar’s Algerian War 
 
In his Means Without Ends: Notes on Politics, Giorgio Agamben argues that 
contemporary political regimes operate on language. The spectacular state, 
as he calls it, enacts an expropriation of language, which defines contempo-
rary politics: 
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The plane of immanence on which the new political ex-
perience is constituted is the terminal expropriation of 
language carried out by the spectacular state. Whereas in 
the old regime, in fact, the estrangement of the commu-
nicative essence of human beings was substantiated as a 
presupposition that had the function of common ground 
(nation, language, religion, etc.), in the contemporary 
state it is precisely this same communicativity, this same 
generic essence (language), that is constituted as an 
autonomous sphere to the extent to which it becomes the 
essential factor of the production cycle.389  
 
In what way has language, as Agamben suggests, become part of the pro-
duction cycle? And in what way does this production cycle expropriate lan-
guage? One way to understand his claim is by looking at how language is 
essential to the construction of the self, not only as a existential phenome-
non but as a political phenomenon. Starting out from a construction of the 
self through language, the political machine works through language to 
code, or decode, the subject according to the functioning of the political 
machine. In this section, I will analyze how such an expropriation of lan-
guage is installed in the state machine, to become one of its most vital func-
tions.  
By expropriating language the state can exercise a power and vio-
lence over the subjects of the state. By interlacing language with other ele-
ments (such as army, prison, or school), a political machine emerges that 
can expropriate political subjects to decode and recode them. The perti-
nent point for analysis is the way that mechanisms of control and violent 
actions make use of language in relation to other political elements, in or-
der to establish the machinic functioning of the modern state. The political 
machine gets inscribed in the very operation and use of language. The use 
of language is modeled on the exercise of power by the modern state. This 
modern state is not just a victim or a cunning user of the tricks played by 
language, as if language had a stable essence that could be summed up by 
the term, exappropriation. The exappropriation operative in language and 
                                                 
389 Giorgio Agamben, Means Without Ends: Notes on Politics (University of 
Minnesota Press: Mineapolis 200), 115.  
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the ways in which the state uses it to set in place its judicial and political 
apparatuses, which exert power over the citizens and foreigners within its 
territory, are engaged in a complex interplay. The exappropriative capacity 
of language models the political machine, in which it becomes a vital ele-
ment. But the political machine, in turn, is able to use language for its ex-
ecutive functioning; hence, the exappropriative capacity of language en-
hances, modulates, and ultimately benefits this functioning. This means 
that if the state uses the tricks of language, it is because these tricks are 
equally installed throughout and as a result of the political, territorial, and 
national developments of the modern nation-state. These developments 
need to be analyzed as a part of the machinic functioning of the state, inso-
far as an interlacing of language with different techniques of subjugation 
makes possible the exercise of state power. 
 This argument implies that there is violence woven into language 
(a violence of expropriation), which is recuperated by the state in order to 
place, localize, and interrogate its subjects. In short, in language itself there 
is already a possibility to connect it to other, extralinguistic techniques that 
are used by the state in the subjection of its subjects. The base from which 
this interweaving becomes possible does not lie at the level of meaning; 
but neither is it related to the sheer materiality of language. Instead, it is the 
originary technicity of language that motivates and enables interweaving 
language with other elements. It becomes possible to think an economy of 
language from this idea of technicity, from its proximity to both technics 
and machine. An economy of language is set up which is not that of the 
efficacious use of meaning stored by language, but one which consists of 
interlacing language with school systems, prison, and interrogation rooms.  
Assia Djebar skillfully reflects on this use of state violence and lan-
guage in a passage in La disparition de la langue française. It depicts events 
immediately following an insurgency and uproar in Algeria toward the end 
of the Algerian War.390 In December 1961, Berkane, who is still the main 
                                                 
390 Assia Djebar’s is not the only novel on the Algerian war that contains a 
depiction of torture  Without doubt, the book that came to set the tone for 
narrative accounts of the war was Henri Alleg’s La Question (Paris: Minuit 
1958)..La Question is Alleg’s acount of the his imprisonment, 
interrogation, and torture in 1957, whilst a French journalist in Algeria. 
Djebar’s book is different in three ways, and this is why I analyze it here. 
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character of the novel and functions as a character-bound narrator, is in-
volved in this uproar. In the wake of a violently subdued protest march for 
the liberation of Algeria, he is chased by the police and finally captured. The 
protest march, close to the end of the war, commemorated a spontaneous 
protest action that took place exactly one year earlier, in which Berkane also 
had been involved but had managed to escape harm. Now, however, at the 
age of sixteen, he is arrested by the police and taken to prison where he is 
locked up in a dark and vast prison with fellow protesters. After a period of 
waiting a group of Special Forces soldiers enter the prison, pointing to Ber-
kane, and saying: ‘we’re taking that one, there!’ [‘On l’emmène, celui-là!’]391 
The soldiers take Berkane to a base near Orleans where they put him in a 
cell – or rather a cellar, according to his description - with a bunch of other 
men. This is where the violence of the state starts to enmesh with the dis-
appearance of the French language as Berkane experiences it. The way Ber-
kane as character-bound narrator depicts this moment from his past shows 
that it was not only a gruesome and painful experience, but that it played 
and is still playing tricks on his capacity to feel at home in language. It 
seems as if, from that moment onward, language begins to disappear. This 
is what intimately relates the passages about prison to other passages 
where a different experience of language is depicted. But here, in the scene 
following the insurgencies, violence is meshed into language itself. This 
                                                                                                              
First, it is a fictional account that does not claims to be based on a direct 
testimony. Second, Djebar’s novel is a work of fiction that is telling 
something about the experience of language and being in-between 
languages. (The experiences of Berkane during the Algerian war form a 
vital part of the novel, but not the only part.) Third, the actual torture 
scene is not depicted in Djebar’s novel; a fact that will be pivotal to my 
argument.    
391 Djebar, La disparition de la langue française, 214. Note that at the time 
the story is set the police forces had already been taken over by the 
French paratroopers, which explains the rapid shift from police custody to 
military custody in the story. (The shift of command from the police to the 
paratroopers took place early in 1957 by governor Jean Lacoste. The 
‘notorious’ General Jacques Massu thereby became the commander of the 
Algerian police.)  
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occurs through the deployment of a series of techniques: persecution, in-
carceration, interrogation, torture, and finally long-term imprisonment.  
At first sight these techniques might appear to have no direct rela-
tion to language, but in Djebar’s story language enters at several levels. 
First, language is woven into the process of interrogation, which in turn is 
woven into the larger ordeal of incarceration and subordination. Interroga-
tion is not a means for extracting information from the interrogated; it is a 
means of extracting all meaning or sense from language. Second, language 
is destroyed during the process of torture. Not only does the horrific experi-
ence of undergoing incarceration, interrogation, and torture have such an 
effect on Berkane that he has trouble casting it into language; but also the 
entire ordeal, I will argue, seems to be conducted to expropriate Berkane’s 
most intimate possession - namely, his emergent adolescent self. This self, 
as Derrida argues in Of Hospitality and Monolingualism of the Other, is most 
intimately constructed and deconstructed in language as a site for both 
appropriation and expropriation, as a site of exappropriation. Thus, in my 
view, these techniques of incarceration and torture carry out a process of 
undoing, or expropriating, the insurgent subject or self. In this process, the 
undoing of language plays a key role and it will remain to haunt Berkane 
years later. The paradox of this narrative is that whilst it is a testimony of the 
moment at which Berkane situates the origin of the loss or disappearance 
that he has experienced ever since, it is also at the same time narrated in 
French, in the language and by the persona that are destroyed in that very 
experience. Since the disappearance concerns his own language, and in the 
last instance also his own life, the story reaches a paradoxical climax at the 
point when the origin of the disappearance is recounted. Step by step, the 
adolescent Berkane is bereaved of his freedom, his language, his voice, and 
finally his face. That which is most proper to him, his own self, is expropri-
ated, taken away from him. When this process of undoing is recounted by 
the older Berkane, the story abruptly ends and Berkane disappears alto-
gether.  
Yet the novel continues as Berkane is reported missing in Algeria 
years later by his brother Driss and Berkane’s current love, Marise. Com-
memorated by the woman he loved, Marise, and in an earlier time Nadjia 
who sends him a letter from Padua, not knowing that he has gone missing, 
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the novel ends with a final reflection by Driss.392 In the last paragraph of the 
novel, the persona of Driss has become a ghostly and polyphonic cluster of 
the voices of Berkane, Nadjia, and Erasmus of Rotterdam (whom Nadjia was 
studying in Padua): 
 
In his clandestine studio, Driss goes back to the bed. He 
slowly reads Erasmus’ Letter on Dreams. Very drowsy, he 
repeats a sentence underlined by Nadjia: “I do not speak 
of the sky of angels…” 
It is Erasmus who speaks, or Nadjia perhaps, or 
Berkane, from where he lies. Murmuring the same words 
“of the sky, the sky of angels!” Driss finally sinks into the 
night. 
 
Dans son studio pour clandestin, Driss se remet au lit. Il 
lit lentement la Lettre sur les songes d’Érasme. Tout 
somnolent, il se répète une phrase, soulignée par Nadjia: 
« je ne parle pas du ciel des anges… » 
 C’est Érasme qui parle, ou peut-être Nadjia, ou 
Berkane, de là où il se trouve. Marmonnant les mêmes 
mots « du ciel, du ciel des anges ! » Driss sombre enfin 
dans la nuit. 
 
This passage is from the very end of the book, some thirty pages after Ber-
kane has disappeared. The focus of the narrative, following his disappear-
ance, is provided respectively by Marise, Driss, Nadjia, and finally Driss 
again. Except in the case of Nadjia, all of the passages are narrated by an 
                                                 
392 This is an important theme in Djebar’s work. Even if in my analysis I 
have opted to concentrate on another aspect of the novel, the importance 
of the commemoration by these women should not be overlooked. 
Moreover, this would be where an entry point for a subtle critique of 
Derrida’s political work could be found, as Gayatri Spivak has convincingly 
argued by juxtaposing Derrida’s spectral deconstruction of ontopology in 
Specters of Marx to the women-narratives that Djebar constructs in Far 
from Madina. See Spivak, “Ghostwriting”, Diacritics, 25 / 2, Summer 1995, 
65-84. 
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external narrator. After Berkane disappears at the end of the paradoxical 
recounting of the crucial passage in his life, the text itself comes to be struc-
tured by another narrator. This allows for a story to emerge that again ends 
in a narrative paradox, as all major personae that figure in it speak through 
one voice but are narrated by an external narrator. Here, then, lies the force 
of fiction in its capacity to delve into the exappropriation of language. The 
voices that emerge – or, in the case of Berkane, re-emerge - in the persona 
of Driss are decidedly fictional. To test this paradoxical fragment of narrative 
against everyday life, to hold it up to the conditions and restrictions that 
reality imposes upon real people would turn it into a completely absurd 
passage. But personae in a novel are not real people; they are narrative con-
structs. The political potential that is inherent to fiction, and to Djebar’s La 
disparition de la langue française in particular, only gains in efficacy once this 
fact is acknowledged.  
In Narratology Mieke Bal makes a plea for the ‘paper’ qualities of 
personae or characters. She warns against the ‘character-effect,’ suggesting 
that we take into account that a character ‘has no real psyche, personality, 
ideology, or competence to act, but [that] it does possess characteristics 
which make psychological and ideological descriptions possible.’393 While 
she admits that there are no strict rules for how to assess the paper qualities 
of a character, she suggests that narrative analyses should be restricted to 
‘the actual words of the text.’ As a case in point she refers to Albertine in 
Marcel Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu. According to Bal, Albertine 
 
is a “paper person” in the true sense. She is an object of 
the protagonist’s obsession, does what he thinks she 
does, and when he no longer needs her to make his point 
about the relation between jealousy, love, and knowledge, 
she dies in an unlikely accident.394  
 
To overlook this aspect of Albertine would be to misunderstand Proust en-
tirely. Yet as soon as we start to  
 
                                                 
393 Mieke Bal, Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative 
(Toronto University Press: Toronto 2002), 115.  
394 Bal, Narratology, 116. 
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accept that she has no psychological depth of her own, 
we not only grasp the specifically Proustian construction 
of character – which is crucial for an appreciation of the 
work – but also the aesthetic thrust of the narrative.395  
 
I would like to add that it is only in this way that we can also grasp the po-
litical thrust of the narrative. This, I contend, is the case for Assia Djebar’s 
novel. By following the fractures and destructuring passages in the novel, 
by recording the paradoxical aspect of the narrative, and then tracing the 
merging of the different personae that play a part in it, it becomes possible 
to trace, in each case, a political articulation of the interrelation between 
language, torture techniques, and the destruction of the self in Djebar’s 
novel. 
 To perform such a reading, then, it is not enough to stick to the ‘ac-
tual words of the texts.’ I will read Djebar’s novel in relation to the Algerian 
war, which receives extensive attention in the novel. The historical facts of 
this war as well as the structure of the narratives that sprang from it are 
carefully staged in La disparition de la langue française. To open up the po-
tential that this novel harbors for such a reading it is not enough to merely 
refer to these events, it is necessary to explicate them from a comparative 
perspective. To give just one example, which I will elaborate below: the fact 
that in Djebar’s novel the torture scene itself is not actually narrated, al-
though it constitutes a climax in the fictional Berkane, is by no means insig-
nificant. The element of torture had been woven into the established narra-
tives of the war; consequently, it had taken on a structuring role in the con-
struction of such narratives.396 The first, best, and probably also constitutive 
example of such narratives is in Henri Alleg’s La Question.397 This book re-
lates how Alleg, a French communist and former head of the newspaper 
                                                 
395 Bal, Narratology, 116. For a more detailed analysis of Proust by Mieke 
Bal, see The Mottled Screen. Reading Proust Visually (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press 1997). 
396 Maurice Mateos-Ruiz has conducted a study on fictional accounts of 
the Algerian war and found that they all had scenes of torture structurally 
embedded in the narrative. See Mateos-Ruiz, L’Algéria des appelés (Paris: 
Atlantica 1998). 
397 On this book, see n.17, above. 
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Alger Républicain, is captured by French troops and is tortured, almost to 
the point of death, for weeks in a row. The torture scenes are described in 
great detail and in fact form the bulk of the novel. In the light of such narra-
tives it is of paramount importance to study how Djebar has managed to 
leave this part of the fabula out of the story. As it turns out, the destruction 
of Berkane as a persona is only accomplished by this ‘absence’ that is intro-
duced in torture. That is to say, the final undoing of Berkane’s self only 
comes to us through techniques that only fiction can account for. Yet it 
consists of more than fiction, and it tells something on the interrelation be-
tween literature, politics, and technics. 
As I have argued, the undoing of the adolescent Berkane takes sev-
eral steps, but each step is nevertheless interwoven with the others by 
means of anticipation and their inevitable contiguity both in time and in 
space. In a first step, Berkane is in a dark cell with a lot of other men. Al-
though it is too dark to see anything the men can easily talk to each other. 
Even so, they do so in a whispering tone. Meanwhile, classical music re-
sounds from further down the hallway. Picking up on a conversation be-
tween two prisoners, Berkane learns that the purpose of the music is to sub-
due the cries of those being tortured: 
   
At the Orleans barracks I was brought to cellars that were 
even more crowded. A crowd of detainees, impossible to 
distinguish who precisely. And again the odor of excre-
ment, but there were jerry cans in front of the doors. In-
carceration, here, was a sort of immobility of bodies; with 
almost no sigh. Hardly a murmur or groan. The night ap-
peared an indeterminable color. Above all, music began; 
but so too did the cries, very high, very far away… 
 - Classical music, someone muttered close to me, 
whom I could not distinguish. 
 - Not to hear the cries of the tortured, a voice 
explained to me, very close, spent. 
 - We hear them all the same! whispered a third. 
 
À la caserne d’Orléans, je suis conduit dans des caves, 
plus peuplées encore. Une foule de détenus : impossible 
de distinguer quiconque. Et, de nouveau, l’odeur des ex-
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créments ; mais il y a des bidons devants les portes. 
L’emprisonnement, ici, une sorte de passivité immobile 
des corps ; et presque pas de soupirs. À peine de mur-
mures ou quelques râles. La nuit semble un couloir in-
terminable. Surtout, commence la musique ; mais aussi 
des cris, très haute, très loin… 
- Musique classique, soupire quelqu’un, près de 
moi, que je ne distingue pas. 
-  Pour ne pas entendre les cris des torturés, 
m’explique une voix, tout près, épuisée. 
 - On les entendra quand même ! souffle une troi-
sième.398 
 
This fragment tells of a constellation of techniques, including new media, 
which are set in place by the French government during the Algerian war to 
imprison the insurgent Algerians, to torture them, and at the same time to 
prevent the prisoners from hearing their fellow comrades being tortured. 
The apparent dialectic that emerges from the three voices, whom Berkane 
hears but cannot see, is striking in this regard. The first one posits that there 
is classical music playing, which in ordinary situations would bring to mind 
nothing negative or frightening, but in this situation already carries with it a 
suggestion of fear and pain. Classical music is simply out of place in a 
prison, one might think. As it turns out, this is not at all the case; classical 
music assumes its role as an element of torture, it is used to subdue and 
blot out the screams of the one being tortured. This is a second step in the 
dialectic of voices, in which the second voice tells us that the music is in-
deed only meant to disguise the screams of pain. As such the music appears 
to be paradoxical, since even if it did successfully blanket the screams, it 
would still serves as an index to the presence of torture. The apparent func-
tion of the music, to prevent prisoners from hearing the screams of pain, is 
thus immediately undone. Berkane, who is still awaiting ‘his turn’ – ‘enfin, 
c’est mon tour!’ – realizes this all too well. The function of music in this politi-
cal and technical constellation of imprisonment arguably lies elsewhere. 
This is where the third voice comes in. By saying that the screams can be 
heard nevertheless, a gruesome synthesis is achieved, or rather undone, 
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between the screams and the music: both sounds now begin to take on a 
role in the technics that is installed. Working alongside each other and 
complementing each other, music and the screams start to reinforce each 
other. But most of all they reinforce the presence of torture. This presence 
however is of the strangest kind, since it is both denied (by the music) and 
affirmed (both by the music and the screams). The music, after all, functions 
both to subdue the cries and to bring them to attention. In one and the 
same move, the loud resounding of ‘French music’, as one prisoner calls it, 
performs a subtle revealing and concealing of what is going on inside the 
prison.399 Stilled by music the screams are brought to attention all the more; 
in a fine, albeit horrific, tactics of veiling and unveiling, muting and sound-
ing, Berkane knows and does not know what awaits him. He is a witness to 
his fellow prisoners being tortured and at the same time he is not. 400 
Meanwhile, the sounds (both music and screams) force him to anticipate 
the moment that he will be tortured. The result is a deregulatory effect on 
the imprisoned Berkane. This deregulatory effect can be read as a first step 
in the undoing or expropriation of the self.  
It is crucial that the expropriation staged here is set to work 
through a series of techniques. These techniques are applied by one coun-
try (in this case, France, but numerous other examples could be given) in an 
attempt to dominate the people of a second country (in this singular case, 
the people of Algeria and those supporting them). From 1955 onwards, 
these techniques of torture were applied in Algeria on a wide scale. The 
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rather unsubtle way of denying the use of torture while information about 
its use keeps leaking is not a side-effect when looked at from the perspec-
tive of expropriation. Quite the contrary, it exemplarily demonstrates a cer-
tain relation between politics and technics. Whilst the stream of information 
that overflowed state control undermined the legitimacy of the war, it also 
at the same time installed a regime of terror that widely exceeded the tor-
ture chamber and was diffused through France and Algiers. If the facts of 
torture pushed contemporary intellectuals in their opinion that the war was 
illegitimate, for a broader audience the news of the tortures was either ig-
nored, or else it forcefully emphasized the unquestionable necessity of the 
war. The contaminating work of leaking information and censuring wher-
ever possible became a part of everyday life in political France. The am-
biguous effect of this technics of leaking and censuring is accurately de-
scribed by Simone de Beauvoir in her autobiographical book, La force des 
choses (The Force of Things): 
 
My compatriots didn’t want to know about it. From the 
spring of ‘57 onwards, the truth came out and if they had 
welcomed it with as much zeal as they did with the reve-
lation of the Soviet working camps, it would have been 
the topic of the day. The conspiracy of silence could only 
succeed because everyone was complicit in it. They didn’t 
listen to those who spoke, they screamed to cover up 
their voices and if, despite oneself, one could hear certain 
rumors, one made hast to forget them.    
 
Mes compatriotes ne voulaient rien savoir. A partir du 
printemps 57, la vérité transpira et s’ils l’avaient accueil-
lie avec autant de zèle que la révélation des camps de 
travail soviétique, elle aurait éclaté au grand jour. La 
conspiration du silence ne réussit que parce que tout le 
monde s’en fit complice. Ceux qui parlaient on ne les 
écoutait pas, on criait pour couvrir leurs voix et si on en-
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tendait malgré soi quelques rumeurs, on se hâtait de les 
oublier.401 
 
If de Beauvoir is here mainly concerned with the general public repressed 
the rumors by devalorizing and finally forgetting them, the active censure 
that was operative in France at the time would become a tangible part of 
her everyday life when, half a year later, Henri Alleg’s La Question was pub-
lished and almost immediately taken out of circulation, along with Jean-
Paul Sartre’s article, “Une victoire” (published in L’express), in which he 
praised the book.402  
For those living under colonial rule in Algeria, the technics of leak-
ing and censuring went far beyond the manipulation of information. In Al-
geria, people had to live with the insecurity that they might disappear. The 
fact that Berkane himself is arrested during a march that commemorates 
the dead and the disappeared of a protest that took place a year before is a 
fictional testimony to this truth. ‘Disappearances’ were frequent and the 
malicious fact that everybody knew what had happened to those who had 
disappeared, yet no one could say so in public, did not miss its effect. It 
formed the heart of the colonial regime of the times and torture took on an 
important place in it. It is this point that Frantz Fanon makes in his early 
analysis of the use of torture in Algeria. Fanon argues that what the para-
troopers are doing in Algeria ‘fits into a pattern of police domination, of 
systematic racism, of dehumanization rationally pursued.’403 This pattern, he 
argues, can only be maintained if it has actual results. In other words, ‘tor-
ture is inherent in the whole colonialist configuration.’404 This configuration 
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is exerted upon Berkane directly in the scene that follows the dialogue in 
the prison.  
 In this next scene, which can be read as a second step in the expro-
priation of Berkane’s self, he is about to be questioned by the interrogators 
and torturers. The scene is introduced by a pensive older Berkane who, as 
character-bound narrator, is wondering why he feels the need to reflect on 
this moment in his life. The situation he was in at the time is described by 
the older Berkane as a ‘tunnel of hours,’ and a ‘kingdom of fear’ that en-
wraps him in darkness. Here the darkness is both literal and literary. On the 
one hand, it functions literally as a real condition that Berkane was sub-
jected to when in prison. On the other hand, the metaphorical function of 
total darkness and the tunnel of hours express the very physical effect that 
both had on Berkane. The result of it was a disorientation of time and place. 
Consequently, this condition is also operative in the larger technics of ex-
propriation that is set to work in the novel: 
 
Realm of shadows: two days, three days; finally, it’s my 
turn! They have spelled out my name, always in the dark. 
I am relieved: the waiting was becoming convulsive. 
 Three or four interrogators, but I wouldn’t be 
able to tell how many hours have passed each time. De-
nying, denying everything.  
 
Royaume d’ombres : deux jours, trois jours ; enfin, c’est 
mon tour ! On a épelé, toujours dans le noir, mon nom. Je 
suis soulagé : l’attente devenait paroxysme. 
Trois ou quatre interrogatoires, mais je ne saurais 
dire combien d’heures se sont écoulées à chaque fois. 
Nier, tout nier.405   
 
A moment later in the novel the retroversion properly begins as the reader 
receives a full account of the entire procedure of interrogation and the in-
creasing levels of torturing that accompany it. The omission of several days 
in a dark prison, to which Berkane only alludes in passing, inserts into the 
story the tunnel of hours and disorienting effect that Berkane himself ex-
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periences. It is through narrative techniques of ellipsis and summary - and 
so not by postulating a psyche or psychological motives for the ‘paper 
character’ Berkane – that a veritable element of the submission and process 
of undoing is captured in the story. Berkane goes on to narrate that he un-
derwent three or four interrogations, but as his notion of time has already 
been disturbed he is unable to tell how much time past with each of them. 
The sole purpose of the interrogations he undergoes seems to be to pro-
vide the soldiers with a reason to keep him as a detainee. The interrogators 
are looking for a crime, a clear act of sedition or insurgency that they can 
impute to Berkane. In this case, any involvement in the insurgencies and 
protest marches would be enough to convict him. In reality, however, 
young men were taken from the streets at random during the Algerian war. 
This was also known and acknowledged by the French public early on in the 
war, with major newspapers such as Le Monde uncovering the tales of hor-
ror and torture from 1957 onward.406 But Berkane does not cooperate and 
recounts to his interrogators the same, rather simple story over and over 
again: he was not carrying the Algerian flag, he was merely picking it up 
from the street were someone had dropped it; he was not running from the 
police officers that were chasing him, but instead was fleeing from a dog 
that was behind him and so on. Berkane invents a persona for himself: he is 
playing dumb or, as he says in his fable, he is merely a typographer’s ap-
prentice:  
 
To play the idiot, against all logic, in spite of the blows 
and awaiting torture, since I behaved that day as an idiot! 
To persist. Not to budge! I know nothing. I am but a small 
typographer’s apprentice. Seriously; I am serious: my 
mother and my sisters need my work! That must have 
lasted two or three hours. Beneath the blows I can no 
longer feel my face, swollen; my ribs, my skull, painful, 
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but I can still take it: I was brought up the hard way, 
thank you, beloved brother Alaoua! 
 
Malgré les coups, et en attendant la torture, contre toute 
logique, jouer l’idiot, puisque je me suis comporté, ce 
jour-là, en idiot ! S’entêter. Ne pas en démordre ! Je ne 
sais rien. Je ne suis qu’un petit apprenti typographe. Sé-
rieux ; je suis sérieux : ma mère et mes sœurs ont besoin 
de mon travail ! Cela a dû durer deux ou trois heures. 
Sous les coups, je ne sens plus mon visage, tuméfié ; mes 
côtes, mon crâne, douloureux, mais je peux encaisser en-
core : j’ai été élevé à la dure, merci, chère frère Alaoua!407 
 
The persona that Berkane assumes to get through the already very violent 
interrogation, the mask he puts on, is constitutive for the simple, even naïve 
answers he gives to his interrogators; and, vice versa, the simplistic dis-
course he assumes constitutes his persona. Berkane is playing ‘the idiot.’ 
This is but one of the languages that Berkane will interiorize in the course of 
his story. It is in this context that I wish to place his description of the blows 
and beatings he receives to his face. This beating, which takes place during 
the interrogation and forms a sort of antechamber for the real moment of 
torture that still awaits him, concentrates on Berkane’s face, as if it wanted 
to get to the origin of the simple discourse that he is assuming. Here, break-
ing his face might also mean to pierce through the mask or persona that 
Berkane holds up against his interrogators.  
 The interrogators are performing an explicit form of interrogation. 
However, what is most striking is that the questions these men pose to Ber-
kane are never actually narrated in the story. Only the simple answers Ber-
kane gives are narrated, as well as the hits and blows he receives to his face. 
The language used by the interrogators remains absent in the story - even 
though it can be easily inferred from the answers that Berkane gives. The 
clichés that make up an interrogation (or the narrative representation of 
such an interrogation) are not only well known, they are also present in the 
clichéd answers that Berkane provides. Language here becomes a routine. 
And routine questions provoke nothing but routine answers. Nothing takes 
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place here, save for an institutionalized reactionary practice of the state ma-
chine to any kind of insurgency. Moreover, the language the interrogators 
presumably used are not only inferable from Berkane’s answers, but also 
from the routine of the whole process. This is, in turn, a sign that the ques-
tions were not really posed to extract information from Berkane who, being 
a young boy with no real ties to any political party and only allied to the 
Front de Libération Nationale (F.L.N.) by sympathizing with their goal, does 
not carry any valuable information.    
This absence of the questions that were presumably posed during 
the interrogation tells us yet another thing about the disappearance of lan-
guage that takes place in the novel. Consequently, it is also in these mo-
ments that the undoing of Berkane as a person take place. What is happen-
ing here cannot be grasped by saying that language is simply instrumental-
ized. That would not distinguish the experiences by Berkane from any other 
daily conversation in which routine questions and answers figure exten-
sively. The discussion that I have dealt with above between Derrida and 
Scholem on the technics of language has resulted in the conclusion that 
language is always already instrumentalized in part. There is no point in 
time or place where it would be possible to speak a language that is free 
from any instrumentalized or technical practice. The signifying act only oc-
curs in an always already instrumentalized way. In Monolingualism of the 
Other, Derrida has called this situation that of an ‘abiding “alienation” [alié-
nation à demeure].’408 But lest this give the impression that Derrida believes 
that language suffers from some kind of lack, he warns that the alienation 
here is of a constitutive nature – it is something that gives rather than takes 
away. In a paratactic phrase, Derrida adds that, in reality, this alienation is 
‘neither a lack nor alienation.’ By this he means that ‘it lacks nothing that 
precedes or follows it, it alienates no ipseity, no property, and no self that 
has ever been able to present its watchful eye.’409 Language gives us a place 
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in which to live and to reside (in French, demeure), but this place turns out 
to be displaced or out of place. The displacement is not merely an after-
effect, it is not a blow dealt to language only after it has become a space for 
living. Quite the contrary, it is constitutive. Hence, language is that which 
belongs most intimately to oneself, while at the same time carrying with it 
the potential to radically expropriate the self. In Derrida’s analysis, as I have 
mentioned above, language exappropriates: it both appropriates and ex-
propriates, at the same time, what is most proper to us, our ipseity.  
What is at stake, then, in Berkane’s interrogation is not the routine 
as such, but rather the way in which the technics of interrogation grafts it-
self onto the original exappropriation that is inherent to language. It is able 
to do so only because language is that which exappropriates. In other 
words, it is through language that a deconstruction of the self can be per-
formed. This is why I think that language and physical violence are inter-
woven in the interrogation scene of Djebar’s La disparition de la langue fran-
çaise. Read in this light, the routine with which the questions and answers 
are posed and given installs a communication situation in which both could 
be posed to anyone, or no one, in particular. Conversely, the answers are 
perfectly predictable and they, too, could have been given by anyone in the 
same interrogation. By the absence of real conversation, language reveals 
one of its most fearsome capacities; namely, to transport the speaking sub-
ject to a realm in which it performs something totally unfamiliar to its own 
self, while at the same time intimately belonging to the self. In La disparition 
de la langue française, this effect is attained by eclipsing the questions that 
are posed, and rendering just the answers. This rigid routine, whose sole 
function is to install such an impersonal situation, serves in turn as a thresh-
old for administering state violence to an insurgent subject who does not 
respond appropriately to the questions posed. It is from this threshold that 
the interrogators will then switch to physical torture, with the justification 
of not having received the information that the state seeks. Hence, the 
technique that is installed in interrogation here is made possible within a 
political machine that bases itself on what Giorgio Agamben calls ‘the ter-
minal expropriation of language.’410  
Such a terminal expropriation of language not only works as a spe-
cialized technique during interrogation; it is also used in the media. I have 
                                                 
410 Agamben, Means Without Ends, 115. 
 221 
argued that tele-technologies alter the spatio-temporal environment that 
constitutes the political space. On a more concrete level of politics, the al-
teration of the political space through tele-technologies signals the grow-
ing import of news briefings and of controlling the news. This became an 
acute problem throughout the Algerian war. An important manifesto and 
petition was published in 1960, entitled Declaration on the Right to Insubor-
dination in the War in Algeria (The Manifesto of the 121). The manifesto was 
censured by the government so that, instead of publishing it in Les Temps 
Modernes, Sartre published two blank pages as an index to the govern-
ment’s censorship. The manifesto contested the legitimacy of the war in 
Algeria on the basis that it was neither a war waged by the French to pro-
tect the French nation or territory, nor was it a war of conquest. Instead, it 
argued that the war in Algeria had become an autonomous war waged by 
the French military on their own account: 
 
Today, it is principally through the will of the army that 
this criminal and absurd combat is maintained; and this 
army, by the important political role that many of its 
higher representatives have it play — at times acting 
openly and violently outside any form of legality, betray-
ing the ends confided in it by the nation — compromises 
and risks perverting the nation itself by forcing the citi-
zens under its orders to become the accomplices of a se-
ditious and degrading action.411   
 
In the light of such a situation the notion of civic responsibility is put to the 
test. The authors of the manifesto conclude that under the conditions of 
this war civic disobediences, such as refusing to serve as a recruit in the Al-
gerian War, is not longer disobedience, but ‘a sacred obligation.’ Instead, 
they demand that this refusal be justified to help the Algerian people in 
their fight for independence: to refuse to take up arms against them; and to 
support the Algerian people in its attempt to destroy the colonial regime 
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that is imposed upon them. The manifesto was signed by 121 of the fore-
most intellectuals of the times, including Robert Antelme,  Simone de Beau-
voir, Maurice Blanchot, André Breton, Hubert Damisch, Marguerite Duras, 
Louis-René des Fôrets, Claude Lanzmann, Henri Lefebvre, Michel Leiris, 
Maud Mannoni, André Masson, J.-B. Pontalis, Nathalie Sarraute, Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Claude Simon, Jean-Pierre Vernant, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, and many 
more.   
If the interrogators did not succeed in piercing through the mask of 
Berkane’s persona, then the moment of torture does. Something odd hap-
pens when the story takes the expropriation of Berkane one further, final 
step. In La disparition de la langue française, the distinction between torture 
and interrogation is complicated: it is both discrete and continuous. In the 
novel, the interrogators and torturers succeed in getting ‘the best’ out of 
this complex interrelation of torture and interrogation. On the one hand, 
the way Berkane tells the story, it seems as if there is a discrete distinction 
between torture and interrogation. Berkane says that he had no idea how 
long the interrogation lasted before they stopped interrogating and started 
to torture him. On the other hand, the interrogation itself is accompanied 
with a violent ransacking of Berkane’s person, which cannot be described 
by any other word than torture. It seems, then, that Berkane himself makes 
this distinction from his position as a character-bound narrator. However, it 
is clear from what we are told in the novel that the interrogation itself was 
already a form of torture, since the interrogation was clearly not meant to 
extract real information from Berkane. Insofar as it is an excuse for torture, 
the interrogation already belongs to the process of torture. 
It is possible to read the effectiveness of this distinction between 
the moment of interrogation (which already achieves a significant level of 
torture) and the moment of torture as such (which might perhaps be 
termed ‘pure’ or ‘absolute’ torture) as a narratological device for underlin-
ing two seemingly distinct, yet wholly compatible aspects of torture in a 
political regime. In the first place, this clear distinction between the interro-
gation and the (pure) moment of torture underlines the fact that torture 
does not have as its objective the extraction of information from an interro-
gated subject. Torture has a very different function: it is meant to inscribe 
the power of the political regime upon the body of an insurgent subject. 
Torture, in other words, is used by the political regime that governs Algeria 
to reaffirm its hegemonic position. This aspect of torture is analyzed at 
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length by Elaine Scarry in The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the 
World.412 Scarry argues that pain destroys language, and hence the subject 
or self. It is for this reason that the use of torture can be such an effective 
political strategy. According to Scarry, torture undoes the world and undoes 
the language of the one subjected to it. This process of undoing opens the 
possibility of reconstituting the tortured subject in the state machine. In 
other words, once the subject has been rid of language, once it has been 
destroyed as a subject, it then becomes possible for the political power to 
be inscribed onto the tortured subject. These two effects of torture intersect 
neatly here. The destruction of the self, understood as the effect of the de-
struction of language in pain, could be called an expropriation of the self. In 
the case of torture, such a destruction of the self is immediately political. It 
also shows how pain is a politically effective mechanism exactly because it is 
related to the operations of language (albeit in a negative way). Subse-
quently, an appropriation can take place, a moment in which the subject is 
reconstituted by the political machine. In other words, the political machine 
inaugurates an ongoing process of exappropriation to which all political 
subjects are subjected through language. This is what happens with Ber-
kane. It also highlights the fact that torture is a political strategy that inti-
mately belongs to the political machine and its military apparatus. As Frantz 
Fanon wrote during the war, ‘Torture in Algeria is not an accident, or an er-
ror, or a fault. Colonialism cannot be understood without the possibility of 
torturing, of violating, or of massacring.’413 The concept of exappropriation 
makes it possible to analyze the difficult interlacement between the de-
struction of self and world in torture, analyzed by Scarry, and the constitu-
tion of the material inscription of the power of the political regime through 
the infliction of pain. They cut into one another, and thereby gain in force 
and become effective. 
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5. Conclusion: Exappropriation by the State Machine versus Hospitality   
 
Throughout this chapter I have analyzed how exappropriation is an act of 
displacement: it both constitutes (placing) and deconstructs (displaces) the 
self or subject. Such an exappropriation works through language, but be-
cause language is plugged into the political state machine, the effects of 
exappropriation are political. The political efficacy of language, I have ar-
gued, is related to the position of language in between technics and ma-
chine. Language sets up an economy in which it is used in relation to ele-
ments such as interrogation, torture, subjugation. This is possible because 
the economy of language is not solely related to the meaning that lan-
guage harbors. As the discussion between Scholem and Derrida makes 
clear, there is always already an originary technicity in language. 
An insurgent subject, like Berkane in La disparition de la langue fran-
çaise, is placed and displaced by means of an ongoing process of exappro-
priation, turning it into a subjugated subject that no longer forms a threat 
to the state. In an entirely successful version of this subjugation, the subject 
that was Berkane would be completely expropriated. The fact that Berkane 
disappears altogether points in this direction. However, exappropriation 
denotes a certain ambiguity: the double move of appropriation and expro-
priation that takes place is not that easily controlled by any agency, includ-
ing the state. Thus, it might occur that exappropriation can be used as a 
device against the state’s attempt to subjugate the subject. In other words, 
the originary displacement of exappropriation – which, in his response to 
Scholem, Derrida refers to as the originary technicity of language – might 
be used as a counter-strategy. In that case, exappropriation would not be 
seen exclusively as a way for the state machine to subjugate an insurgent 
subject through the use of language and torture (the case of Berkane). In-
stead, exappropriation would also form a positive strategy for the foreigner 
or the insurgent subject to destabilize the state machine. 
The extent to which such a displacement the state machine would 
have political effects remains to be seen. A first problem with this kind of 
exappropriation would be to delineate where it begins and where it ends. 
To put it differently, such an exappropriation could destabilize the borders 
of the state, by its displacement of margin and center, but only if the ambi-
guity between margin and center gets resolved. Giving expression to the 
ambiguity of the distinction between center and margin, Vietnamese writer 
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and filmmaker Trinh Minh-Ha argues that ‘without a certain work of dis-
placement […] the margins can easily recomfort the center in its goodwill 
and liberalism.’414 The work of displacement that Minh-Ha advocates is one 
that not only marginalizes the center and centers the margin; it is also a 
work that starts from the acknowledgement that the political place (the 
place of the political) is being restructured. It is this work of displacement, 
together with the inevitable ambiguity that it involves and the continual 
risk of expropriation, that I want to make speak in Derrida’s neologism 
exappropriation, where at the same time something is placed and displaced. 
The political stakes of this displacement are brought to the fore in Minh-
Ha’s reflection on the risk of taking the margins for granted. She asks: 
 
How possible is it to undertake a process of decentraliza-
tion without being made aware of the margins within the 
center and the center within the margin? Without encoun-
tering marginalization from both the ruling center and 
the established margin? Wherever she goes she is asked 
to show her identity papers. What side does she speak 
for? Where does she belong (politically, economically)? 
Where does she place her loyalty (sexually, ethnically, 
professionally)? Should she be met at the center, where 
they invite her in with much display, it is often only to be 
reminded that she holds the permanent status of a “for-
eign worker,” a ”migrant,” or a ”temporary sojourner” – a 
status whose definable location is necessary to the main-
tenance of a central power.415 
 
The persona staged by Minh-Ha reports on an operation of power that con-
sist in placing and localizing the stranger who comes in. Even though this 
persona is invited in with much display, it is an invitation that does not 
come without reciprocity and obligation. The stranger is invited in and thus 
begins to take part in a pact that requires the stranger to be identifiable, 
localizable and accountable at any time. In order to obtain information from 
                                                 
414 Trinh T. Minh-Ha, When the Moon Waxes Red: Representation, Gender, 
and Cultural Politics (New York and London: Routledge 1991), 17. 
415 Minh-Ha, When the Moon Waxes Red, 18. 
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and about the stranger who is coming in, tele-technology such as scanners, 
monitoring equipment, and the internet is used by the state. This is a 
techno-political attempt to master a territory over which power is exercised 
and into which strangers are invited. But the same tele-technologies are 
also increasingly destabilizing the territory that the state tries to master. 
There is placement and displacement at the same time, in the same move-
ment. This is the process of exappropriation. 
In his essay on hospitality Derrida tries to counter the exappropria-
tion of the state machine by introducing a different kind of hospitality, ab-
solute hospitality. The situation depicted by Minh-Ha is analyzed by Derrida 
as restricted hospitality, a hospitality that commences not by letting the 
stranger come in, but by asking her name, her profession, and her loyalties. 
This is to place the stranger, to give her a definable location necessitated by 
the maintenance and exertion of power. Such a restricted hospitality is in-
stalled by the state and intimately belongs to the state and its modes of 
power. It is not necessary to be a foreigner to the state, since the same thing 
happens with Berkane during the Algerian war. It is a contract that gives the 
state the ability to force strangers ‘to be subjects in law, to be questioned 
and liable, to have crimes imputed to them, to be held responsible, to be 
equipped with nameable identities, and proper names.”416 The risk of pos-
ing at the margins lies in the fact that it allows the restricted hospitality to 
clearly define and stabilize the stranger (as someone at the margins who is 
temporarily sojourning in the center); that is to say, it expropriates the 
stranger. Better a displacement of power itself, a displacement that is op-
erative in an analysis and critique of the endeavor to control and define 
both margin and center. This would be the work of displacement in the po-
litical. I would argue that such a work would focus on delineating the ma-
chinic functioning of the state and the role exappropriation plays in it. In an 
earlier chapter, I showed how the consolidation of the territory is a con-
stituent element of the modern political machine. Thus, if recent tele-
technologies are now destabilizing the territory, then this opens an oppor-
tunity to re-examine and possibly destabilize this modern political machine.  
Such a destabilization would work along the lines of hospitality; 
that is to say, it would look how and where the territorial state is being de-
                                                 
416 Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality, transl. R. Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press 2000), 23. 
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structured. This implies an examination of restricted hospitality. Starting out 
from hospitality it would criticize the restrictions that are imposed on it. 
Thus, it becomes possible to grasp the paradox at work in the law of hospi-
tality that forces it to pervert itself in its exertion. Although restricted hospi-
tality is set in place by the state as a power mechanism, to draw the stranger 
into the politico-judicial apparatus, the notion of hospitality itself constantly 
appeals to us to transgress the restrictions that are imposed upon it by the 
state.417 This is why Derrida puts restricted hospitality, as a state-imposed 
contract, in contact with another form of hospitality that breaks with the 
pact that the state tries to impose on the stranger. This he calls uncondi-
tional hospitality. It is a hospitality that breaks with restricted hospitality in 
that it does not attempt to use hospitality as a way of stabilizing the desta-
                                                 
417 In her article, “Making Sense of Derrida’s Aporetic Hospitality,” O. 
Custer analyzes the imminent aporia of hospitality primarily on the basis 
of her attendance at Derrida’s seminar in Paris (of which parts were later 
reprinted in Of Hospitality). Custer stresses the fact that Derrida time and 
again appealed to ‘intuitive terms’ to explain the inherent aporia that is 
weaved into the laws of hospitality. Although in my account I principally 
focus on the fact that real hospitality requires that one transgresses the 
laws of hospitality, Derrida also stresses that a total and unconditional 
hospitality would not be a real hospitality either. If I can rely on Custer’s 
account of Derrida’s seminar, the main focus for this problem was that of 
the guest entering a household, again used as an intuitive example or 
figuration to explain the ‘other side’ of the aporia of hospitality. Custer 
explains: ‘To put it again into intuitive terms (in his seminar Derrida 
appealed a lot to them time and again), if there are no limits, if I really say 
to a guest “make this your home,” do I not cease to be a host? If there are 
no limits then the roles of host and guest can no longer be assigned in a 
way which we consider necessary to speak of a scene of hospitality.’ O. 
Custer, “Making Sense of Derrida’s Aporetic Hospitality,” in Z. Direk & L. 
Lawlor (eds.) Jacques Derrida: Critical Assessments of Leading 
Philosophers, Vol. III (London & New York: Routledge 2002), 203. I do not 
address this particular question of hospitality because it is not likely to 
occur; it remains confined to a purely hypothetical situation which has no 
relevance for me, being interested in a more concrete literary and political 
use of the concept. 
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bilized territory of the state, or to gain control over it. Consequently, un-
conditional hospitality does not ask the questions that are posed by re-
stricted hospitality: it requires more than just allowing the stranger to enter 
under certain conditions and after having answered a series of questions. 
For Derrida, unconditional hospitality demands 
 
that I open up my home and that I give not only to the 
foreigner (provided with a family name, with the social 
status of being a foreigner, etc.), but to the absolute, un-
known, anonymous other, and that I give place to them, 
that I let them come, that I let them arrive, and take place 
in the place I offer them, without asking of them either 
reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names.418  
 
In this passage, Derrida distinguishes between the foreigner, or stranger, 
and the absolute other, and accordingly he distinguishes between re-
stricted hospitality and unconditional hospitality. The foreigner, or stranger, 
is given a restricted hospitality as soon as his name and origin are known to 
the state. The absolute other receives another kind of hospitality, without 
questions being asked. The unconditional hospitality that the absolute 
other receives subverts the state’s restricted hospitality. It is this paradoxical 
relation between restricted hospitality and unconditional hospitality that 
clarifies what is at stake in exappropriation. Somewhat counter-intuitively, 
perhaps, at least from a Derridean perspective, I propose that exappropria-
tion be interpreted as a de(con)struction of the other as a political category, 
both as stranger and as absolute other. Only the paradoxical contamination 
of these two forms of hospitality, restricted and unconditional, avails this 
deconstruction. While the deconstruction of the stranger alone would be a 
negative activity, because always at risk of being an expropriation of the 
stranger by state power, the deconstruction of the absolute other that is 
introduced with unconditional hospitality could serve as an appropriation 
of the stranger, salvaging it from the subjecting power of the state. How-
ever, since appropriation by the stranger and expropriation by the state 
cannot be distinguished and held apart, and since restricted and absolute 
hospitality are interlaced in the paradoxical law of hospitality, what occurs 
                                                 
418 Derrida, Of Hospitality, 25. 
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here is neither an expropriation of the stranger by the state’s restricted 
hospitality, nor an appropriation and rescue of the absolute other through 
unconditional hospitality. Instead, there is an exappropriation of the other 
as a risky political category. This exappropriation functions as a deconstruc-
tion of the other as a political category, and in the very same movement it 
opens up the realm of the political (at least on a conceptual level). The po-
litical realm, or our conceptualization of it (but in that case, I would argue, 
our conceptualization has effects on politics itself), is no longer guided by 
the distinction between self and other, nor is it a reduction of everything to 
the same. 
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Dit proefschrift stelt zich ten doel om, uitgaande van de theorie van de de-
constructie die de afgelopen 40 jaar door de Franse filosoof Jacques Derrida 
werd ontwikkeld, een breder begrip van techniek (technics) te ontwikkelen 
dat in staat is om zinvolle analyses te maken van de interrelatie tussen lite-
ratuur en politiek. Bij het ontwikkelen van een begrip van techniek tracht ik 
dit begrip op een abstracter niveau te denken dan doorgaans het geval is. 
Techniek wordt niet begrepen als een technologisch object of een techno-
logische functie. Veeleer wordt het begrip techniek in deze studie op een 
abstracte wijze gedefinieerd als de mogelijkheid van verschillende, vaak erg 
heterogene elementen om met elkaar een relatie aan te gaan, met elkaar in 
verbintenis te treden. Aan de hand van het begrip techniek tracht deze stu-
die te onderzoeken op welke wijze heterogene elementen kunnen samen-
komen en op welke wijze ze op die manier een nieuwe operatieve constel-
latie vormen. Techniek is de interrelatie die ontstaat tussen verschillende 
dingen en op die manier het vormen van nieuwe constellaties mogelijk 
maakt. Vanuit deze abstracte definitie heeft het begrip techniek niet enkel 
implicaties voor de wijze waarop er (in de filosofie, in de literaire en culture-
le theorie, en in de politiek) over technologie wordt gedacht; het begrip 
heeft ook implicaties op de wijze waarop er over taal gedacht kan worden. 
In deze studie wordt geargumenteerd dat taal, en in het bijzonder de taal 
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die in de literatuur wordt gebruikt, een exemplarische rol speelt wanneer 
we een inzicht willen krijgen in wat techniek is.  
De belangrijkste begrippen die aan deze studie ten grondslag lig-
gen en de literaire analyses ervan bepalen worden geïntroduceerd in de 
inleiding en het eerste hoofdstuk. In de inleiding van de studie worden de 
voornaamste kenmerken van techniek onderzocht, zoals de oorsprong er-
van, de ontologische positie ervan, en de werking van techniek. Aan het 
begrip techniek moet een emergente oorsprong toegekend worden. Dat 
wil zeggen dat er niet één centraal beginpunt kan aangeduid worden waar 
we kunnen spreken van techniek. Integendeel, omdat techniek begrepen 
wordt als de mogelijkheid van verschillende heterogene elementen om met 
elkaar in interactie te treden om zo nieuwe constellaties te creëren kan er 
pas werkelijk van techniek gesproken worden wanneer verschillende dingen 
samenkomen. Om die reden is er niet één oorsprong van techniek, maar 
vele, en deze oorsprong is niet gericht op eenheid maar op multipliciteit. 
Het verschil (de differentie of différance) is daarbij een essentieel onderdeel 
van techniek; techniek is datgene wat, als de mogelijkheid tot het aangaan 
van een interrelatie, het mogelijk maakt dat er een verschil behouden kan 
blijven in het samenwerken van verschillende elementen. Teruggaand op 
het werk van Jacques Derrida en Gilles Deleuze spreek ik in dit verband van 
een economie van krachten (forces) die aan het werk is in techniek, die de 
werking van techniek beheerst en als zodanig ook kenmerkt. In de inleiding 
en in het eerste hoofdstuk van mijn proefschrift wordt het begrip kracht 
aan een theoretische analyse onderworpen. Kracht wordt daarbij gedefini-
eerd als datgene wat één bepaald element ertoe in staat stelt om een in-
vloed uit te oefen op een ander element. In techniek is er altijd een spel van 
krachten aan het werk tussen verschillende (politieke, literaire elementen). 
Hoe dit idee meer praktisch begrepen kan worden wordt onderzocht in het 
derde hoofdstuk, waar de relatie tussen kracht, geweld, en fictie een be-
langrijke rol speelt. 
 Naast het begrip techniek speelt het begrip machine een centrale 
rol bij dit onderzoek naar de interrelatie van literatuur, politiek, en techniek. 
Een machine wordt eveneens begrepen op een abstracte manier. Er ont-
staat een machine wanneer de economie van krachten die door de techniek 
in gang wordt gezet begint te consolideren, wanneer de circulatie van 
krachten in een calculeerbare, stabiele functie gegoten kan worden. Een 
machine is precies deze vastgelegde circulatie. 
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 In deze studie worden de begrippen van techniek en machine uit-
gediept aan de hand van een lezing van literatuur en aan de hand van een 
studie die tracht na te gaan hoe literatuur en politiek steeds in een weder-
zijdse relatie met elkaar staan. Het ontstaan van deze relatie tussen litera-
tuur en politiek wordt toegedragen aan techniek. Nadat in de inleiding een 
eerste conceptuele uiteenzetting is gegeven van de belangrijkste begrip-
pen die een rol spelen in dit boek (techniek, economie, kracht, taal, politiek, 
en machine) en de theoretische ankerpunten zijn aangegeven, tracht dit 
werk in vier hoofdstukken steeds één bepaald facet van het begrip techniek 
in relatie tot literatuur en politiek uit te diepen. In het eerste hoofdstuk 
wordt de relatie tussen politiek, literatuur en techniek uitgediept aan de 
hand van een analyse van de roman Zwerm. Geschiedenis van de Wereld van 
Peter Verhelst. In dit hoofdstuk wordt ook het begrip van machine voor het 
eerst uitgewerkt. De vraag die hier als uitgangspunt dient is: wat markeert 
de overgang van techniek naar machine? Het antwoord dat hierop gegeven 
wordt is: terwijl techniek begrepen kan worden als een vrije circulatie van 
de krachten die in een losse economie op elkaar inwerken, is de machine 
datgene wat ervoor zorgt dat deze circulatie van krachten een georgani-
seerde, veel minder flexibele structuur krijgt die beheersbaar, calculeerbaar 
en manipuleerbaar is. Een machine is dan ook niet zozeer een concrete 
technologie; veeleer is het een organiserend principe dat uitgaat van de 
circulatie van krachten in techniek. In Zwerm van Peter Verhelst zien we hoe 
er op literair, politiek, en metafysisch niveau steeds gestreefd wordt naar 
het calculeerbaar maken van een reeks evenementen, hoe er getracht 
wordt om controle te krijgen op de samenkomst van heterogene elemen-
ten. We zien echter ook hoe dit proces steeds faalt. In mijn analyse van Ver-
helsts roman tracht ik aan te tonen hoe, aan de hand van literaire technie-
ken, het mogelijk wordt om een zekere systematiek te geven aan een eve-
nement, waardoor de heterogene samenloop van elementen calculeerbaar 
wordt. Tegelijkertijd, en bij nader inzien, moet duidelijk worden dat de sys-
tematiek die de literaire representatie verleent aan een evenement, zichzelf 
meteen weer teniet doet. De samenloop van heterogene elementen blijft 
daardoor heterogeen en onunificeerbaar. Aan de hand van deze dubbele 
lezing wordt duidelijk dat literatuur zelf een machine is dat het functione-
ren van een (metafysische of politieke) machine en haar streven naar een-
heid en berekenbaarheid inzichtelijk maakt maar tegelijkertijd voortdurend 
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verstoord en onderuit haalt. Literatuur functioneert met andere woorden 
als een politiek en metafysische relevante dispersiemachine. 
In het tweede hoofdstuk wordt het begrip moderne machine geïn-
troduceerd. Terwijl het eerste hoofdstuk inhoud gaf aan de begrippen poli-
tieke machine en metafysische machine wordt nu geargumenteerd dat de 
moderne machine zich kenmerkt door een neiging om het politieke en me-
tafysische project op elkaar af te stemmen. De moderne politieke machine 
heeft zowel op politiek als op metafysisch vlak de neiging om ernaar te 
streven een afgesloten geheel te worden. Tegelijkertijd vertoont de moder-
ne machine zowel in haar politieke als in haar metafysische variant een es-
chatologische neiging, een streven naar een einde waarin de moderne ma-
chine zichzelf zou opheffen. De neiging om een afgesloten geheel te vor-
men en de neiging om tot een eind te komen zijn de twee bepalende ten-
densen van de moderne machine. Aan het slot van dit hoofdstuk worden 
de politieke tendensen van de moderne machine samengenomen met de 
specifiek moderne karakteristieken ervan. Het begrip moderne politieke 
machine wordt zodoende geïntroduceerd. 
 Het derde hoofdstuk gaat de conceptuele ontwikkeling van de 
moderne politieke machine na. De moderne politieke machine lijkt twee 
kenmerken te hebben: ten eerste creëert het een staat aan de hand van wat 
in dit boek als een proces van territorialisering beschreven wordt, en ten 
tweede ontwikkelt de moderne politieke machine een discours van legiti-
miteit dat ertoe dient de sociale en politieke territorialisering van de staat te 
rechtvaardigen. Echter, het argument in het derde hoofdstuk is dat om deze 
twee kenmerken te kunnen begrijpen een derde kenmerk van de moderne 
politieke machine aandacht verdient. Dit derde element is de nadruk die de 
moderne politieke machine legt op de uitvoerende functies van het politie-
ke apparaat. De moderne politiek kenmerkt zich door de ontwikkeling van 
een politioneel apparaat, een militair apparaat, en een juridisch apparaat. 
Dit zijn allen uitvoerende functies; maar tegelijkertijd liggen ze allen binnen 
het domein van de politieke staat. De wending naar uitvoerende functies 
die desalniettemin politiek zijn is wat een machine bij uitstek definieert als 
machine. De politieke moderniteit staat in die zin gelijk aan het machine-
worden van de politiek. 
 In het vierde hoofdstuk staat literatuur weer centraal via een lezing 
van de roman La disparition de la langue française van de Frans-Algerijnse 
schrijfster Assia Djebar. Aan de hand van een analyse van deze roman wordt 
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de relatie tussen taal en techniek, die bij de inleiding ook al aan bod kwam, 
verder uitgediept. De protagonist van La disparition de la langue française is 
Berkane, die na een jarenlange afwezigheid terugkeert naar zijn geboorte-
land Algerije. Dit is voor hem aanleiding om een soort van dagboek bij te 
houden waarin hij zijn gevoelens en herinnering uit zijn jeugd in Algerije 
tijdens de jaren vijftig van de vorige eeuw beschrijft. Tijdens zijn tienertijd, 
aan het eind van de Algerijnse oorlog, participeerde Berkane in de betogin-
gen voor een onafhankelijk Algerije. In mijn lezing van Djebar’s roman ar-
gumenteer ik dat dit verzet tegen het heersende politieke regime een cen-
trale rol speelt in Berkanes zelfbeleving. Om dit aan te tonen moet er geke-
ken worden naar de centrale passage in de roman: het moment waarop 
Berkane tijdens een betoging opgepakt wordt, gevangengezet, onder-
vraagd en gemarteld wordt. In deze passage is te zien hoe militaire technie-
ken in elkaar weven met politionele technieken. De wijze waarop dat ge-
beurt is via taal, via het gebruik van taal. Deze interrelatie van taal en mate-
riële marteling heeft een essentiële impact op Berkane, die tijdens de ro-
man langzaam maar zeker zijn taal verliest en uiteindelijk ook zichzelf. 
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